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Abstract 
The ‘Southern Fire’ is an ethno-religious conflict in the southernmost 
region of Thailand that has claimed thousands of innocent lives since an 
upsurge in violence in 2004. Although it does not catch the world’s attention 
as much as other conflict cases in the same region, daily violent incidents 
are ongoing for more than a decade. The violence in the south has multiple 
causes including historical concerns, economic marginalisation, political 
and social issues, religious and cultural differences, educational opportunity 
inequities, and judicial discrimination.  
According to a framework for conflict resolution, for Thailand’s case, 
the state’s policy alone could not resolve the conflict as it focused mainly on 
implementing a ‘peacekeeping’ strategy by increasing the number of 
security forces and pursuing a ‘peacemaking’ strategy via peace talks. 
However, to create lasting peace in this region, civil society actors need to 
be involved in a ‘peacebuilding’ strategy in order to keep the balance of 
socio-economic structures and prevent violence from happening again. 
More than a hundred civil society groups are involved in attempting to build 
peace in the southernmost provinces. Since the resurgence of violence, 
some civil society groups have accumulated their experiences and played 
significant roles in the area. These groups have become a strong network 
which could reduce the tensions in this region.  
The research aims to promote the civil society sector as a tool of a 
non-violent approach; to study the role of the civil society sector in building 
peace in the southernmost provinces; and to strengthen civil society groups 
attempting to find a solution to the insurgent problem. This research used 
the qualitative method employing in-depth interviews and documentary 
research. The data was collected through person-to-person interviews with 
representatives of twenty-nine civil society groups. This research examines 
the role of the civil society sector in building peace in southern region; the 
efficacy of civil society groups; the problems of civil society groups active in 
the south; and puts forward recommendations on how to improve the work 
of the civil society groups. 
iv 
One of the main findings was that bridge-builder, academic and relief 
worker are the most significant roles civil society groups play. The efficacy 
of the civil society sector in peacebuilding in the deep south shows that it 
has the potential to grow. It has a number of strong internal factors and 
many external opportunities that can increase capabilities and help the 
groups to perform better. There are, however, four important problems 
including human resources, time management, influence from funding 
sources, and political and safety issues, which can have a serious impact 
on the civil society sector. The three key recommendations that can help to 
enhance the performance of civil society groups are building trust in the 
communities, understanding the needs of the locals, and working with a 
clear strategy. 
This research concludes that the civil society sector plays various 
roles in attempting to create peace in this region. Together with other actors, 
the civil society sector can be an important part of the effort to reduce the 
violence and can play a major role in building sustainable peace in southern 
Thailand when the violence eventually stops.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 The violence in southern Thailand1 is one of the most prolonged 
ethno-religious conflicts in Southeast Asia. Although the conflict in southern 
Thailand does not catch the world’s attention as much as other cases in the 
region, almost every day innocent persons have been killed since the 
upsurge in the insurgency in 2004. It has proved difficult to find a win-win 
solution between conflicting parties.  
The conflict, called the ‘Southern Fire’ in Thailand, has claimed 
almost 4,000 lives in over a decade. The violent situation seems to be 
continuing and an end to the conflict is not being reached. Both state and 
non-state actors have played important roles in attempting to resolve the 
conflict with civil society actors seen as necessary to any resolution. As a 
civilian living in southern Thailand, the researcher realised that the civil 
society sector, which is formed by the local people and outsiders who are 
keen to see peace in the country, could make some positive changes in 
these areas.  
In fact, it was agreed by the worldwide academics’ network in general 
that civil society can play an important role in reducing violence and building 
peace in some conflict cases. However, the concept of the civil society 
sector is still new in Thai society and has different perspectives from 
Western ones.  
After exploring some relevant thesis and research works in Thailand, 
it was found that the topic about the southern conflict is one of the most 
popular research topics among university students and scholars. These 
topics can be classified into various fields such as religion (e.g. role of 
Muslim leaders in the southern violence), education (the development of 
                                            
1 Southern Thailand comprises of 14 provinces. The violent incidents happen mostly in the 
three southern border provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and in four districts of 
Songkhla. 
2 
teachers’ skills in these southernmost provinces), political science (e.g. 
public opinion on the autonomy model in the southern border provinces), 
culture and customs (e.g. ways of life of Buddhists in Muslim communities 
in the deep south), and public health (e.g. mental health of teenagers in this 
conflict area).2  
An article from the Deep South Watch website3 tried to survey and 
classify all civil society groups working on the southern violence issue in 
order to build a database of civil society sectors involved with the southern 
conflict resolution. Interestingly, the article found that quite a large number 
of civil society groups were active in the south; approximately 300 groups. 
There have been some attempts to classify civil society groups but none of 
them has analysed their roles or evaluated their performances. After reading 
much academic research about how civil society is involved in conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding in many other parts of the world, the 
researcher wanted to find out more about how Thai civil society operates 
and in what ways they too could help with reducing violence and building 
peace in Thailand.  
This thesis is important because the civil society sector is the largest 
sphere in the society which has a high potential to make changes in the 
community. Nevertheless, the civil society sector needs to be developed in 
the right direction. This thesis is designed to study and analyse the role of 
civil society groups attempting to build peace in the southernmost provinces 
of Thailand. After estimating the status of civil society groups in each 
category, the ultimate goal is to improve the civil society sector to be able 
to work on peacebuilding activities more efficiently. Eventually, the 
researcher hopes that this thesis can somehow contribute to the solution to 
the southern conflict and bring peace to the region. 
This chapter begins with the purposes of the thesis and the research 
questions. Following on from this, an overview of the conflict including facts 
about Thailand, history of the region, the new round of violence and the 
                                            
2 Thai National Research Repository, Website. http://www.tnrr.in.th/rir/index.php?page 
=search&topic=keyword&search_input=สามจงัหวดัชายแดนภาคใต้ (accessed 18 June 2014). 
3 Deep South Watch, “Civil Society and Peace Process (Vol. 3): The Database of CSOs 
in the Deep South,” http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/3203 (accessed 28 May 2012) 
[in Thai]. 
3 
development of the violence are discussed. Next, a brief overview of the 
concept of civil society in building peace is also introduced. The chapter 
concludes with an outline of the thesis structure. 
 
1.2 Purpose of the Thesis  
The purpose of the thesis is threefold: first, to promote the civil 
society sector as a tool of a non-violent approach which could help create a 
sustained peace in these provinces; secondly, to study the role of the civil 
society sector in building peace in the southernmost provinces; and thirdly, 
to strengthen civil society groups attempting to find solutions to the 
insurgent problem in this region. 
 
1.3 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
Research questions  
In keeping with the purposes of this thesis, the research questions 
are as follows: 
1) What is the role of the civil society sector in building peace in the 
ethno-religious conflict in southern Thailand? 
2) How efficient are civil society groups in attempting to build peace 
in the region? 
3) What are the problems for civil society groups active in the south? 
4) What are the recommendations to improve the civil society groups 
to work more efficiently? 
Research hypothesis  
As it has been agreed by peacebuilding scholars that the civil society 
sector should be included in the conflict resolution in southern Thailand 
there is no doubt that civil society groups have tried to get involved, the 
questions arise as to which roles and how successful they are.  
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the civil society sector can play 
a significant role in building peace in the ethno-religious conflict in southern 
Thailand. 
 
4 
1.4 Introduction to the Conflict 
Before seeking suitable solutions to the conflict, the background to 
and the history of the conflict should be clearly understood. This section 
aims to introduce facts about Thailand, the history of the region, and an 
overview of the new round of the violence in order to begin to address the 
research questions. However, more details concerning the conflict will be 
considered in Chapter 4. 
1.4.1 Facts about Thailand 
The Kingdom of Thailand was formerly known as Siam. Thailand is 
one of eleven countries in the Southeast Asian region. It is the only country 
in Southeast Asia that has never been colonised. Thailand is a Buddhist-
majority country with a strong central government functioning as a 
constitutional monarchy. King Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX) has reigned 
since 9 June 1946, making him the world's longest-serving current head of 
state and the longest-reigning monarch in Thai history. The king is officially 
titled Head of State, the Head of the Armed Forces, an Upholder of the 
Buddhist religion, and the Defender of all Faiths.  
Thailand is bordered to the north by Myanmar and Laos, to the east 
by Laos and Cambodia, to the south by Malaysia, and to the west by the 
Andaman Sea and southern Myanmar. Its maritime boundaries include 
Vietnam in the Gulf of Thailand to the southeast and Indonesia and India in 
the Andaman Sea to the southwest. 
In 2013, Thailand’s population was approximately 66 million. The 
majority of the population is Theravada Buddhism where 93.4% of the 
population are Buddhist, 5.2% are Muslim and 1.4% are Christian and 
others.4 Geographically, the Muslim population is concentrated in southern 
Thailand; particularly in the provinces of Pattani,5 Yala, Narathiwat and four 
districts (Chana, Sabayoi, Thepa and Natawee) of Songkhla province. 
Approximately 75% of the population is ethnically Thai; 14% is of Chinese 
                                            
4 National Statistical Office, Ministry of Information and Communication Technology, 
Statistical Yearbook Thailand 2013 (Bangkok: Statistical Forecasting Bureau, 2013), 15. 
5 Pattani may be written as Patani (with one ‘t’). This is the Malay spelling used to refer to 
the past Malay Sultanate and Kingdom of Patani. In this research, Pattani was used as it 
is a transliteration for the Thai word. 
5 
origin; and 3% is ethnically Malay: the rest belong to minority groups 
including Mons, Khmers and other tribes. The country's official language is 
Thai.6  
1.4.2 History of the Region 
In the past, the area containing the three southernmost provinces of 
Thailand was called ‘Langkasuka’ which had a long relationship with Siam. 
Pattani was geographically important as it was located between the East 
and the West, so it became a major maritime trade route. Pattani’s culture 
flourished, especially the Hindu and Buddhist cultures. The influence of 
Islam came into this region later and became the religion that bound the 
ethnic Malays to the region. Pattani’s status as a colony of Ayutthaya, and 
the prosperity derived from being a centre of trade and religion, were the 
major factors which made it seek separation from Ayutthaya.  
Generally, the history of Thailand can be divided into four eras, 
namely: Sukhothai (1238-1438), Ayutthaya (1350-1767), Thonburi (1768-
1782) and Rattanakosin (1782-present). For the purposes of this thesis, the 
history of relations between Siam and the southern area will be presented 
by dividing it into four periods including Sukhothai Era, Ayutthaya Era, 
Thonburi Era and Rattankosin Era (King Rama I-V), and Rattanakosin Era 
(King Rama VI-present). 
1) Sukhothai Era 
Sukhothai was the first kingdom of Siam existing from 1238 until 
1438. From 1200, the Monthon7 of Nakhon Si Thammarat ruled all twelve 
southern outposts from Kor Kod Kra8 to Kedah, which was included in 
Pattani (Langkasuka). In 1281, Nakhon Si Thammarat combined with the 
Sukhothai Kingdom. From that time, the twelve outposts were part of the 
Sukhothai Kingdom. In 1365, Langkasuka came under two powerful 
kingdoms: Siam in the north and Majapahit in the south. After the Majapahit 
Kingdom collapsed, Pattani became autonomous and was ruled by Rajas. 
                                            
6 ConstitutionNet, Constitutional History of Thailand, http://www.constitutionnet.org/ 
country/constitutional-history-thailand (accessed 31 August 2011). 
7 The term ‘Monthon’ was used as a country subdivision of Siam or ‘Outpost’ in the past. 
8 Kor Kod Kra is the narrowest part of the Malay peninsular. 
6 
Pattani became a maritime trade centre which was famous among 
merchants.9  
In 1438, Sukhothai became part of Ayutthaya. Some of the outposts 
which were under Sukhothai became autonomous, while Pattani and other 
outposts were claimed as part of Ayutthaya.10 
According to Thomas D. Fraser, the relationship between Siam and 
Pattani during the Sukhothai Era meant that Pattani was Siam’s tributary. 
Later on, Malacca became very powerful and prosperous and, as a result of 
that, Pattani was included as part of Malacca. Until 1511, Malacca was ruled 
by Portugal. After that, Pattani came under Siam again in the Ayutthaya 
Era.11 
2) Ayutthaya Era 
Ayutthaya was a Siamese Kingdom that existed from 1350 to 1767. 
The status of Pattani was as a colony of Ayutthaya. Although Pattani was 
located far to the south of Ayutthaya, it was necessary to keep Pattani for 
strategic reasons because of its unique location and its prosperity from 
being a popular maritime trade route. Pattani was allowed to maintain its 
way of life, laws, culture and religion. As Ayutthaya’s colony, Pattani 
promised to pay a tribute12 every three years, and also had to provide 
additional manpower, weapons and food to Ayutthaya during time of war. 
The relationship between Pattani and Ayutthaya had been good until conflict 
between Siam and Burma erupted in 1548.13 The Sultan of Pattani led some 
troops to reinforce Ayutthaya, but then decided to invade Ayutthaya instead. 
After that, the relationship between them depended on the strength of their 
rulers.14 The prosperity derived from being a centre of trade and religion 
was the major factor that led Pattani to try and separate itself from 
Ayutthaya. Moreover, civilians in Pattani did not accept the King of Siam 
and resisted officials assigned by Siam. Also, Pattani invaded some 
                                            
9 Klongchai Hattha, Langkasuka Kingdom: History of Southern Border People  
(Bangkok: Prince of Songkla University, 2009), 98. [in Thai]. 
10 Ibid., 99. 
11 Ibid., 105. 
12 The tribute that Pattani had to give to Ayutthaya was gold and silver flowers. 
13 Asia’s World, Website, http://www.thailandsworld.com/th/thailand-history/central-
thailand-history/kingdom-ayutthaya-burmese-wars/index.cfm (accessed 22 December 
2014). 
14 Klongchai, Langkasuka Kingdom, 106. 
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outposts in the south such as Patthalung, Nakhon Si Thammarat and 
Songkhla.15 
3) Thonburi Era and Rattanakosin Era (King Rama I-V) 
Rattanakosin was the fourth Thai Kingdom and it succeeded the 
Thonburi Era (1767-1782). Thonburi was the capital of Siam for a short time 
during the reign of King Taksin the Great, after the capital Ayutthaya was 
ruined by the Burmese. King Rama I of the Chakri Dynasty who founded 
Rattanakosin moved the capital to Bangkok on the other side of the Chao 
Phraya River in 1782.16 
King Rama I appointed the Monthon of Nakhon Si Thammarat to rule 
Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu while Pattani was under the Monthon of 
Songkhla. In 1785, Pattani failed to pay the tribute that was due to Siam. In 
response, King Rama I sent a naval force to attack Pattani which resulted 
in a high death toll among its people. Eventually, Siam forced Pattani to 
surrender.17 
During the reign of King Rama III, Siam decided to return power to 
the Sultan of Kedah as the British wanted to trade with Kedah. Siam wanted 
to keep a good relationship with Britain in order to be protected from the 
prospect of a French invasion. In 1892, during the reign of King Rama V, a 
significant change occurred with the modernisation of the Siamese nation-
state. Siam undertook major administrative reforms through the 
centralisation of power and tax reform based on new Finance Ministry 
regulations and the Sultanate system in the south was dissolved. One 
consequence of the reforms was conflict between the central authorities and 
regional leaders over the loss of vested interests and prestige on the part of 
the local leaders.18 
In 1902, Pattani, Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Perlis were 
announced as a ‘Monthon’ of Siam and were called ‘Monthon Pattani’. This 
centralised administration policy was strongly rejected by the Sultan of 
                                            
15 Ibid., 110 
16 Thailanddaddy, Thonburi Kingdom 1767-1782, http://www.thailanddaddy.com/thonburi 
_ kingdom.html (accessed 3 October 2011). 
17 Klongchai, Langkasuka Kingdom, 117. 
18 National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), Overcoming Violence through the Power of 
Reconciliation, Report, 16 May 2006, 35. 
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Pattani, Tengku Abdul Kadir who was then detained in Bangkok and 
released in 1905.19  As Britain tried to increase its role, especially with 
respect to the economy and trade, in the northern Malay states, Siam was 
afraid that the British would incite the sultans to rebel against Siam. This 
centralised administrative restructuring was a turning point in Siam’s 
administration and was as a result of British and French colonisation.  
In 1906, Siam revamped the public administration again by dissolving 
seven outposts: Pattani, Nong Chik, Yaring, Raman, Yala, Saiburi and Ra-
ngae, which were created by King Rama I,20 into four outposts including 
Pattani, Yala, Kedah and Narathiwat.  
The Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 was signed between the British 
and Siam during the reign of King Rama V.21 The agreement in effect 
divided the northern Malay states into two. The state of Greater Pattani, as 
it was known then, remained under Siam’s rule, while Siam surrendered its 
claims to sovereignty over Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Terengganu to the 
British. This decision was planned by the British in order to keep Siam as a 
friendly neighbour, utilising their adjacent position as a buffer between the 
British Malay states and French Indochina. 
4) Rattanakosin Era (King Rama VI-present) 
Between 1910-1922 (King Rama VI), resistance and rebellion in the 
deep south erupted many times. As a result of the centralisation policy of 
King Rama V, in 1916 ‘Muang’ (city) was changed to ‘Changwat’ (province). 
During that time, Monthon Pattani included the provinces of Pattani, Yala, 
Saiburi and Narathiwat. Then, in 1931, Saiburi province was degraded to a 
district of Pattani province. Later, in 1933, Monthon Pattani was dissolved 
and only the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat have remained 
under the Ministry of the Interior since then.22  
During the reign of King Rama VII, Thailand became a democracy 
with national elections providing more channels for Muslims to participate in 
political activities. Unfortunately, the democracy in Thailand was not ideal 
                                            
19 Klongchai, Langkasuka Kingdom, 121. 
20 National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), Overcoming, 35. 
21 Jeff Upward, Insurgency in Southern Thailand: The Cause of Conflict and the 
Perception of Threat (Victoria: University of Ballarat, 2006), 5. 
22 Klongchai, Langkasuka Kingdom, 122. 
9 
as power fell into the hands of various military governments including the 
one under Field Marshal Phibulsongkhram. In 1939, Phibulsongkhram’s 
government introduced the ‘Thai Ratthaniyom’ (Thai Customs Decree),23 
which forced all Thai citizens, including minority groups, to conform to a set 
of common cultural norms. Muslims were prevented from adopting Muslim 
names or using the Malay dialect and men and women were forbidden to 
wear traditional Malay-Muslim dress in public. The ‘Shari’ah’24 was replaced 
by Thai Buddhist laws of marriage and inheritance. 
As a consequence, in 1948 Muslim elites in Narathiwat formed the 
first resistance movement against the central Thai authority. This was 
known as the ‘Dusun Nyur Rebellion’ and was led by Haji Sulong bin Abdul 
Kadir who was presumed to have been killed by the police in 1954.25 Since 
then, the struggle of Malay-Muslims has developed into various movements. 
There were more than 60 militant groups operating in the south in the 1960s 
and 1970s; some political, some criminal, some a mixture. Violent incidents 
reached a peak in the mid-1970s, but by the mid-1980s the violence had 
decreased. It was mostly caused by overhauling the government strategy in 
handling the situation. Key initiatives included the establishment in 1981 of 
the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) to enhance 
consultation with, and reduce prejudice among, local Malay people and 
state officials in the deep south, and also the establishment of the Civilian-
Police-Military Task Force 43 (CPM 43) to coordinate the security forces in 
the region. 
1.4.3 The Resurgence of Violence in 2004  
In 2001, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was widely criticised for 
his mishandling of the situation because of his hardline approach. The 
                                            
23 Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya and Sabrina Chua, Conflict and Terrorism in 
Southern Thailand (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005), 4. 
24 Shari’ah is the body of Islamic religious law. The term means "way" or "path to the 
water source." It is the legal framework within which the public and private aspects of life 
are regulated for those living in a legal system based on the Islamic principles of 
jurisprudence and for Muslims living outside the region. Shari’ah law deals with many 
aspects of day-to-day life, including politics, economics, banking, business, contracts, 
family, sexuality, hygiene, and social issues. Source: Theological Dictionary, “Sharia,” 
http://tdwotd.blogspot.com/2010/03 /sharia.html (accessed 22 January 2012). 
25 Surachart Bamroongsook, Insurgency in Southern Thailand (Bangkok: Square Prince 
93, 2008), b. [in Thai]. 
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dismantling of the long-established SBPAC and CPM 43 in 2004, plus the 
transfer of internal security responsibilities in the south to the police, seen 
by Thai people as generally heavier-handed than the army, all contributed 
to the rise in the insurgency. The first sign of a return to violence occurred 
after nine separate bomb incidents in the southern border provinces in June 
2001. The level of unrest gathered pace during the subsequent two years. 
Eventually, in 2004, there was a sudden upsurge of violence in the 
provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat. Three major violent incidents 
occurred in 2004 and saw the beginning of a new round of violence.  
The first major incident, in January, was the army camp raid in Cho 
Airong, Narathiwat. The second event was on 27 April which involved 
several attacks on police posts and army checkpoints across Pattani, Yala 
and Songkhla and ended in a bloody incident inside the Krue Se Mosque, 
Pattani, when the Thai army gunned down 32 men. By the end of the day, 
105 militants, one civilian and five members of the security forces were 
dead. The last tragic incident was on 25 October when approximately 1,500 
Malay-Muslims gathered outside the Tak Bai police station, Narathiwat to 
protest the arrest of six Malay-Muslims who the protestors claimed were 
innocent. Around 1,300 protestors were stacked in trucks up to five or six 
layers deep with their hands tied and taken to the Inkayuth Army Base in 
Pattani. Almost eighty protestors were dead of asphyxiation when the trucks 
arrived at the army camp.26 
1.4.4 An Overview of Developments in the Violence 
Incidents of unrest in the south from January 2004 to the end of 2013, 
of which there were a total of 15,713 (an average 4.31 incidents per day), 
resulted in approximately 3,705 deaths27 and 9,076 injuries. The top three 
                                            
26 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad,” Asia Report no. 
98 (18 May 2005): 29. 
27 Isra News Agency has reported the death toll monthly since 2004. From 2004 to the 
end of 2013, the widely publicised death toll was approximately more than 5,000. 
However, in January 2014, the Southern Border Provinces Police Operation Center 
investigated and reclassified the data by removing the cases which were not related to 
the national security and the new death toll was reduced to 3,705. Source: Isra News 
Agency, “Ten Years of Southern Fire,” http://www.isranews.org/south-news/scoop/ 
item/26320-tenyears.html (accessed 15 March 2014) [in Thai]. 
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violent incidents were caused by shootings, bombings and arson attacks, 
respectively.28 
From 2004, the level of violence in the deep south has clearly 
escalated. In 2004, there were 1,154 incidents; in 2005, 2,078; in 2006, 
1,934 incidents and in 2007, 2,475 incidents. After 2007, however, incidents 
of unrest showed a significant decline. In 2008 and 2009, there were 
approximately 1,300 incidents each year. In 2010 to 2011, the violent 
incidents dropped slightly before increasing to 1,465 incidents in 2012. The 
insurgency entered a new phase when official peace talks between 
representatives of the Thai government - the National Security Council 
(NSC) and the main militant organisation - Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) 
were announced on the 28 February 2013. Despite the talks, the unrest 
appears to be increasing again, as there were approximately 1,639 
incidents in 2013 which is the fourth highest in a decade.29  
 
Figure 1.1 - The Violent Incidents in Southern Thailand from 2004 to 2013 
Source: Adapted from Isra News Agency, http://www.isranews.org/south-news/stat-
history/item/26389-10subjects.html (accessed 4 March 2014). 
 
The insurgency in the south has been ongoing for ten years involving 
seven governments, six prime ministers30 and a coup d’état. The violence 
can be divided into four phases. Phase One, from 2004 to mid-2007, saw a 
sudden upsurge in violence. A rapid escalating wave of attacks led to a 
higher number of deaths and injuries and the severity of the incidents 
                                            
28 Isra News Agency, “Ten Data Categories: Ten-year Southern Fire Anniversary,” 7 
January 2014, http://www.isranews.org/south-news/stat-history/item/26389-
10subjects.html (accessed 4 March 2014) [in Thai]. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Thaksin Shinawatra served as prime minister for two terms from 2001 to 2006. 
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increased. The violence at the time was of high frequency and intensity, 
particularly after the 2006 coup d’état. 
In Phase Two, between July 2007 and 2010, the situation started to 
change because of tactical adjustments by the state and the increased 
presence of military troops in these provinces after the dramatic escalation 
of violence between 2006 and early 2007. Furthermore, the Thai military 
had a clearer idea about the insurgents’ strategy known as ‘people's war’.31 
It was believed that because of the military strategy, all kinds of insurgent 
attacks dropped sharply as the militant groups struggled to adapt and then 
slowly rebuild.  
In Phase Three, from 2011 to 2012, the statistics for deaths and 
injuries were quite stable. This period was marked by the clear emergence 
of a more tightly organised and increasingly professionalised guerrilla 
movement. Incident numbers, however, did not rise considerably.  
Phase Four, from 2013 to present, is impacted on by two new factors 
which are demanding major tactical changes on both sides. First, is the 
influence of the peace talks between the Thai government and the BRN. 
The second is the growing government counter-insurgency measures and 
especially intelligence operations. The result is that in 2013, the number of 
casualties of military, police and militant warriors became higher than that 
of civilians who used to be the main targets for the insurgents.32 
 
1.5 Why is Civil Society Important to the Conflict? 
 The government has put a lot of effort, manpower and money into 
trying to stop the violent situation in the deep south which has been ongoing 
for over a decade. Unfortunately, the solution for the conflict remains difficult 
to find. However, civil society’s involvement and public participation are the 
options which have become more active and important in southern 
                                            
31 The basic concept of People's War is to maintain the support of the population and 
draw the enemy deep into the interior where the population will bleed them dry through a 
mix of mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. Source: Srisompob Jitpiromsri, “Sixth Year of 
the Southern Fire: Dynamics of Insurgency and Formation of the New Imagined 
Violence,” Deep South Watch (DSW) 3-6, http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file_archive. 
32 Anthony Davis, Thai Insurgency Enters New Phase, http://www.atimes.com/atimes 
/Southeast_Asia/SEA-01-231013.html (accessed 4 March 2014). 
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Thailand. This section will give a brief introduction to the concept of civil 
society and a more in-depth analysis will be given in later chapters.  
1.5.1 What is Civil Society? 
This question is still a complicated one to find an explicit answer to 
as the concept of civil society remains unclear, complex and difficult to 
define. The diversity of meanings, interpretations and schools of thought 
has influenced theoretical debates and empirical research.33 
Civil society organisations are the “wide array of non-governmental 
and not-for-profit organisations that have a presence in public life, 
expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on 
ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic 
considerations”. 34  The term can be defined into a broad range of 
organisations such as NGOs, community groups, women’s associations, 
youth groups, labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organisations, 
foundations, faith-based organisations, independent media, professional 
associations, think tanks, educational institutes and social movements. 
More concepts of civil society will be analysed in Chapter 2. 
1.5.2 Civil Society in the South 
 An overview of civil society in Thailand, described fully in Chapter 7, 
will be useful for a better understanding of the concept of the civil society 
sector in Thailand and also the groups which are active in the conflict area. 
The civil society sector in the southernmost region has created a new 
and important space between the Thai state, the insurgents and the local 
communities. Civil society organisations including for example, academics, 
students, lawyers, journalists, conflict victims and former detainees have 
been active in initiating and mobilising various activities. The purposes of 
these civil society groups are diverse, but they mainly aim to help victims of 
the violence. 
                                            
33 World Bank, Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Potential, Limitations and Critical Factors, 
Report no. 36445-GLB Social Development Department, Sustainable Development 
Network, (20 December 2006), 2. 
34 The World Bank Social Development Department, Website, http://worldbank.org/ 
participation cited in ibid. 
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 The size of the civil society sector in the southern border provinces 
has enlarged quickly since the new round of the violence. Various forms of 
civil society can be found in this region such as working groups, networks, 
NGOs and institutes. This diversity has made it difficult to classify civil 
society groups involved in the southern conflict. However, in Chapter 8 the 
categories of civil society used for this research will be described. 
1.5.3 Role of Civil Society in the Conflict  
It has been widely agreed that civil society has the potential to play 
an important and effective role in building peace during all stages of conflict. 
The civil society sector has contributed often positively to the reduction of 
violence, the negotiation of settlements, and the facilitation of peace in post-
conflict circumstance.35 This idea will be proved in Chapter 5 which presents 
the role of civil society in five conflict areas in South and Southeast Asia. 
In numerous cases of violent conflicts, local people and civil society 
groups in conflict areas show that they can be more than victims and 
observers. The role of civil society in peacebuilding has gained increased 
recognition in the last decade. Chapter 6 will present more topics to analyse 
the importance of the role of civil society in building a peace process. Some 
of the questions that will need to be asked would be, for example, how to 
develop the potential of civil society, what are the roles of various actors in 
the civil society sector, what are critical factors and pre-conditions for their 
efficacy, and how can external actors best provide support?36  
 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
 This thesis consists of ten chapters which are divided into four parts. 
The details are as follows: 
Part One: Theories, Framework and Methodology  
 There are three chapters in this first part which are an introduction, 
theoretical and literature reviews, and research methodology.  
                                            
35 Thania Paffenholz, “Summary of Results for a Comparative Research Project: Civil 
Society & Peacebuilding,” CCDP Working Paper no. 4 (The Centre on Conflict, 
Development and Peacebuilding, 2009), 6. 
36 World Bank, Civil Society, v. 
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Chapter 1 has introduced the purpose of the thesis as well as the 
research questions and the hypothesis. It also describes the background to 
the violence in southern Thailand and the brief concept of civil society. 
Chapter 2 outlines the main theoretical perspectives and is divided 
into three sections. First, the concepts of civil society which provides its 
theories, definitions, characteristics, positions, categorising and a typology 
of its actors. Secondly, perspectives on ethnic conflict including its 
definitions and relevant terms, a typology of ethnic groups, the types of 
ethnic conflict and levels of analysis. Thirdly, the links between civil society 
and ethnic conflict which covers four topics: civil society and conflict 
management, civil society and peace negotiations, the role of civil society 
in conflict areas and models of ethnic conflict resolution. A conceptual 
framework for this research is also created in this chapter.  
The research methodology for the fieldwork is described in Chapter 
3 and includes the research design, sources of data, details of the research 
samples, the methods for data collection, and tools for data analysis (i.e. 
grounded theory, mind map and the SWOT Analysis). Also, the limitations 
and recommendations for future fieldwork are included in this chapter. 
Part Two: Ethno-religious Conflicts  
 This part includes two chapters which study cases of violent conflict 
and insurgencies. Chapter 4 examines the nature of ethno-religious conflict 
in the deep south of Thailand including the background to the conflict; the 
significant incidents relating to the conflict from the beginning of the 
resistance movement to the new round of violence in 2004; an introduction 
to the ten major militant groups; an overview of the government’s policies 
relating to the conflict; key state agencies in the south; and the three laws 
issued during the conflict. 
Chapter 5 explores the dynamic of violent situations in South and 
Southeast Asia by presenting an overview and the nature of ethno-religious 
conflict in this region. It also explores the five cases of ethno-religious 
conflicts and the roles of civil society. There are: India (the Assam conflict), 
Sri Lanka (the Eelam War), the Philippines (the conflict in Mindanao), 
Indonesia (Aceh) and Myanmar (the Hill Tribe conflict).  
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Part Three: Civil Society and Peace Process 
Part Three focuses on the relations between civil society and 
peacebuilding and also presents an introduction to civil society in Thailand. 
Most importantly, the roles of civil society used for this research analysis 
are classified in this part. 
Chapter 6 describes the concept of peacebuilding and the role of civil 
society in the peace process including the origins, definitions, theoretical 
approaches, dimensions, and phases of peacebuilding. The next topic is 
peace building in action which describes its actors, levels of leadership, its 
approaches and its relations with the dynamics of conflict. Moreover, this 
chapter analyses the importance of civil society to peacebuilding. The roles 
of civil society in peacebuilding are eventually classified into eight 
categories in this chapter. 
The overview of civil society in Thailand is presented in Chapter 7 
which begins with the emergence of civil society in Thailand and then the 
specific characteristics (i.e. its position in Thai society, its formalising and its 
categorisation) of Thailand’s civil society which are examined from its 
historical and cultural circumstances. The factors which challenge and 
promote the civil society sector in Thai society are also analysed in this 
chapter. Those factors have affected the formation and development of civil 
society in Thailand.  
Part Four: Research Findings, Analysis and Conclusion 
 This final part consists of the findings and analysis. After combining 
all knowledge from the preceding chapters, this part will answer the main 
research questions and provide the conclusion of the thesis. 
Chapter 8 provides the details of respondents, interview questions, 
and an overview together with the characteristics of the civil society groups 
involved in building peace in the south. Also, this chapter presents the data 
from the fieldwork in Thailand which were collected from in-depth interviews 
of civil society groups involved in building peace in the conflict area. The 
findings are presented according to the eleven categories of civil society 
organisations. 
The findings from the interviews, documentary evidence and the 
researcher’s experience were analysed by selected research tools in 
17 
Chapter 9. It begins with the analysis of stages of the conflict and the types 
of actors. This chapter aims to answer the main research questions, so it 
includes roles of civil society, its efficacy, the difficulties, and 
recommendations to improve civil society’s performance. Finally, the 
chapter ends by looking at the future of civil society in the south which 
includes the trend of civil society’s work, positive trends, new issues and the 
people’s expectations of civil society in the future. 
Chapter 10 is the conclusion of the thesis. This final chapter 
summarises the key components including the nature of the conflict; 
theoretical review and methodology; and the main findings including the role 
of the civil society, its efficacy, the difficulties it faces, how to improve it and 
other findings. The chapter ends with recommendations for further study. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 This chapter analyses the theories and definitions of civil society and 
ethnic conflict from Western and Thai perspectives. Civil society is a diverse 
term which has various meanings according to, for example, the histories, 
theories, origins and circumstances of a state. Ethnic conflict is also 
categorised into various types. This chapter also explores the works of 
some scholars which have examined the contributions of civil society to 
resolving ethnic conflict. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to describe the two core elements 
of this thesis which are civil society and ethnic conflict as well as their 
relationship. Therefore, this chapter is divided into three main sections: the 
concepts of civil society, perspectives on ethnic conflict and the links 
between civil society and ethnic conflict. Finally, the conceptual framework 
of this thesis is also established from theories and literature reviews. 
 
2.2 The Concepts of Civil Society 
The first section is an overview of civil society which includes 
Western and Thai theories of civil society, the characteristics of civil society, 
the position of civil society in the community, the different categories of the 
concept of civil society, and a typology of civil society’s actors. This will help 
to clarify the complex nature of civil society which will be analysed further in 
the later chapters such as the role of civil society in South and Southeast 
Asian countries (Chapter 5); the relationship between civil society and the 
peacebuilding process (Chapter 6); and civil society in Thailand and its role 
in building peace in the deep south (Chapter 7-9). 
2.2.1 Theories and Concepts of Civil Society 
There is no commonly agreed definition of the term civil society 
beyond the basic idea of civil society being an arena of voluntary, non-
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coerced collective action around shared interests, purposes, and values.37 
The term civil society appears to operate within blurred boundaries. There 
have been, however, attempts to determine the definitions of civil society in 
different ways. The idea of civil society emerged from western states and 
expanded to Thailand using different perspectives. 
 Western Theories  
Over two thousand years ago, scholars argued about ideas involving 
communal life in the state. Three important philosophers in the classical 
period, including Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, expressed views concerning 
an early concept of civil society. Socrates advocated that issues be resolved 
by public argument until they achieved a reasoning that could not be refuted. 
Plato’s ideal state was rule by philosopher-kings, who made decisions 
based solely on the common good. According to Aristotle, the best state is 
a polity which is ruled by the middle class.38 
In general, civil society was central to the work of some of the most 
important political thinkers from the 17th century onwards. Some of them 
distinguished between the state and civil society; that is, an organised 
society over which the state rules. The distinctive importance of civil society 
as a concept originates with the state of nature theorists, especially Hobbes 
and Locke. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) believed that people live in a 
society of all against all who are competing for scarce resources. This led 
people to seek a new basis for society predicated upon civic virtues. A state 
must be created under the consent of the people to safeguard the peace 
and to secure the rights of all citizens.39 Civil society, then, is the framework 
within which those without political authority live their lives: this includes 
economic relationships, family and kinship structures, and religious 
institutions. Therefore, it is considered a purely analytic concept because 
“civil society does not exist independently of political authority, nor vice 
                                            
37 Thania Paffenholz, ed., Civil Society & Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment 
(Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 2010), 3. 
38 Rory O’Brien, Philosophical History of the Idea of Civil Society, February 1999, 
www.web.net/robrin/papers/civhist.html. (accessed 16 June 2011). 
39 Ibid. 
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versa, and it is generally believed that neither could long continue without 
the other; therefore, no clear boundary can be drawn between the two”.40 
For Western scholars, civil society concerns the balance of power 
between state and civil society. John Locke (1632-1704), saw civil society 
as a protector of individual rights and property from the potential abuses and 
arbitrariness of state power.41 Locke stressed that civil society should be 
understood as a body in its own right, separate from the state.42  
Similarly, Charles de Montesquieu (1689-1755) argued for a balance 
between state authority and civic associations. 43  His model of the 
separation of powers distinguished between political society and civil 
society. Montesquieu, however, presented a far less sharp contrast 
between the two spheres.44 
G.W Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) raised civil society to an entirely 
new level, and the theme of his enlightenment work was radically extended 
and modified. Hegel included economic society within civil society, but he 
also set down legal frameworks for public authority, corporations, 
bureaucracies, state assemblies and public opinion. Hegel’s civil society 
included economic relations, but it also included other organisational and 
legal forms.45 Hegel viewed civil society as a position between the spheres 
of family and state. Civil society thus comprised a huge variety of actors, 
including the market economy, social classes, corporations, intellectuals 
and civil servants. In Hegel’s view, civil society actors are not always in 
harmony, but rather are in conflict. Therefore, civil society must be 
controlled by a strong state that is supposed to act in the common interest 
of the population.46 
                                            
40 David Robertson, A Dictionary of Modern Politics (London & New York: Europa 
Publication, 2002), 75.  
41 Martina Fischer, Civil Society in Conflict Transformation: Ambivalence, Potentials and 
Challenges. (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, October 
2006), 21. 
42 Paffenholz, Civil Society & Peacebuilding, 4. 
43 Fischer, Civil Society, 21. 
44 Paffenholz, Civil Society & Peacebuilding, 4. 
45 Wayne Hudson, “Problematizing European Theories of Civil Society,” in Civil Society in 
Asia, eds. David C. Schak and Wayne Hudson (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 
2003), 11. 
46 Paffenholz, Civil Society & Peacebuilding, 4. 
22 
Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) advocated self-government and 
civic participation as a means for counteracting power abuses by the state 
and/or other social majorities. 47  He placed an emphasis on the role of 
independent associations within civil society and saw associations as 
schools where democratic thinking could be learned by citizens with the aim 
of protecting and defending individual rights against potentially authoritarian 
and tyrannical regimes within society. Ultimately, these associations should 
be built on voluntary participation at all levels (local, regional and national). 
 Marx’s approach was very different. For Karl Marx (1818-1883), civil 
society is a development to meet the needs of the ‘bourgeoisie’. Marx 
reduced civil society to economic relations and theorised it as a temporally 
and historically specific sphere; the contradictions of which could not be 
internally resolved or reconciled at the level of the state. Instead, civil society 
required transformation through a revolution.48  He viewed civil society as 
the structural base while the state belonged to the superstructure that 
ensured capitalist domination by force.49 
Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) was one of the most important Marxist 
thinkers in the 20th century. The state was not to be understood in the narrow 
sense of government; instead, Gramsci divided it between ‘political society’, 
which is the arena of political institutions and legal constitutional control, and 
‘civil society’, commonly seen as the ‘private’ or ‘non-state’ sphere, 
differentiated from both political society and the economy. He stressed, 
however, that the division was purely conceptual and that the two, in reality, 
often overlap.50 In contrast to Marxist theory, Gramsci saw civil society as 
part of the superstructure in addition to the state, but with a different 
function: the state served as the arena of force and coercion for capitalist 
domination, and civil society served as the field though which values and 
meanings were established, debated, and contested.51 For Gramsci, the 
complex nature of modern civil society meant that a ‘war of position’, could 
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be carried out by revolutionaries through political agitation, trade unions, 
advancing proletarian culture, and other ways of creating opposition to civil 
society necessary alongside a ‘war of manoeuvre’- a direct revolution- in 
order to have a successful revolution without the danger of a counter-
revolution or degeneration.52 
Jurgen Habermas (1929-) focused on the role that civil society should 
play within the communication process in the public sphere. According to 
his understanding, the state needs an articulation of interests in the public 
space to put different concerns on the political agenda. Political 
representatives, however, need to obtain informed public opinion beyond 
the established power structure. 53  Reaching democratic opinions and 
decisions through political parties, associations and parliaments demands 
an exchange with “informal public opinions”. These can only be formed in 
the context of a politicised public sphere that develops independently of the 
power structures of the state.54 Therefore, the ability to organise within civil 
society is needed particularly by marginalised groups as a means to 
articulate their interests. 55  According to Habermas’ idea, civil society 
excludes state institutions, political parties, as well as economic interest 
groups and the business community. The core of civil society is formed by 
spontaneous associations, organisations and social movements that 
articulate social problems and grievances to a political public. 56 
Consequently, some scholars, like Merkel and Lauth, proposed a more 
realistic concept of civil society, defined as a sphere of action beyond the 
state that consists “of a variety of plural organisations and associations 
which have been founded on a voluntary basis, and who articulate their 
particular material and normative interests and organise autonomously. 
These are located in the space between the private sphere and the state”.57 
Today, civil society is commonly described as “a sphere of voluntary 
collective activity encompassing shared interests, purpose, and values of 
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civility. This sphere is furthermore distinguished from state, market, and 
family institutions. These boundaries are, however, blurred, complex and 
negotiated in reality as civil society covers a wide range of spaces, actors 
and institutional forms”.58 Some of the functions of civil society that Beverly 
Woodward noted are: to create a sphere of autonomous social activity, to 
campaign and agitate on behalf of political and social objectives, to provide 
a counterweight to governmental power, and to oppose the illegitimate 
exercise of governmental power.59 
Additionally, Merkel and Lauth distinguished “a political sphere (i.e. 
state administration, political parties and parliaments), an economic sphere 
(i.e. business and companies) and private sphere, defining civil society as 
the space where all these overlap”.60 They suggested that civil society is 
“the space in between” social actors who can be related to other specific 
sectors, but also act in civil society.61 
Finally, since the growth of civil society has been one of the most 
important issues in international development, a definition of civil society by 
the World Bank has been added. This is because it is an international 
organisation which has interacted with state development and civil society 
since the 1970s. 62  Civil society organisations (CSOs) refers “to non-
governmental and not-for-profit organisations that have a presence in public 
life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based 
on ethnic, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic 
considerations. This includes a wide of array of organisations: community 
groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), labour unions, 
indigenous groups, charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, 
professional associations, and foundations”.63 
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 Thai Concepts 
Civil society in the West has been well developed and it has led to 
changing relations of power between the state and people. The state has 
less influence on people in Western states while the Thai state has an 
almost absolute power on ruling the country.64 Consequently, Thai scholars 
have some different points of view concerning civil society. 
Civil society is a new social concept for Thai people.  The concept of 
civil society in Thailand was first introduced in 1981 by Surapong 
Chaiyanam who derived his ideas from Gramsci. Although civil society can 
be transcribed into various Thai words, ‘Prachasangkom’ is an accepted 
general term. Until the early 1980s, civil society had not interested Thai 
scholars because the society was controlled by the state and social 
structures were different from the West in the 18th century.65  
As Thai civil society structures are still in their infancy, various parties 
have different ideas and understandings of it. There is, thus, diversity in its 
activities or operations. Although Western civil society emphasises the 
strength of citizens and the public sector, the Thai version of a civil society 
could not ignore the state. Rather, it seeks to find ways to work with the 
state. Furthermore, the joint venture between civil society and the state may 
be important to measure good governance, a concept which is constantly 
addressed in Thailand today.66 The meaning of civil society in Thailand is 
different from the Western one which stresses concepts which are opposite 
to the state. The following are the concepts of civil society from well-known 
Thai scholars. 
The first definition is from Chaianan Samutwanit who is a former 
Professor of Political Science at two leading universities in Thailand. He was 
one of the key drafters of the 1997 Constitution of Thailand. According to 
Chaianan, civil society means every sector of society, including the state 
and people working together in partnership. His idea focuses on a ‘civic 
movement’ where various groups use activities and functions as a centre, 
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without political establishment. This strategy is called Area-Function-
Participation (AFP) which emphasises the participation process in hosting 
activities. This cooperation is participated in by every partnership from sub-
areas (i.e. provinces, districts, or villages).67 This makes civil society from 
his view different from the Western concept where the state is separated 
from civil society.  
Similar to Chaianan, Chuchai Suppawong viewed civil society as a 
gathering of civic groups including government, business organisations or 
citizen sectors. They cooperate with one another in order to resolve crises 
or complicated problems within their community partnerships. Additionally, 
the civic sector works together largely in an atmosphere of harmony and 
unity.68 
In contrast, Paiboon Wattanasiritham gave meaning to civil society 
as any part of society which excludes the state.69 Civil society does not 
depend on any laws, like the state, or expect any profit, like business 
sectors. He viewed civil society as a society where people are involved in 
managing routine matters via organisations, through systems, processes 
and various activities held in citizen sectors.70  
Thirayuth Boonmi is one of the country’s foremost social thinkers. He 
was a freedom fighter and a prominent student leader in the October 14, 
1973 uprising. He argued that to solve the basic problems in Thai society, 
the third power, or civil society sector, must be involved. A strong society in 
his view focuses on diffusing powers which should cover every class, variety 
of career, income levels and all regions across the country.71  
Anek Laothamatas is a Thai political scientist. Civil society in his view 
encompasses all people and levels in society and focuses on the following 
issues: unity, the middle class, public participation, public commitment and 
citizenship awareness. As most Thai people believe they are clients or 
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followers, to have a good and peaceful community there needs to be good 
rulers. This mindset results in people lacking citizenship awareness.72  
Kasian Tejapira viewed civil society as an institution beyond the 
state, but includes the private sector (economic units and markets), 
institutions (schools, temples and families) and social movements. If these 
groups are not the state, then they are counted as a part of the civil society 
sector.73 
The last influential Thai social critic worth mentioning is Prawase 
Wasi, who commands much respect from activists and bureaucrats alike. 
He had an important role in setting up several development agencies, which 
are today major domestic funders for Thai NGOs. He pointed out that Thai 
society was imbalanced because only two sectors, that is, the state and 
private organisations, were strong while the civil society sector was weak. 
To maintain balance of the whole society, citizens and communities needed 
strengthening. He proposed the idea of civil society as a way to solve 
problems caused by the state.74 
 Definition Used in this Research  
As the term civil society has been used in various ways for diverse 
purposes, the definition of civil society used in this research should be 
clarified.  
This research categorises civil society as non-profit voluntary groups 
working for the same purpose and interest. The groups may be formed by 
members who have the same motherlands, cultural beliefs, religious 
affiliations, and occupations. The groups could be initiated and then 
supported by local people, the state, and private sectors. Due to Thailand’s 
circumstances, it is difficult for a civil society to be created entirely by the 
citizen sector, without having the government involved. This is why this 
research has included some civil society groups which are part of state 
agencies or supported by the government and business sector.  
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2.2.2 The Characteristics of Civil Society 
 After exploring the various definitions of civil society from both 
Western and Thai perspectives, it can be seen that these definitions lead to 
some common characteristics which can be considered and developed to 
strengthen the civil society sector.75 They are: 
1) Diversity 
Diversity is an important characteristic because diverse community 
relations create a suitable environment for learning and developing. 
Diversity can be classified into two types. First, structural diversity means a 
variety of groups gathered around a region (e.g. province, district, village, 
school or business groups), level of membership (e.g. club, organisation, 
association, foundation or committee) and characteristics of members (e.g. 
gender, age, nationality, religion, education, career or status). Secondly, 
diversity of content means various groups’ activities and skills (e.g. 
publication, research or development), and different interests/problems 
(e.g. politics, environment or agriculture).76 
2) Community 
A definition of community in the civil society sphere is broader. It 
covers not only small communities in rural settlements, but also urban 
areas, middle-class involvement, and business and academic networks. 
Members in communities connect to one another through a genuine desire 
to make things better, common interests and/or benefits.77  
3) Public Consciousness 
Public consciousness is an essential factor which strengthens the 
civil society sector. In fact, there are various groups in Thai society, such as 
self-interested groups, public-interest groups, pressure groups and 
volunteer groups, who operate but are not strong enough to make changes 
to the society. This is because the state is the main actor for most matters 
in Thai society making it necessary to develop citizenship awareness and 
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public consciousness in order to support civil society so it can play a greater 
role in the community.78 
4) Continuous Activities 
A variety of group members alone is not enough if they cannot 
coordinate activities together. In today’s dynamic society, it is important for 
civil relations to have a learning society with continuous activities also a vital 
factor in building strong communities. Society needs a modern tool to 
support learning in communities such as ‘interactive learning through action’ 
which helps and develops the continuity of activities.79 
5) Communications and Networks 
To have a strong and sustained civil society, efficient management, 
communication strategies and network facilities are necessary factors. 
Ideally, civil society is strengthened by bringing small diverse groups 
together and turning them into strong networks.80 
2.2.3 The Position of Civil Society  
 It is also important to clarify where civil society is placed in the 
community. According to civil society concepts and theories put forward by 
various scholars, the civil society sector has been positioned differently and 
plays diverse roles according to political and cultural norms. Understanding 
this will help in analysing civil society in Thailand in Chapter 7. 
The first concept which was mentioned by Paffenholz considered civil 
society as a separate sector consisting of a variety of mainly voluntary 
organisations that have different objectives, interests and ideologies. Civil 
society is seen as different from the political, the business, as well as the 
private sectors as it is a non-state actor that is not purely driven by private 
or economic interests. Therefore, the civil society sphere is formally and 
legally independent from the spheres of the state, economy and family. 
However, the civil society sector interacts closely with these other sectors, 
especially the state/political sector, as civil society makes political demands 
toward the state agencies (see figure 2.1).81 Although civil society interacts 
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with these sectors, it does not replace these actors, but rather aims to 
improve their effectiveness and responsiveness.82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 - Civil Society as a Sector 
Source: Thania Paffenholz, ed., Civil Society & Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment 
(Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 2010), 7. 
  
 Some of the research agreed that specific actors in general 
contributed to specific sector areas, but occasionally can also act as civil 
society. This concept characterises civil society as the space between the 
sectors. Therefore, civil society is the public realm between state, economy 
and family sectors (see figure 2.2).83 
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Figure 2.2 - Civil Society as an Intermediate Sphere  
Source: Thania Paffenholz, ed., Civil Society & Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment 
(Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 2010), 7. 
  
 According to the World Alliance for Citizen Participation, civil society 
can be defined as “the sphere of institutions, organisations and individuals 
located between the family, the state and the market, in which people 
associate voluntarily to advance common interests”. Additionally, it can be 
said that neither civil society nor the different sectors of society are isolated 
phenomena (see figure 2.3).84 
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Figure 2.3 - Civil Society as an Overlapping Sphere within the Sectors 
Source: Pierre Nikolov and Daniel Semcesen, A Comparative Case Analysis of Civil 
Society and Ethnic Conflict in Thailand and Malaysia. (Lund: Lund University, 2008), 7. 
 
2.2.4 Categorising the Concept of Civil Society 
 This chapter has, thus far, described the basic concept of civil society 
and shown that this term is diverse and complicated. A Thai academic, 
Kritsada Boonchai, has classified the concept of civil society according to 
its key ideas and theories. Five concepts of a civil society category are 
explained as follows: 
The first category is ‘State-centred Civil Society’ often seen in 
developing countries. This idea is different from Western perspectives 
where civil society is independent from state influence. In those countries, 
the state remains the most powerful sector for decision making. However, 
the state offers opportunities for citizens to participate in some matters.85 
‘Capitalist Civil Society’ is the second concept which aims to reduce 
the role of the state in economic and social sectors. It focuses on a civil 
society where the middle-class seek competitive markets to increase the 
potential of the business sector. Civil society under this concept should be 
free from state control with the market system able to negotiate with the 
state.86 
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Thirdly, ‘Liberal Civil Society’ focuses on ‘citizenship’ which means 
democratic awareness of citizen rights. It stresses middle-class demands, 
volunteer activities and independent association. It tries to reduce the role 
of the state in public activities. The government is a mediator that has a duty 
to respond to people’s needs.87 
Fourthly, a concept of ‘Community Civil Society’ was developed from 
an idea of ‘strong community’ which means cooperation between various 
community interests. This cooperation will lead to a strong citizen society. 
This concept does not deny state assistance, but, in fact, the state plays a 
key role in helping civilians.88 
Finally, ‘New Social Movement’ is a new concept which aims to make 
changes in a community through political society by using public 
participation. This leads to changing structures, rules and social ideals such 
as the capacity for civic disobedience. This concept does not aim to seize 
state power or fight through the political system (i.e. parliament, political 
parties, the law and the bureaucracy), like in the past. Instead, it uses 
political public spaces to make changes and adjust relations between the 
state, private and citizen sectors.89 
2.2.5 A Typology of Civil Society Actors 
Last, but not least in the civil society sector, it is important to get to 
know more about the various actors in the civil society sphere. Manuel 
Mejido Costoya has provided the principal attributes of the four types of civil 
society actors: Non-governmental organisations, Social movements, 
Networks and Plateaus. It needs to be stated here that the networks and 
plateaus categories of the typology are homologous with the NGOs and 
social movements.90 
1) Non-governmental Organisations 
NGOs are the most institutionalised and also hierarchical groups in 
the civil society sector. The structural attributes of NGOs are typical of the 
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bureaucratic rationalisation that strengthens hierarchical institutions. NGOs 
have a formal division of human resources as represented by their paid, 
professional staff. NGOs also have an established financial infrastructure 
and a continuous financial flow that is driven by donor contributions, 
investments, grants and memberships. Formalised by official annual 
reports, this financial dimension binds NGOs to the economic and legal 
framework of a country. These relationships to the institutional framework 
can be seen when NGOs attempt, for example, to assure a certain tax 
status, qualify for financial assistance or make certain investments.91 
2) Social Movements 
The attributes of social movements are opposite to the 
characteristics of NGOs. Unlike the highly formalised NGOs, social 
movements do not have formal structures, chains of command and 
hierarchical patterns. Compared to NGOs, social movements lack a formal 
division of labour, an established financial infrastructure and a continuous 
financial flow. Social movements manage problems through an empathetic 
and shared-lived experience and operationalise their solutions through 
direct action.92 Moreover, Social movements are less institutionalised and 
more horizontal than NGOs. They resemble clientele-based groups, 
extended family structures and religious associations rather than modern 
hierarchical institutions. This is why they are often described as grassroots 
organisations.93 Unlike NGOs, social movements are less bound to the 
economic and juridicial frameworks of a society and do not attempt to build 
institutional ties with the system.94 
3) Networks 
Networks of civil society actors are the third category of the typology. 
Networks are information-age extensions of NGOs.95 Networks attempt to 
use the information technology revolution and, more specifically, what is 
referred to above as social forms of network to improve their effectiveness.96 
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Networks continue to understand social problems within the frame of 
reference of the specialised, technical and intellectualised discourse of 
NGOs, but to this perspective they add the postmodern or post-industrial 
problem of pluralism - that is, networks give pride of place to the importance 
of a pluralistic discourse.97 
4) Plateaus 
The fourth category of civil society actors is the plateaus which, like 
networks, attempt to use the information technology revolution and, more 
specifically, the interconnectivity and decentralisation of the network social 
form to link up civil society actors. Plateaus use this information technology 
in the belief that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. These new 
organisational forms point to the growing complexity of civil society. 
Networks are the information-age correlates of NGOs; plateaus are 
information-age correlates of social movements. Plateaus, on the other 
hand, function in a similar way to the pre-institutional logic and intuitive 
knowledge of social movements. NGOs become more flexible, and they link 
up to form networks of CSOs. Social movements become more expanded 
and link up to form plateaus of civil society actors.98 
 
2.3 Perspectives on Ethnic Conflict 
Following the section on civil society actors, we turn to the 
perspectives on ethnic conflict. To understand the characteristics of ethnic 
conflict this section includes definitions, a typology of ethnic groups, the 
types of ethnic conflict, and levels of analysis of ethnic conflict. These topics 
will help explain the ethnic conflict cases in southern Thailand as well as 
some countries in South and Southeast Asia which will be analysed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, respectively.  
After the end of the Cold War, armed inter-state conflicts decreased 
globally, while armed intra-state conflicts increased dramatically. Ethnic 
groups continue to fight over various issues, including territory, economic 
resources, cultural identity and political rights. Furthermore, ethnic groups 
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within states asked their ethnic kin in other states for support to fight their 
governments. 99  This section explores the information concerning ethnic 
conflict. It will give an overview of definitions, typology and offer levels of 
analysis about ethnic conflict. 
2.3.1 Definition of Ethnic Conflict and Relevant Terms  
First of all, let us define the term ‘ethnicity’ which most scholars agree 
is “that part of a person’s identity which is drawn from one or more ‘markers’ 
like race, religion, shared history, place, social symbols or language”.100 An 
ethnic group, therefore, “is a group of people bound together by a belief 
about common kinship and group distinctiveness, often reinforced by 
religion, language, and history”.101  
Tolerance between ethnic groups can be challenged over matters 
such as autonomy, language rights, education, religion, national symbols 
and political representation, however, most ethnic groups strive for rights 
and progress without violent means.102 Most ethnic conflicts are conducted 
through political institutions and channels. Violence, however, can become 
a factor when struggles or competition between ethnic groups are 
repositioned outside the political arena.103 
According to Anthony Smith in Ethnic Conflict and International 
Security, an “ethnic community” is “a named human population with a myth 
of common ancestry, shared memories, and cultural elements; a link with a 
historic territory or homeland; and a measure of solidarity”.104 Six criteria 
must be met before a group can be called an ethnic community. First, the 
group must have a name for itself. A lack of a name reflects an insufficiently 
developed collective identity. Second, the people in the group must believe 
in a common ancestry. This is more important than genetic ties, which may 
exist, but are not essential. Third, the members of the group must share 
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historical memories, often myths or legends passed from generation to 
generation by word of mouth. Fourth, the group must have a shared culture, 
generally based on a combination of language, religion, laws, customs, 
institutions, dress, music, crafts, architecture, even food. Fifth, the group 
must feel an attachment to a specific territory, which it may or may not 
actually inhabit. Sixth, the people in a group have to think of themselves as 
a group in order to constitute an ethnic community; that means they must 
have a sense of their common ethnicity.105 
Hizkias Assefa’s commonly used definition of an ethnic group is that 
it is a collectivity of people who share the same primary characteristics such 
as ancestry, language, culture and religion. Ethnicity then, refers to the 
behaviour and feeling about oneself and others that supposedly emanates 
from membership of an ethnic group. Finally, ethnic conflict has come to 
mean cleavages between groups based on differentiations in ethnic 
identities.106 
According to Daniel Byman, “An ethnic conflict is a violent conflict 
between ethnic groups or between an ethnic group and government forces 
that consists of one or more different ethnic groups”. He also added there 
are two main types of conflict: group versus group conflict, with the 
government acting as a third party of some kind and group versus 
government conflict, where the government is an active party acting on 
behalf of one ethnic group”.107  
Imtiyaz Yusuf analysed the ongoing events in southern Thailand from 
an ethno-religious dimension, focusing on the need to understand how the 
Malay-Muslims in the south perceive their identity in ethnic and religious 
terms. Ethnicity is the defining characteristic of a group’s identity which sets 
it apart from others in its own and others’ views. Religion often can be used 
for ethnic interests as a tool to make conflicts. Thus, the conflict in the south 
has an ethno-religious dimension, similar to the conflicts in some countries 
in South and Southeast Asia. The combination of ethnicity and religion often 
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results in explosive conflicts in the political arena to which solutions are not 
easily found.108 
2.3.2 A Typology of Ethnic Groups 
 Why does ethnic diversity cause conflict? Perhaps it is because each 
ethnic group has its own unique characteristics which are different from 
other groups or the majority of the community. A typology is very useful to 
understand the link between ethnic groups, the causes of ethnic conflict, 
and the means to resolve the conflicts. It will also help us to understand the 
common characteristics of the ethnic groups in southern Thailand which will 
be analysed further in Chapter 4. Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr have 
provided a typology of ethnic groups found within states. These include five 
groups: ethno-nationalists, indigenous peoples, ethno-classes, communal 
contenders and dominant minorities. 
 Ethno-nationalists are large ethnic groups based on historical 
traditions of political autonomy and/or territory. These groups often have an 
organised political leadership.109  
Indigenous peoples are descendants of inhabitants of lands that 
were colonised or conquered. They tend to live on the margins of the 
modern nation-states, surviving in small tribes or communities.110 
Ethno-classes are distinct ethnic groups that represent a social class 
in a society. They normally lack direct political party representation.111 
Communal contenders are ethnic groups that wish to share 
governance with other ethnic groups in the same state. They typically have 
been the victims of discrimination or marginalisation. Thus, they press for 
greater political participation.112 
Finally, dominant minorities represent those ethnic groups that are 
minorities within their own state but have typically controlled and dominated 
the state.113 
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2.3.3 Types of Ethnic Conflict 
Understanding the differences between ethnic groups helps to 
explain the types of conflict caused by ethnic diversity. Ethnic conflict has 
various involved actors and different motivations which may lead to 
violence. Therefore, ethnic conflict can be divided into three broad 
categories: civil rights conflicts, ethnic rebellions and inter-communal 
violence. 
1) Civil Rights Conflicts 
Civil rights conflicts occur when a group feels it is denied access to 
state resources or to cultural rights. Civil rights contests may start with non-
violent protests, strikes and political mobilisation. Three possible ways to 
escalation can then occur. First, the demands may not be met, in which case 
the group may itself turn to violence. Secondly, the state may instigate 
violence, including repressive or extra-judicial measures. Thirdly, retaliatory 
violence may be initiated by rival ethnic groups, particularly where these are 
aligned to the state. Civil rights conflicts can escalate, depending on the 
political geography, into full secessionist or civil wars.114 
2) Ethnic Rebellions 
  Ethnic rebellions take a number of different forms, depending on the 
goals of the militant groups and the governmental approach to what may be 
peaceful civil protest. The majority of modern ethnic conflicts contain some 
form of separatist element where an ethnic group seeks to detach or 
distance itself politically from the state in which it currently resides. A 
number of conflicts are regarded as part of the unfinished business of post-
Second World War issues.115  
3) Inter-communal Violence 
Although inter-communal violence is often extremely brutal, it is 
rarely purely random or mindless. The participants will collectively recognise 
some injustice against themselves, and these underlying sentiments will 
frequently be harnessed by political leaders for their own ends. Therefore, 
                                            
114 Stuart A. Notholt, Fields of Fire, an Atlas of Ethnic Conflict (London: Stuart Notholt 
Communications Ltd, 2008), 1.08. 
115 Ibid. 
40 
prolonged inter-communal fighting always comes together with a broader 
political agenda or set of demands.116 
2.3.4 Levels of Analysis of Ethnic Conflict 
Before designing a research methodology in Chapter 3, it was first 
necessary to clarify units and levels of analysis. The level of analysis 
approach to ethnic conflict is usually classified into three levels: international 
(e.g. balance of power and international systemic issues); domestic (e.g. 
problems within legislatures, bureaucracies and political history); and 
individual (e.g. political elites and leaders).117 In this research, only the 
domestic level will be described as the case of conflict in southern Thailand 
is mainly caused by factors within the state system. An exploration of the 
domestic level of analysis provides useful tools for a better understanding 
of the ethnic conflict.  
Factors of Violence at the Domestic Level 
Michael E. Brown has set out four key categories that indicate the 
predisposition for violence: structural; political; economic/social; and 
cultural/perceptual factors. 
1) Structural Factors 
The three structural factors have been noted. First, weak state 
structures often result from government corruption and ineptitude. 
Weakened state structures make for a more permissive atmosphere for 
conflict to emerge between groups. Leaders may be engaged in power 
struggles, extensive human rights abuses occur, an inability to control 
borders is evident, and ethnic groups push for their demands as well as 
compete with each other for resources. Consequently, a weak state is 
unable to respond effectively to their demands, with conflict being the likely 
result.118 
In terms of intrastate security concerns, mistrust reinforces the 
negative perceptions each group has of the other, especially the perception 
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of hostile intentions, and thus each group may be inclined to threaten the 
other leading to counter threats and a spiral in escalation of the conflict.119 
The last structural factor is ethnic geography. Brown asserts that 
“states with ethnic minorities are more prone to conflict than others, and 
certain kinds of ethnic demographics are more problematic than others”.120 
2) Political Factors 
Political issues are about the control and status of territory – and 
which ethnic group has control of the state institutions. When the political 
institutions of a state favour one group over another, the out-group is likely 
to feel resentment and seek to change the discriminatory institutions.121  
3) Economic/Social Factors 
Economic and social factors cover, for instance, economic problems, 
discriminatory economic systems and economic development which can 
lead to resentment if one ethnic group is favoured over another. Economic 
and social factors, in which inequities between ethnic groups in access to 
jobs, economic resources or employment are prevalent, can lead to 
conflict.122 
4) Cultural/Perceptual Factors 
Cultural discrimination against minority ethnic groups can serve as a 
trigger for conflict. Ethnic conflicts are often the result of conflict over 
language and religion. Group histories and group perceptions of themselves 
and others are also involved in causing conflict. In fact, these cultural and 
perceptual factors are about identity. While resource issues are sources of 
conflict, scholars increasingly note the importance of intangible factors, such 
as identity, as sources of conflict.123 
 
2.4 The Links between Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict 
After the earlier two sections describing the concepts of civil society 
and ethnic conflict, the following section will describe the relationship 
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between them and how civil society supports building peace - which is so 
central to in Chapter 9. This section includes civil society and conflict 
management, civil society and peace negotiation, civil society’s roles in 
conflict areas and models of ethnic conflict resolution. 
With the eruption of ethnic wars in Europe, Asia and Africa, the role 
of civil society as a tool to resolve ethno-religious conflict has been 
significant. Numerous politicians, scholars and practitioners around the 
world anticipated that civil society would be the initiator and sustainer of 
peace processes.124 The following will provide some examples of the links 
between civil society and ethnic conflict. 
2.4.1 Civil Society and Conflict Management  
 Academics emphasise the role of civil society groups involved in 
conflict management as discussed below.  
In Thania Paffenholz’s view, in the Social Development Papers: 
Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, civil society, civic engagement, and 
peacebuilding have important roles to play in peacebuilding. Based on an 
analysis of civil society functions, this study concluded that civil society can 
make important contributions to peacebuilding in the short, medium and 
long terms. The most important function of civil society in peacebuilding 
seems to be advocacy, particularly in terms of making the voices of civil 
society heard and bringing important issues to the peacebuilding agenda. 
Other civil society roles are also important for peacebuilding, especially 
human rights monitoring which contributes to the protection of civil society, 
through joint activities that can build bridging ties across divided societies.125 
Civil society, however, needs a functioning state to perform its role 
efficiently.126 
 According to an article Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in 
Preventing War & Building Peace, Catherine Barnes agreed that within any 
society, civil society is a potentially powerful force that can mobilise to either 
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escalate conflict or facilitate its resolution.127 In addition, preventing conflict 
and building sustainable peace requires strategies that address structural 
causes of conflict and enable partnerships between civil society actors at 
the local, regional and global levels to interact with governments, inter-
governmental organisations and businesses.128 In the conflict cycle, civil 
society organisations play various roles at different stages from prevention, 
early operational crisis response during violent conflict, peacemaking, 
prevention reoccurrence and post-settlement peacebuilding.129 
According to Martina Fischer in an article called Civil Society in 
Conflict Transformation: Ambivalence, Potentials and Challenges, the 
potential contributions of civil society actors for peacebuilding and conflict 
transformation is important.130 Support for civil society should be further 
developed as a key element of development and peace politics. 131 
Peacebuilding and conflict transformation require an integrated approach 
that addresses state institutions, economic structures and civil society.132 
 Raffaele Marchettia and Nathalie Tocci analysed the relationship 
between civil society and conflict in an article called Conflict Society: 
Understanding the Role of Civil Society in Conflict. Their study provided an 
analytical framework to reveal this complex relationship and assessed the 
impacts which civil society may have on conflict. Moreover, it examined 
more specifically the role of civil society in ethno-political conflicts. Finally, 
the article specified the identification of different factors determining the 
impact of civil society on conflicts, including political identities, frameworks 
of action and political opportunity structures in which civil society actors 
operate. 133  In conclusion, three main macro-impacts of civil society in 
conflict can be outlined: fuelling conflict, holding conflict in the short-term 
and peacemaking impacts.134 This research focuses only on the impact on 
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peace resolution which civil society organisations may be involved in post-
violence situations such as capacity-building, reconstruction and 
rehabilitation.135  
2.4.2 Civil Society and Peace Negotiations 
While the work Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Confronting 
Exclusion of Anthony Wanis-St. John and Darren Kew has focused on the 
importance of civil society’s role in post-conflict peacebuilding, it is also 
useful for the ongoing conflict in Southern Thailand. Although the exclusion 
of the civil society sector from peace negotiations may make the process 
less complicated, the absence of civil society voices at the negotiating table 
can negatively impact on the sustainability of a peace agreement during 
peacebuilding.  
This research proposed a framework of comparison for more than 
twenty different peace negotiations across Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin 
America. According to this research, there were three levels of civil society 
involvement at the peace negotiations stage. Civil society groups had high 
involvement in the peace negotiations directly by having a certain place at 
the negotiation. They could have moderate involvement but influence the 
negotiations indirectly through parties who were officially assigned to the 
talks. Finally, low participation of civil society groups means having little or 
no access or influence upon the parties in the negotiations.136 The cases in 
which civil society groups actively engaged in official peace negotiations 
tend to achieve more sustained peace.137 It can, however, be concluded 
that some common relationships between civil society involvement in peace 
negotiations and the sustainability of peace agreements is necessary for 
success. All cases (i.e. Guatemala, Liberia, Mozambique and Sierra Leone) 
with a high civil society involvement in the negotiations have resulted in 
sustained peace in the peacebuilding phase.138 Surprisingly, most of the 
cases (i.e. Bosnia, Burundi, Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Israel-Palestine, 
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Kosovo, Liberia, Nepal, Nigeria, Rwanda and Tajikistan) of low civil society 
involvement experienced a resumption of warfare or unsustainable 
peace.139 
Clearly, a relationship between civil society participation in peace 
negotiations and the durability of peace settlements exists. Civil society 
groups have a direct or indirect role in peace negotiations and excluding 
them tends to undermine the peacebuilding process.140 
2.4.3 The Role of Civil Society in Conflict Areas 
Chapter 5 will analyse more cases of the role of civil society in conflict 
countries and will provide further information from various sources. The 
following will introduce three significant individual works focusing on civil 
society’s roles in the countries facing ethnic conflict: the main theme of this 
thesis. 
 Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict in Thailand and Malaysia 
Pierre Nikolov and Daniel Semcesen’s research in 2008 on A 
Comparative Case Analysis of Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict in Thailand 
and Malaysia, aimed to contrast and explain the role of civil society in 
relation to ethnic conflict in Thailand and Malaysia. A comparative case 
analysis was applied across four analytical dimensions: space, structure, 
values, and impact. Nikolov and Semcesen’s study demonstrated that 
coercive regimes suppressed civil society and communities remained intra-
ethnic in both countries. Although civil society was weakened in both cases, 
inter-ethnic government policies secured ethnic peace over five decades in 
Malaysia, whereas the absence of similar policies has prolonged ethnic 
violence in Thailand.141  
Taking a Hegelian perspective, the authoritarian governments of 
Thailand and Malaysia have restrained the civil society sector resulting in 
fierce competition which leads to violent conflict. In the Malaysian case, the 
regulating state has managed to prevent ethnic violence and intra-state 
conflict. Without regulations, fundamentalist religious groups find financial 
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support to further their homogenisation agenda and provoke ethnic 
violence. Thailand, on the other hand has used homogenisation policies, 
which have provoked intra-state conflicts. According to Gramsci’s ideas, 
civil society is a sphere of contestation between the civil society sector and 
coercive state institutions. In the Malaysian context, civil society is 
restrained by the state, with the electorate continuing their silent consent, 
and where the values of a coercive regime become socialised in civil society 
and the hegemonic ideology is maintained. Gramsci also underlined that 
civil society can be a strong site of rebellion against coercive institutions. 
This Gramscian perspective sees the civil society sector in Thailand as a 
sphere of periodic shifts between mass rebellion and periods of consent for 
the coercive regime in power.142 
 The Role of Civil Society in Conflict and Peace in India’s 
Northeast  
Another piece of work concerning the role of civil society in conflict 
resolution was written by Samir Kumar Das which was called Conflict and 
Peace in India’s Northeast: The Role of Civil Society. 
Northeast India is a geographically distinctive region connected to 
the rest of India by a narrow corridor. This constitutes barely one per cent 
of the boundaries of the region, while the remaining ninety-nine per cent of 
its boundaries are international – with China’s Tibet region to the north, 
Bangladesh to the southwest, Bhutan to the northwest, and Myanmar to the 
east.143 
Although the roles of civil societies are far too complex to be fitted 
into any one category, a classificatory scheme for understanding and 
explaining the role of civil societies in making peace in a region is still useful. 
There are four types of organisations and initiatives that help to explain the 
role of civil societies in building peace in India’s Northeast.144 
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1. Civic Representatives. The first approach refers to those civil society 
groups that make claims of representing an ethnic community and 
thereby get involved in conflicts. 
2. Peace Groups. A second category of civil society organisations are 
those expressly set up with the objective of making the necessary 
preparations for peace dialogues between conflicting parties, 
working out ceasefire details, and facilitating a process that often 
culminates in the signing of peace accords. 
3. Bridge-builders.  A third segment of civil society consists of groups 
and organisations that play an active role in building bridges at the 
local level and thereby makes the peaceful coexistence of different 
communities possible. 
4. Popular Initiatives. Finally, civil society’s role in making peace is also 
located in some as yet disorganised, or loosely organised, popular 
initiatives that mark its emergence as a force autonomous from both 
the state and insurgents. 
Civil society groups and initiatives play diverse roles in the conflicts 
afflicting India’s Northeast. Their role in making peace is limited largely to a 
support role. Civil society has largely remained in the background, and its 
role has been restricted to doing the groundwork necessary for the 
conflicting parties to stop hostilities, brainstorming for ideas, and seeking a 
negotiated settlement to their problems.145 
 The Role of Civil Society in Forging Sustainable Peace in 
Mindanao  
Steven Rood’s study has investigated the role of civil society in 
forging sustainable peace in Mindanao, in the southern Philippines. It 
argued that civil society groups have the potential to make significant 
contributions to the management of the insurgent conflict in the southern 
Philippines and in terms of forging a lasting peace. Civil society in this study 
has included a wide range of organisations such as NGOs, church-based 
groups and business associations. All of these organisations are involved 
in efforts to manage the conflict in the southern Philippines. In this context, 
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the study has argued that civil society in Mindanao can contribute 
significantly in terms of managing the conflict and achieving sustainable 
peace in Mindanao. The main activities of civil society found in Mindanao 
are promoting dialogues between Christian and Muslim communities, 
creating space for peace process and involvement in an official peace 
process.146  
A study by Niklas Hansson was mentioned in this work to support the 
idea that there is a strong correlation between civil society’s success and 
access to the peace agreement process. Some countries in Africa which 
involved the civil society sector in their peace processes tended to be 
successful in their peace agreements; these included Mozambique, El 
Salvador, South Africa and Guatemala.147 Therefore, the role of civil society 
in peacebuilding is important and should be developed. 
However, there are some limitations to civil society impacting on 
macro political process. Instead, civil society’s involvement tends to have 
indirect effects which are involved in facilitating the atmosphere of peace 
process such as broadcasting discussion of the root causes of conflict; 
arguing in the media and with policy elites against pursuing victory and in 
favour of developmental changes; and providing political space for 
government officials to manoeuvre toward a settlement.148. Despite these 
limitations and weaknesses, local and international civil society 
organisations can help bring about lasting peace in the regions. This study 
made several recommendations to improve the potential of civil society in 
building peace in Mindanao. First, Muslim civil society should be 
strengthened to rectify an imbalance of Muslim and Christian communities. 
Also, civil society networks involved in the peace process should be 
strengthened to help transform them into formal organisations capable of 
bringing Muslims and Christians together. Finally, civil society organisations 
should work with policy elites to reach a wider public and to expose citizens 
to issues involved in the peace talks. 
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2.4.4 Models of Ethnic Conflict Resolution 
 The links between civil society and ethnic conflict, and some cases, 
have now been examined in the earlier sections. Several models have been 
created by Ryan and Cordula-Reimann to include ideas to demonstrate how 
civil society and citizen sectors work together to resolve conflict or build 
peace. These two models - the Peace-building Model and the Third-party 
Strategies with Conflict Transformation - are useful for this research as they 
support the idea of the importance of civil society which will be linked to the 
role of civil society in peace building in Chapter 6. 
1) Peace-building Model  
Stephen Ryan has combined the peace strategies introduced by 
Johan Galtung, and developed by Michael Harbottle, and has added 
another tripartite system suggested by Christopher Mitchell (see figure 2.4). 
 
Problem to be 
addressed 
Strategy Target Group 
Violent behaviour Peace-keeping 
(military activity) 
Armed groups 
(warriors) 
Perceived 
incompatibility of 
interests 
Peace-making 
(political activity) 
Decision-makers 
(leaders) 
Negative attitudes  
and socio-economic 
structures 
Peace-building 
(socio-economic 
activity) 
Ordinary people 
(followers) 
 
Figure 2.4 - A Framework for Conflict Resolution 
Source: Adapted from Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations (Hants: 
Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990), 52. 
 
i. Peace-keeping and the reduction of violent behaviour 
Peace-keeping is an activity which involves the interposition of 
military and/or police forces between armed groups either to stop violence 
or to prevent it. The public will tend to be less committed to such a course 
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of action, and will tend to share or reject such values as the general 
intercommunal situation and the activities of the warriors’ changes.149 
When ethnic groups are engaged in a violent conflict, peace-keeping 
is often the most urgent and necessary of all peace strategies for it is the 
only one which deals directly with the warriors on all sides who are engaged 
in mutual destruction.150 
ii. Peace-making and the reduction of conflicting interests 
Peace-making is concerned with the search for a negotiated 
resolution of the perceived conflicts of interests between the parties. There 
are three main ways by which the parties can try to deal with such conflicts 
of interests.  
The first approach is to try and impose a solution either through 
violence or through power. The second approach of trying to resolve ethnic 
conflicts is through the law. There are several problems with such 
approaches. Using power to impose a solution to the conflict does not deal 
with the perceived incompatibility of interest which underlies the conflict. As 
these root causes are left unresolved, the conflict will simply be suppressed 
and will re-emerge in the future. Thus, this approach may be effective only 
for a short term. Also, trying to resolve the conflict by using the law will be 
not a popular option, especially if the instruments of legal enforcement are 
deemed to be biased. The various problems with the use of violence or 
power and the inappropriateness of the recourse to law has led many to 
regard the third one, negotiation, as the best peace-making strategy.151 The 
negotiation should focus on the interests of all relevant parties and final 
agreements should be based on objective criteria or fair standards 
acceptable to all parties.152 
iii. Peace-building and the reduction of negative attitudes 
Peace-building is the strategy which most directly tries to reverse the 
destructive processes that accompany violence. This involves a shift of 
focus away from the warriors, with whom peace-keepers are mainly 
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concerned, to the attitudes and socio-economic circumstances of ordinary 
people. Therefore, it tends to concentrate on the context of the conflict 
rather than on the issues which divide the parties. Most peace-building 
strategies involve greater inter-party contact. So whereas peace-keeping is 
about building barriers between the warriors, peace-building tries to build 
bridges between local people in communities. 
The most simplistic approach to peace-building is the contact 
hypothesis, defined as “the widely held belief that interaction between 
individuals belonging to different groups will reduce ethnic prejudice and 
inter-group tension”.153 
2) Third-party Strategies with Conflict Transformation 
 Cordula Reimann is concerned with three approaches to conflict 
management: conflict settlement, conflict resolution and conflict 
transformation. The role of three-track actors and their strategies are 
applied in the three approaches. The third-party strategies consist of three 
actors called Track I, Track II and Track III.  
Track I activities include official and non-coercive measures, such as 
fact-finding missions, facilitation, negotiation, mediation and peacekeeping, 
to more coercive measures, such as power-mediation, sanctions, peace-
enforcement and arbitration. In contrast to Track I, Track II refers to all non-
official and non-coercive activities, such as facilitation, consultation and 
mediation. Finally, Track III refers to all activities initiated and undertaken 
by actors involved in grassroots training, capacity building and 
empowerment, trauma work, human rights, development work and 
humanitarian assistance.154 
The three approaches to conflict management engage different 
actors and adopt multiple strategies taken. First, ‘Conflict Settlement’ refers 
to all strategies for achieving an outcome that ends direct violence, without 
necessarily addressing the underlying conflict causes. 155  The second 
approach, ‘Conflict Resolution’, refers to all process oriented activities that 
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aim to address the underlying causes of direct, cultural and structural 
violence. 156   The deepening of conflict analysis and the widening of 
strategies will also require a greater number of actors involved in the 
process. These can be drawn from civil society groups, academic 
institutions and all forms of civil mediation or citizen diplomacy groups, 
including local and international conflict resolution NGOs operating at Track 
II level.157 The last approach, ‘Conflict Transformation’, refers to outcomes, 
processes and structures oriented toward long-term peacebuilding efforts, 
which aim to overcome revealed forms of direct, cultural and structural 
violence. The goal of conflict transformation moves beyond the aims of both 
the previous approaches.158 The Track III strategies aim to support local 
struggles for social justice and thus for radical, structural change. 159 
Whereas Track I and Track II actors in the conflict settlement and conflict 
resolution approaches tend to view the civilian population and grassroots 
levels as passive, Track III strategies put them as a centre-stage actor of 
conflict resolution.160 It is clear that Track I or Track II approaches alone 
cannot provide an efficient solution for contemporary violent conflicts. 
Therefore, Track III strategies need to be included in the peacebuilding 
process.161  
In summary, conflict transformation is an open-ended, long-term, 
multi-track and dynamic process, which significantly widens the scope of 
actors involved. It combines Track I, II and III activities and is thus likely to 
engage a wide variety of actors, including: official, military and political 
leaders (Track I); informal conflict resolution experts, INGOs and NGOs 
working in conflict resolution (Track II); and grassroots, local NGOs 
providing development cooperation and humanitarian assistance (Track 
III).162 
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2.5 Conceptual Framework  
 The concepts of civil society and ethnic conflict described in this 
chapter, together with the models of ethnic conflict resolution, have been 
synthesised into a conceptual framework which will be used for this 
research. In conflict management and peace building processes, there are 
normally three main actors: state, civil society and citizen. Each actor has 
different roles which contribute differently to the conflict solution. These 
actors interact closely with one another in order to figure out the best 
possible solutions for the conflict. However, the outcomes of each actor and 
strategy are varied.  
The state consists of a small number of people at the top who have 
the most power in making decisions. The main role of the state is dealing 
with approaches like the Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Strategies. 
These approaches would stop violence or conflict immediately, but could 
not guarantee how long the peace would last. This chapter has showed that 
there is a relationship between civil society and ethnic conflict. To achieve 
an ultimate goal which is sustainable peace, many variables need to be 
considered. Moreover, civil society and citizen sectors should be involved 
in conflict resolution which is known as a Peacebuilding Strategy.  
This research defines peace as situations in which there is no 
violence or armed conflict in the area. Local people can return to their 
normal daily routine. Furthermore, the feeling of discontent and 
discrimination experienced by the local Muslim people should be resolved. 
Only then can a lasting peace be achieved. 
The conceptual framework used for this research, which aims to find 
out the role of civil society in building peace in the southern border provinces 
of Thailand, is illustrated in figure 2.5.  
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Figure 2.5 - Conceptual Framework 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the theoretical perspectives from the past to 
the present which are relevant to this research. Although there is no 
common definition of civil society which can be agreed upon by scholars, 
the concepts of civil society from both Western thinkers and Thai scholars 
have been examined and a definition for this research has been set down. 
The differences in meanings and interpretations about civil society and 
ethnic conflict which resulted from their origins and histories have influenced 
the theoretical perceptions and empirical research. This chapter also 
included the relationship between civil society and ethnic conflict and 
examined models of ethnic conflict resolution. The conceptual framework 
for this research has also been identified in this chapter. The next chapter 
will discuss the research methodology which provides an overview of data 
collection, research sample groups and the process of data analysis. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research methodology 
which includes the following areas: research design; sources of data; an 
overview of research samples; plans and methods for data collection; 
research tools for the process of data analysis; and the limitations and 
recommendations of the fieldtrip undertaken for this research.  
 
3.2 Research Methodology 
The research is concerned with analysing meanings and 
experiences rather than expressing numbers or statistical findings, so a 
qualitative method is used. This qualitative method employs in-depth semi-
structured interview with open-ended questions together with documentary 
research. 
To increase the credibility and validity of the data, this thesis makes 
use of both primary and secondary data which is called ‘Data Source 
Triangulation’. 163  This strategy can help strengthening the thesis by 
increasing the overall validity and credibility of the collected data and the 
information used. This method of combining different aspects of research 
from multiple places. 
This thesis makes use of both primary and secondary data:  
1. Primary Data. This was collected through person-to-person 
interviews with the leaders or representatives of civil society groups in 
Thailand. The interviews adopted a non-random sampling procedure using 
purposive sampling. The interviews adopted a non-random sampling 
procedure using purposive sampling. This sampling method was selected 
because of two principal aims which are: to ensure that there are diversity 
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among all key samples and to ensure that all the key samples are covered. 
There are a range of different approaches to purposive sampling, this thesis 
has adopted an approach called ‘maximum variation sampling’. It began by 
identifying diverse characteristics or criteria for constructing the sample.164 
In this case, civil society groups were classified into eleven categorises. 
Then, the researcher selected at least one group for each category which 
have played significant roles in attempting to build peace in the 
southernmost provinces. This helps to ensure that the research covered all 
aspects of civil society’s activities.  
2. Secondary Data. This includes data obtained from published 
books, academic journals, newspapers and articles posted on websites. 
 
3.3 Research Design 
Types of Information What the Research Requires Method 
Factual information Facts about Thailand, the  history of 
the region, of conflict, the background 
of militant groups, government 
counter-insurgency policies and 
strategies, laws passed during the 
conflict, the restructuring of key 
government agencies, the 
background of civil society in 
Thailand, and case studies of ethno-
religious conflicts in South and 
Southeast Asian countries 
Document 
review 
Theories Ideas concerning Western and Thai 
civil society and ethnic conflict 
concepts, models of ethnic conflict 
resolution, concept of peacebuilding, 
and the strategic role of the civil 
society sector in peacebuilding 
Document 
review 
                                            
164 Michael Patton, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (Beverly Hills, CA: 
Sage, 1990) 172. 
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Types of Information What the Research Requires Method 
Perceptual information Characteristics of civil society groups 
in attempting to build peace in the 
south, the role of civil society groups, 
the efficacy of civil society groups in 
building peace, difficulties and 
recommendations 
In-depth 
interviews 
and 
document 
review 
  
 
3.4  Sources of Data 
1) In-depth Interviews  
The main findings have been analysed from in-depth interviews with 
members of twenty-nine civil society groups. They were classified into 
categories depending on their main purposes. At least one civil society 
group as a representative from each category was selected for an in-depth 
interview. 
2) Internet 
Online sources were necessary to search for updated information 
which is the most convenient tool to reach most databases. The information 
sourced includes relevant academic journals in Thailand and internationally, 
Thai newspapers and statistical information on the unrest in Southern 
Thailand. There are many reliable internet websites that are good sources 
for data and news concerning the conflict in the southern provinces such as 
the Isra News Agency and the Deep South Watch Centre. 
3) Library 
Library sources provided books and journals to address the research 
methodology, theories of civil society, theories of peace studies, concept of 
peacebuilding and cases of ethno-religious conflicts in other countries. 
  
 
 60 
 
3.5 Research Sample  
The theories and concepts of civil society analysed in Chapter 2 were 
used to select sample groups for this research. Most civil society groups in 
Thailand could be categorised as ‘State-centred Civil Society’ which means 
the state remains powerful in some matters in the civil society sector. These 
sample groups have three levels of connections with the state or political 
sphere. 
The first group is civil society groups in Thailand that are compatible 
with Western concepts where they position themselves as a separate sector 
as mentioned in 2.2.3. These include the organisations which may depend 
mainly on foreign donors or are self-funding, for example, the Muslim 
Attorney Centre Foundation (MAC), the Chamber of Commerce, and the 
Islamic Culture Foundation of Southern States. 
The second group consists of most of the civil society groups in 
Thailand which have close links with the government to varying degrees as 
was mentioned in 2.2.1 - the Thai concept. Some are very independent in 
managing their groups’ activities, but somehow still related to the 
government such as being partly funded or academically supported by the 
government. Most of the sample groups are examples of this concept. 
The final group, according to the concept of civil society put forward 
by Thai scholars is one where the government is included into the civil 
society’s sphere totally. Thus, two government agencies (i.e. SBPAC and 
the Civil Society Coordinator Working Group (CSCWG)) which work closely 
with the local civil society groups are included in the research sample 
groups. 
Twenty-nine civil society groups were selected, mostly from the three 
southernmost provinces although some were from Songkhla and the central 
provinces. These groups were selected based on the researcher’s opinion 
that they played significant roles in relation to the southern conflict, and have 
been considered good representatives of each category of civil society. The 
following is an introduction to the civil society groups that were selected for 
in-depth interviews.  
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1) Southern Natural Resources Network 
The Southern Natural Resources Network consists of five small 
groups concerned with natural resources issues such as the Pattani Bay 
Conservative Movements and the Saiburi Watershed Project. The network 
was formed by Asst. Prof. Nukul Rattanadakul, a lecturer at Prince of 
Songkla University under the support of the Yadfon Foundation in Trang 
province. The network was formed before the upsurge of violence in 2004. 
Representatives started working in three villages in 1992, and today its 
network covers 50 villages. The initial purpose of the network was to 
promote public participation in natural resource management within 
communities by using a strategy of working together with villagers in 
partnership. After the insurgent violence became a problem in this area, the 
network has reduced their role in natural resources and paid more attention 
to the issues of peace and human rights.165  
2) Muslim Attorney Centre Foundation (MAC) 
In 2004, a group of Muslim lawyers formed a Muslim Attorney Club 
headed by a renowned lawyer, Somchai Neelapaijit. Its initial objective was 
to help the accused on charges relating to the violation of national security. 
Since late 2005, national security cases in the southernmost provinces have 
increased exponentially with the group establishing a ‘Muslim Attorney 
Centre’. From 2007, MAC expanded their branches into four provinces: 
Bangkok, Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. Today, the purposes of the centre 
are to promote, encourage and publicise knowledge about human rights and 
law to the people; to assist villagers charged with national security breaches 
and human rights violations; to strengthen a network of lawyers and human 
rights activists; and to build relations with the network of human rights 
organisations at both national and international levels.166 
3) Justice for Peace Foundation (JPF) 
The JPF was founded in June 2006 as a network of human rights 
and peace activists which was formerly known as the Working Group on 
Justice for Peace (WGJP). The WGJP engaged in human rights monitoring 
                                            
165 Respondent 20, Interview. Southern Border Natural Resources Network. 4 July 2012. 
166 Muslim Attorney Centre Foundation, Website, http://th.macmuslim.com/ (accessed 11 
December 2013). 
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and advocacy as well as encouraging grassroots movements and 
supporting victims of human rights violations in their fight for justice. In 
December 2009, WGJP was registered as a Foundation with the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Authority, later changing its name to the Justice for Peace 
Foundation. Today, the objectives of the foundation are to raise public 
awareness on issues of justice, the rule of law, national human rights and 
international human rights standards; to strengthen the capacity of victims 
and their families to fight for justice and of communities; to protect human 
rights using non-violence; and to advocate nationally and internationally for 
the Thai government to address human rights violations and digressions 
from the rule of law in order to end impunity and provide remedies to victims 
and their families.167 
4) Cross Cultural Foundation (CrCF) 
The CrCF is a non-profit and non-governmental foundation located 
in Bangkok. CrCF was founded by a group of lawyers and registered under 
the Ministry of Culture in 2002. Since then, it has coordinated several 
activities with its working partners such as the Lawyer Council of Thailand, 
the Thai Volunteer Services Foundation, the Rule of Law and Reconciliation 
Center and the Justice for Peace Foundation. It aims at promoting cross-
cultural understanding on issues concerning the protection and promotion 
of human rights and democracy. CrCF also works to promote and protect 
the rights of marginalised groups in Thailand such as ethnic groups, migrant 
workers, stateless people and victims of conflict.168 The foundation has 
played a greater role in the deep south since 2004 when the renowned Thai-
Muslim lawyer and human rights activist, Somchai Neelapaijit disappeared. 
It provides legal and other aid to victims, particularly Muslims, affected by 
violence in the southern border provinces.169 
5) Bungaraya Group  
The Bungaraya Group is a civil society organisation established in 
early 2009 by a group of Prince of Songkla University students based in 
                                            
167 Justice for Peace Foundation, Facebook Page, http://www.facebook.com/Justicefor 
Peace (accessed 11 December 2013). 
168 Cross Cultural Foundation, Website, http://www.crcf.or.th/en/about.php (accessed 3 
June 2011). 
169 Respondent 15, Interview. Cross Cultural Foundation-CrCF. 29 June 2012. 
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Pattani. The group has created a website, called ‘bungarayanews.com’,170 
which has publicised journals, interviews, histories and research concerning 
southern Thailand in three languages: Thai, Melayu and English. The 
website presents views from the southern region including social, economic, 
educational and religious information to outsiders in order to make them 
understand the situation in the conflict area.171 The initial activity of this 
group was related to media work and later expanded to the academic field 
as well. The main objectives of the academic field are to develop skills and 
to increase the potential of teachers in these provinces.172 
6) Deep South Watch (DSW) 
The DSW group was established in 2006 by a group of professionals 
with backgrounds in academia, medicine and the media. The Director of 
DSW is Asst. Prof. Dr. Srisompob Jitpiromsri who was one of the founders 
and it is based in Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus. The aims 
of DSW are to raise awareness concerning the conflict in southern Thailand 
and to use non-violent means to constructively transform the conflict. In 
order to achieve this goal, DSW has planned its own action based on three 
‘modules’. Module 1: Public Communication Module emphasises the 
creation of channels of communication for the local people and 
simultaneously builds a communication network that reflects the 
perspectives of a variety of people, particularly voices from inside the 
conflict areas. Module 2: Knowledge Formation Module is the process of 
understanding the situation while trying to find a solution based on the 
knowledge and experiences through the formation of study groups, think 
tank forums, workshops, and seminars. Module 3: Civil Society Mobilisation 
Module refers to the process of supporting the civil society sector to mobilise 
a political space through networking and creating a ‘common space’ that will 
facilitate proposals based on the local people and enhance the power to 
negotiate on the basis of public interests.173 
                                            
170 Bungaraya News, Website, http://www.bungarayanews.com (accessed 13 May 2011). 
171 Komchadluek News, Website, http://www.komchadluek.net/detail/20090823/25403/ 
(accessed 13 December 2011). 
172 Respondent 4, Interview. Bungaraya Group. 20 June 2012. 
173 Deep South Watch, Website, http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/about (accessed 13 May 
2011). 
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7) Center for the Study of Conflict and Cultural Diversity in  
Southern Thailand (CSCC)  
On 29 April 2009, the Faculty of Political Science, Prince of Songkla 
University, Pattani Campus, together with five other authorities including 
Prince of Songkla University, Faculty of Management Sciences, Faculty of 
Communication Sciences, College of Islamic Studies and Peace Studies 
Institute, established the CSCC. Asst. Prof. Dr. Srisompob Jitpiromsri is one 
of the founders who was selected to be the Director of CSCC. Its mission is 
to strengthen the university in order to be a centre of social and political 
conflicts studies and research in the south. Moreover, this centre is a 
cooperative institute for researchers from Thailand and overseas, looking at 
topics related to the deep south and problems occurring elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia. The centre has proposed policy solutions to the 
government for the southern conflict and aims to be a knowledge 
warehouse for research and referencing. It is also the first institution to 
centre on collecting public policies concerning the resolution of the deep 
south conflict.174 
8) Institute for Peace Studies  
The Institute for Peace Studies was initiated by scholars of Prince of 
Songkla University, Hat Yai Campus in 2004 with their main purpose being 
to create and develop a body of knowledge about Peace Studies as well as 
creating human resources specialised in this field.175 The founders realised 
that a number of researchers tended to focus on the violence in the conflict 
areas rather than non-violent solutions and mediating peaceful solutions. 
This institute aims at resolving conflict by focusing on psychological relief 
and adopting ‘contemplative studies’.176 Their main tasks are teaching and 
                                            
174 Prince of Songkla University, “Center for the Studies of Conflict and Cultural Diversity 
in Southern Thailand,” http://mis-pattani2.pn.psu.ac.th/mail/mail2/looknote.php?& 
Did=01387&PHPSESSID= 20ce29785630645190663beacbb22180 (accessed 13 May 
2011). 
175 Institute for Peace Studies, Website, http://peacestudies.psu.ac.th/ips/ (accessed 10 
December 2013). 
176 The Contemplative Studies Initiative is a group of Brown faculty with diverse academic 
specialisations who are united around a common interest in studying the underlying 
philosophy, psychology, and phenomenology of contemplative experience, across time, 
cultures and traditions. Source: Brown University, Contemplative Studies, http://www. 
brown.edu/academics/contemplative-studies/ (accessed 27 December 2013). 
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producing research works about peace studies, especially about the deep 
south conflict.177 
9) Knowledge for Deep South (K4DS) 
The K4DS Project was initiated in 2007 by Dr. Worasit Sornsriwichai, 
a lecturer of the Faculty of Medicine, Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yai 
Campus. The main purpose of the project is the creation of databases about 
three southernmost provinces including research publications, theses, 
projects, bibliographic information and news. The core tasks of the project 
are to map and brainstorm with people from various professions including 
the media, academics and practitioners from both government agencies and 
civil society networks. The database has been updated systematically and 
regularly. This online database was designed for users who can access 
material via the internet faster and more efficiently.178  
10) Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies (IHRP) 
The IHRP is the result of a merging between Mahidol University’s 
Center for Human Rights Studies and Social Development (established 
1998) and the Research Center for Peacebuilding (established 2004). 
IHRP’s activities focus on the fields of peace, conflict, justice and human 
rights studies, in the Asian Pacific region and beyond. The mission of the 
IHRP is the advancement of human rights and peace by educating human 
rights and peace practitioners, promoting programmes to community and 
international organisations, and conducting research on important issues.179 
Based in Mahidol University, Nakhon Pathom Campus, it is one of the 
institutes outside the conflict areas that has played a significant role in the 
southernmost conflict. The institute provides high quality research on peace 
issues in order to offer a better understanding of the root causes of the 
ethno-religious conflict in the south and to promote peaceful methods of 
conflict resolution as an alternative. The institute brainstorms many levels 
                                            
177 Respondent 5, Interview. The Institute for Peace Studies. 22 June 2012. 
178 Knowledge for Deep South, Website, http://k4ds.psu.ac.th (accessed 10 December 
2013). 
179 Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies, Website, http://www.ihrp.mahidol.ac.th/ 
(accessed 6 January 2014). 
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of opinion from Thai society from high-level leaders to local people in order 
to find a means to create a sustainable peace.180 
11) Deep South Coordination Center (DSCC) 
The DSCC was first established in June 2006 by lecturers and alumni 
of Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus. Later, two branches were 
established in Narathiwat and Yala.181 The purposes of the centre are to 
create academic database and to assist victims escaping from unrest in the 
southern provinces. The database consists of information on violent 
situations, lists of victims, types of assistance, relevant organisations, and 
academic articles. This database aims to help relevant aid groups in the 
conflict area, especially widows and orphans, and is also advantageous for 
long-term monitoring and for creating a body of knowledge for the future.182 
12) Graduate Volunteer Training Centre 
The Graduate Volunteer Training Centre is based at the Faculty of 
Medicine, Prince of Songkla University, Hat Yai Campus. One of the 
important missions at Prince of Songkla University is to create academic 
leaders who have knowledge and skills relevant to the potential of local 
people. Even though a number of research works have been produced by 
the university, not much research actually fulfils local people’s needs. As a 
result of this, the Institute of Research and Development for the Health of 
Southern Thailand together with Prince of Songkla University established 
this centre after realising the importance of working closer with graduates 
and the community. It is very useful for graduates to have a chance to learn 
together with locals. This benefits future research relevant to what the 
community wants. It also helps grow a volunteering spirit in the younger 
generation and new graduates.183  
 
                                            
180 Insight on Conflict, The Institue of Human Rights and Peace Studies, http://www. 
insightonconflict.org/conflicts/thailand/ peacebuilding-organisations/research-centre-on-
peace-building/ (accessed 27 December 2014). 
181 GotoKnow, Three Centres of Deep South Coordination Centre, http://www.gotoknow. 
org/posts/257030 (accessed 11 December 2013). 
182 Deep South Coordination Center, Website, http://www.deepsouthrelief.org/ (accessed 
11 December 2013). 
183 Graduate Volunteer Training Centre, Website, http://volunteer.psu.ac.th/index.php/ 
about-us.html (accessed 11 December 2013). 
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13) Islamic Committee of the Talakorbagong Mosque  
Talakorbagong Mosque is one of more than 70 Mosques located in 
Nong Chik district, Pattani province. This mosque was selected because it 
was recommended by the sample groups’ network that it is well supported 
by the community. An Islamic Mosque Committee is normally based in every 
Muslim community that has a Mosque in their village. The main purpose of 
the committee is to manage religious matters and events in communities. 
Mosques are places where villagers pray, have community meetings and 
teach religion to children on weekends. The committee consists of fifteen 
members selected by villagers who are over 30 years old and have sound 
moral character.184 
14) Thai Muslim, Buddhist and Chinese Association  
This association was founded after an informal conversation 
between two local renowned seniors, Kleun Poompuang, a manager of a 
Buddhist school and Seng Baimad, an Islamic teacher.185 Later, the Thai 
Muslim, Buddhist and Chinese Association was formed by twenty-one 
members from three main cultural groups in the deep south: Buddhist, Thai-
Muslim and Thai-Chinese. Seven charismatic members were selected by 
each cultural group. The main purpose of this association is to find a 
peaceful way to resolve the conflict in the southern provinces. The activities 
focus on establishing a better understanding between cultures about how to 
live peacefully in a multicultural society. The youth training project is an 
example of how their activities strengthen relations between youths from 
different religions. This association aims to nurture civil society groups even 
more strongly into networks able to act as linkages between state and 
militant groups.186 
15) Islamic Culture Foundation of Southern States 
The Islamic Culture Foundation of Southern States was established 
by Police Major General Jamroon Den-udom in 1997. In the past, the main 
objectives of the foundation focused on religious and cultural matters as well 
                                            
184 Respondent 27, Interview. Islamic Committee of Talakorbagong Mosque. 6 July 2012. 
185 Deep South Watch, “Introduction to the Thai Muslim, Buddhist and Chinese  
Association,” http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/dsj/2256 (accessed 6 January 2014) [in 
Thai]. 
186 Ibid. 
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as law and justice issues. After upsurges in violence, the vital missions 
sought to focus more on assisting Muslims who faced injustices and to 
promote civil politics as an option for a southern conflict solution. Today, the 
main activity is broadcasting radio programmes called “Social Window” five 
hours per week. The foundation produces three different radio programmes 
on varied issues, such as politics news, civil society activism and 
government policy in the three southernmost provinces. Moreover, they 
have their own member network to promote public participation and to 
support a concept of ‘Pattani Metropolitan’.187 188 
16) Pattani Chamber of Commerce  
The Pattani Chamber of Commerce was established under the Acts 
of Chamber of Commerce in May 1985 by twelve founders led by Chao 
Pongthanakorn. 189  The Chamber represents the private sector and 
coordinates relations between government and business sectors. The main 
activities of the Chamber concern matters of industry, agriculture, trade, 
tourism promotion, finance and the economy. Although its main purpose is 
not to resolve the conflict in the deep south, its activities help in reducing 
poverty which is considered one of the root causes of problems. Moreover, 
it provides assistance and promotes charity in communities.190  
17) Civil Organisation for Peace and Sustainable Economy of 
Narathiwat  
The Civil Organisation for Peace and Sustainable Economy was 
established in July 2004 by a group of community representatives and 
volunteers such as village public health volunteers, village development 
volunteers, disability development volunteers, community cooperative 
centre members, professional representatives, youth representatives and 
religious leaders. The group was first supported by Lt. Gen. Pichet 
                                            
187 Pattani Metropolitan is a concept of special local administration for the three southern 
border provinces. This may include its own law which allows the locals to keep their 
identity, religion and ways of life under the constitution of Thailand. Source: Pakorn in 
http://www.oknation.net/blog/print.php?id=534942 (accessed 25 May 2014). [in Thai]. 
188 Respondent 25, Interview. Islamic Culture Foundation of Southern States. 6 July 2012. 
189 The Thai Chamber of Commerce and Board of Trade of Thailand, History of the 
Pattani Chamber of Commerce, http://www.thaichamber.org/Pattani/static1.asp?Tag=2 
(accessed 6 January 2014). 
190 Bangkokpost Newspaper, “The Pattani Chamber of Commerce,” http://www. 
bangkokpost.com/business/8080_info_the-pattani-chamber-of-commerce.html (accessed 
11 December 2013). 
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Wisaichorn (Army Area Deputy Commander during that time). The group 
focuses on applying his Majesty’s Philosophy of Sufficiency Economy191 to 
use in their community working together to strengthen the civil society 
sector. This group is classified as an economic civil society group because 
it aims to improve local people’s well-being and develop agriculture in this 
area by promoting organic fertiliser. The organisation has three branches 
located in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat.192 
18) Pattani Provincial Health Security Coordinating Center  
The Pattani Provincial Health Security Coordinating Center was 
established by the National Health Security Office (NHSO) in 2005. The 
main purpose is to help people understand their rights and health security 
services in order to guarantee minimum protection from diseases and 
unhealthy lifestyles. The main tasks are to be a linkage between people and 
relevant health organisations, and to cooperate among service providers, 
people and local administrative organisations. 193  This also promotes a 
‘Health Assembly’ which delivers a process of health public policy 
development based on public participation. Opportunities for people and 
relevant government agencies to exchange and share views which could 
lead to the development of public policy for the well-being of people are 
encouraged. 
19) Deep South Women Association for Peace (Deeppeace)  
The Deeppeace is a Yala-based civil society group which aims to be 
a centre for cooperation and assistance for women and orphans in the 
                                            
191 Although His Majesty King Rama IX has been promoting self-reliant or sustainable 
farming since the 1950s, it is generally accepted that the idea of Sufficiency Economy 
had been brought up in the 1970s in His Majesty’s speeches. Sufficiency Economy is a 
philosophy based on the fundamental principle of Thai culture. It is a method of 
development based on moderation, prudence, and social immunity; one that uses 
knowledge and virtue as guidelines in living. Significantly, there must be intelligence and 
perseverance which will lead to real happiness in leading one’s life. Source: The 
Chaipattana Foundation, Philosophy of Sufficiency Economy, http://www.chaipat.or.th/ 
chaipat_english/index.php? option=com_content&view=article&id=4103&Itemid=293 
(accessed 28 December 2013). 
192 Civil Organisation for Peace and Sustainable Economy of Yala, Website, http://www. 
yalacsop.com/ko1.html (accessed 15 May 2011). 
193 National Health Security Office, Website, http://www.nhso.go.th/files/userfiles/file/ 
PR/134_2556.pdf (accessed 12 December 2013). 
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southern border provinces.194 The Deeppeace was initiated in a community 
of Pattani central mosque by a group of students from Bangkok in 2008. 
The group started with relief work in the conflict areas assisting many 
women and children in the area who became victims of the southern 
violence. Subsequently, an official association was formed not only to help 
the victims financially, but also to allow victims to get back to their normal 
daily routines and be leaders in the future.195 
20) Civic Women’s Network for Peace in the Deep South  
The Civic Women’s Network for Peace in the Deep South was 
founded in 2010 by Soraya Jamjuree who is known as a representative of 
modern Muslim women. The network gathered twenty leaders of women’s 
civil society groups formed before and after the resurgence of violence in 
2004. Groups formed before 2004 mostly work on local products while 
groups formed after 2004 mainly aim to assist victims of the unrest. The 
main purpose of gathering all the heads of these women groups is to 
empower the leaders between the networks and their communities with the 
same main mission to bring peace back and to stop all types of violence. 
Therefore, the network would be able to publicise their mission more widely. 
This women’s group is based in Pattani.196 
21) Southern Youth Network  
In the past, youth groups in the southern provinces were active and 
already had some activities but lacked coordination among groups in 
different areas. In 2004, youth civil society groups networked to resolve 
problems by using the power of youth in the conflict area. The aim is to 
create a new generation capable of volunteering and develop the potential 
to be leaders in their communities. 197  This youth group also works for 
orphans which was a problem that the government had overlooked. This 
                                            
194 Deep South Women Association for Peace, Website, http://www.womandeeppeace. 
com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=2 (accessed 13 May 
2011). 
195 Muhamad Dueramae, “Introduction to Deep Peace Women association for Peace,” 
Prachathai, 26 April 2013, http://prachatai.com/journal/2013/04/46433 (accessed 13 
December 2013) [in Thai]. 
196 Respondent 14, Interview. Civic Women’s Network for Peace in the Deep South. 28 
June 2012. 
197 Southern Youth Network, Website, http://www.youngkhidmat.com/2013/04/blog-
post_23.html (accessed 17 December 2013). 
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network is based in Pattani and also looks after the networks in Narathiwat, 
Yala and Songkhla.198  
22) Association of Children and Youth for the Peace in the  
Southernmost Provinces of Thailand (Luuk Rieang Group) 
The Luuk Rieang Group has been operating since 2002. This Yala-
based group was formed by youth initially working on drug issues, 
reproductive health, and HIV/Aids.199 Since 2004, some members of the 
Luuk Rieang group have lost family members in the southern conflict. The 
mission has now shifted to relieving activities for women, youths and 
children affected by the violence. Today, their main task is to provide relief 
to victims and stop violence against children and youths through training 
programmes and healing activities.200  In 2011, the Luuk Rieang Group 
registered as the “Association of Children and Youth for the Peace in the 
Southernmost Provinces of Thailand”. Being registered offers them a better 
chance to access more funding sources and more sustainable financial 
support.201  
23) Youth Voluntary Heart Group 
The beginning of this Youth Voluntary Heart Group was initiated in 
2004 by a group of students of Prince of Songkla University, Pattani 
Campus and financially supported by the Family Network Foundation in 
Bangkok. From a small number of members, today the group has about 
twenty main volunteers. The group started with relief work such as visiting 
victims affected by violent incidents and later shifted to assist children and 
cover youth issues.202 Their activities are mainly to visit communities, to 
develop skills and to grow a volunteering spirit in youths. This Narathiwat-
based group covers four provinces including Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala and 
Songkhla. 
 
 
                                            
198 Respondent 12, Interview. Southern Youth Network. 28 June 2012. 
199 Luuk Rieang Group, Background and Activities, http://www.luukrieang.com/main/ 
background-activities.php (accessed 10 December 2013). 
200 Luuk Rieang Group, Introduction to ‘Luuk Rieng Group’, http://www.luukrieang.com/ 
main/about.php (accessed 8 May 2011). 
201 Luuk Rieang Group, Background and Activities. 
202 Respondent 1, Interview. Youth Volunteer. 19 June 2012. 
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24) Deep South Relief and Reconciliation Foundation (DSRR)  
The DSRR was established under the Faculty of Medicine, Prince of 
Songkla University, Hat Yai Campus after the violence erupted in 2004. The 
foundation is run by committees who have experience in relief work, are 
flexible and able to respond to victims’ needs more efficiently. Relief work 
operates in many ways, in short- or long-term and material assistance or 
physical, mental and social assistance. Material assistance, for example, 
comes in the form of funding and assistance with accommodation; while 
social assistance includes offering chances for new careers, and 
strengthening the community by using temples, mosques and ponoh 
schools as the centres. This foundation also aims to organise knowledge 
and research to retrieve creative knowledge and give feedback to the policy 
makers and local people.203 
25) Asian Resource Foundation (ARF) 
The ARF was established in 1996 under the Asian Muslim Action 
Network (AMAN) with the aim of promoting a spirit of caring and sharing in 
cultural and spiritual values. Holistic development supports and empowers 
the poor and other marginalised and vulnerable groups. Work is done to 
strengthen cooperative actions among the people of Asia and beyond for a 
just, peaceful, and sustainable world.204 The foundation started working in 
Thailand’s southernmost region in 2005. It is based in Bangkok, but 
coordinating officers are found in each southernmost province. This 
foundation is categorised as a multi-purpose civil society group covering 
various tasks such as encouraging peace, assisting local people, promoting 
human rights and supporting projects for women.205 
26) Civil Society Council of the Southernmost Thailand 
The Civil Society Council of the Southernmost Thailand was first 
initiated by twenty civil society groups in August 2011.206 The president of 
                                            
203 Deep South Relief and Reconciliation Foundation, Website, http://www.dsrrfoundation. 
org/about-us.html (accessed 3 June 2011). 
204 Asian Resource Foundation, Website, http://www.arf-asia.org/arf.php (accessed 3 
June 2011). 
205 Respondent 11, Interview. Asian Resource Foundation. 27 June 2012. 
206 The twenty groups comprise of 1) Confederation of Teachers in Southern Border 
Provinces, 2) Hilal-Ahmar Foundation, 3) Fasai Centre,Youth Network, Yala, 4) Wetland 
Research Project, Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus, 5) Young Muslim 
Association of Thailand, 6) Islamic Culture Foundation of Southern States, 7) Foundation 
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the council is Prasit  Megsuwan. The purposes of the council are to create 
a space for public brainstorming for conflict resolution; to enhance the 
capability of the civil society sector; to determine directions in resolving the 
conflict; and to develop the southernmost area sustainably. The council 
determined a vision toward 2021 that aims to achieve a strong special 
autonomous administration207 which could create peace and develop the 
southernmost provinces. To obtain this goal, there are four strategies 
including enhancing democracy; retaining the justice system; improving the 
quality of life of the locals; and supporting the identities, religions and 
cultures of every community.208 
27) Sukaew Foundation  
The Sukaew Foundation was established in 2004 by Dr. Rung 
Kaewdang and some renowned seniors originally from the three 
southernmost provinces. It is uncommon to find a civil society group based 
in this region where most members are Buddhists. The foundation works 
together with government authorities and private organisations to resolve 
conflict in the provinces. It believes that the insurgent problem in the south 
is a national issue and it is the whole country’s responsibility.209 This multi-
purpose civil society group is based in Yala. Its projects and initiatives carry 
                                            
of Genius Orphanage, 8) Halal Consumer Protection Assembly, 9) Fund for Families Who 
Work for Volunteering Work, 10) Al-salam Institute, Yala Islamic University, 11) Drug 
Rehabilitation Centre (New Life Home), 12) Jariyatham School Foundation, 13) Deep 
South Watch, 14) Civic Women’s Network for Peace in the Deep South, 15) Pattani 
Provincial Health Assembly Coordinating Centre, 16) Deep South Civil Society Media 
Network, 17) Faith Community Network, 18) Local Development Institute of Pattani, 19) 
Civil Society Centre of Yala, and 20) Deep South Provinces Community Radio Network. 
Source: Isra News Agency, Website, http://www.isranews.org (accessed 25 August 
2012). 
207 The concept of a special autonomous administration may be divided into three 
approaches: 1) Regionalisation – which involves the creation of new regional 
administrations which have greater authority over their own affairs; 2) Administrative 
reform - which emphasises the way power is organised at the level of the state. This 
might involve the creation of a new agency to oversee the southern region or new 
budgetary mechanisms; and 3) Devolution. The emphasis of this approach is on creating 
new representative mechanisms at the local or regional level, on shifting power to the 
people in a given area. Source: Duncan McCargo, “Autonomy for Southern Thailand: 
Thinking the Unthinkable?,” Pacific Affairs 83, no. 2 (June 2010): 269. 
208 Isra News Agency, Website, http://www.isranews.org/south-news/south-slide/item/ 
(accessed 11 December 2013). 
209 Sukaew Foundation, Website, http://www.sukkaew.org (accessed 3 June 2011). 
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out diverse work such as a goat bank project and a youth leadership 
development project.210 
28) Civil Society Coordinator Working Group (CSCWG)  
The CSCWG is a military working group under the Internal Security 
Operations Command (ISOC) Region 4 that was established in January 
2006 and is responsible for security in the southern border provinces. It is 
based in Inkayuth Army Camp, Pattani. Although it is a state authority, it is 
one of the research samples because it works closely with local people and 
civil society groups in conflict areas.211 It is a small working group that aims 
to create a better understanding between people and the state, to monitor 
situations in the conflict area, to coordinate the relevant authorities in order 
to help victims recover from the violence, and to promote bottom-up 
approaches by proposing information from the locals to policy-making 
levels.212 
29) Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC)   
The SBPAC is a government authority under the Ministry of Interior 
which was established in 1981 with the goal of increasing the participation 
of people across Thai society in the establishment of peace in the southern 
border provinces. It emphasises development and education around peace 
and social justice issues in order to resolve the root causes of conflict and 
ease the after-effects, while improving government officials’ understanding 
of the region. The SBPAC works with all parties involved in the conflict 
including local and national government, the army, universities, and local 
people by offering a range of services such as training, consultancy, and 
funding for peace activities. The ultimate goal is to find a sustainable, 
peaceful end to unrest in the region.213 This Yala-based centre was selected 
as a research sample although it is a government agency because it is a 
key organisation that has played a significant role and cooperated with the 
                                            
210 Respondent 24, Interview. Sukaew Foundation. 5 July 2012. 
211 Internal Security Operations Command, Website, http://www.isoc.thaigov.net 
(accessed 3 June 2011). 
212 Respondent 13, Interview. Civil Society Coordinator Working Group of the Internal 
Security Operation Command (CSCWG). 28 June 2012. 
213 Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre, Website, http://www.sbpac.go.th/ 
(accessed 3 June 2011). 
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civil society sector in creating peace in these provinces for more than 30 
years. 
 
3.6 Plans and Methods for Data Collection 
Data collection is a very important stage of doing research and it is 
where many researchers feel the ‘real’ research occurs.214 It is important to 
limit mistakes during the fieldwork as the researcher had limited resources 
such as time and money. Good planning with the right research tools helped 
the data collection go smoothly. The in-depth interview was the most 
suitable tool compared with other research tools (e.g. focus groups or 
questionnaires) for this research because it enabled detailed information to 
be obtained about each civil society group without being interrupted by 
people from other groups. By visiting their environment the respondents 
were more relaxed and it was also a good opportunity for the researcher to 
observe their activities.215 
There were five stages in developing and using the in-depth interview 
which was the main research tool for this thesis.  
1) Drafting the interview questions 
The semi-structured interview with open-ended questions was used 
in this research. Questions were predetermined, but there was sufficient 
flexibility to allow the interviewee an opportunity to shape the flow of 
information.  
2) Developing an interview guide 
An interview guide is a list of questions used by the interviewer, 
mainly as a memory aid during the interview. The interview guide used in 
this research had the following structure: 1) introduction about the research 
topic and the researcher; 2) background information about respondent(s) 
and their civil society group; 3) key questions about administration, funding 
source, activities, problems and how to improve their group’s performance; 
                                            
214 Graham Birley and Neil Moreland. A Practice Guide to Academic Research (London: 
First, 1998), 40. 
215 The ethics approval completion was required by the University of Waikato before the 
research could proceed. 
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4) general opinions about the role of civil society in the southern region; and 
5) closing questions/additional information.  
3) Selecting the sample interviewees 
The researcher first selected approximately twenty research samples 
based on internet sources. To ensure that selected groups existed, the 
researcher made some long-distance calls to get brief details about these 
selected groups. More civil society groups were introduced during the 
fieldtrip and ultimately twenty-nine civil society groups were interviewed. 
These civil society groups were classified by the researcher into eleven 
categories according to their main targets and activities. Chapter 8 will 
analyse further the characteristics and roles of each category. 
 Natural resources issues: Southern Natural Resources 
Network; 
 Human rights: Muslim Attorney Centre Foundation (MAC), 
Justice for Peace Foundation (JPF), and Cross Cultural 
Foundation (CrCF); 
 Media: Bungaraya Group, and Deep South Watch (DSW); 
 Academic: Center for the Study of Conflict and Cultural Diversity 
in Southern Thailand (CSCC), Institute for Peace Studies, 
Knowledge for Deep South (K4DS), Institute of Human Rights 
and Peace Studies (IHRP), Deep South Coordination Center 
(DSCC), and Graduate Volunteer Training Centre; 
 Religion and culture: Islamic Committee of Talakorbagong 
Mosque, Thai Muslim, Buddhist and Chinese Association, and 
Islamic Culture Foundation of Southern States; 
 Economic: Pattani Chamber of Commerce, and Civil 
Organisation for Peace and Sustainable Economy of Narathiwat; 
 Public health: Pattani Provincial Health Security Coordinating 
Center; 
 Women: Deep South Women Association for Peace 
(Deeppeace), and Civic Women’s Network for Peace in the Deep 
South; 
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 Youth: Southern Youth Network, Association of Children and 
Youth for the Peace in the Southernmost Provinces of Thailand 
(Luuk Rieang Group), and Youth Voluntary Heart Group; 
 Multi-purpose: Deep South Relief and Reconciliation 
Foundation (DSRR), Asian Resource Foundation, Civil Society 
Council of the Southernmost Thailand, and Sukaew Foundation; 
and 
 Government agencies: Civil Society Coordinator Working 
Group (CSCWG), and Southern Border Provinces Administrative 
Centre (SBPAC). 
4) Pilot testing of the questions  
The interview guide was tested on a selected civil society group in 
order to establish the effectiveness of the interview questions. One civil 
society group, the Kampong Sanae Youth Project, was selected for this 
purpose. An interviewee was the manager of the project located in 
Narathiwat. This group was selected because it was under the Institute of 
Human Rights and Peace Studies which has been working in this area for 
quite some time. The pilot testing was useful as it helped with the flow of 
questions, clarification of the questions, possible additional questions and 
timing for the interview session. 
5) Conducting the interviews  
  The fieldtrip to Thailand took approximately six weeks. The 
interviews were conducted mostly in the four provinces of Pattani, Yala, 
Narathiwat and Songkhla. The numbers of participants were no more than 
three people in each interview session. This included the researcher and 
one or two representative(s) from the civil society group. Most respondents 
were the leaders of civil society groups or representatives assigned by 
leaders to attend the interview. Each respondent was asked to share 
knowledge, experience and insights into their particular speciality. First of 
all, the participants were introduced to the researcher, the research topic, 
the background of the thesis and the purposes of the research. Before the 
interview started, the respondent was asked to sign a consent form. The 
interviewing session was conducted in the Thai language. Each session 
took approximately 45 minutes to an hour. During the interviews the 
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researcher took written notes. Face to face interviews were also recorded 
on a digital voice recorder.  
 
3.7 Data Analysis 
After completing the fieldwork and data collection, the next step was 
data analysis. This research adapted some techniques from grounded 
theory, mind mapping, and the SWOT Analysis which combined the 7S 
Model together with the PEST Analysis. 
3.7.1 Grounded Theory 
Grounded Theory is a process for developing empirical theory from 
qualitative research that consists of a set of tasks and underlying 
principles.216 In this research, grounded theory was adopted for the data 
analysis process as it provided a set of flexible guidelines and a process for 
textual data analysis that is well suited to understanding organisational 
behaviour. The main purpose of using grounded theory was to analyse the 
interview transcripts by screening the important points out of the raw data. 
It can also group data that uses different words but has the same meaning 
together. It was applied as an approach to analyse data using the following 
steps.  
First, with preparing transcripts which capture both the words spoken 
by the participant(s) and the interviewer. The interviewing was conducted 
and transcribed in the Thai language by the researcher soon after 
conducting the interview which made it easier to pick out what was being 
said.  
The second task of data analysis using grounded theory is creating 
codes. Coding is a process that involves the labelling or indexing of all the 
data using the codes listed. The process of coding involves a careful reading 
of data, considering which codes are discussed in that section of data and 
then labelling each section with relevant codes manually.  
                                            
216 Monique Hennink, Inge Hutter and Ajay Bailey, Qualitative Research Methods 
(London: Sage, 2011), 208. 
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The list of respondents, the topics from the interview questions and 
the findings were coded. All respondents were coded into numbers from 0 
to 29 according to the dates of the interview.217 Coding for the interview 
questions was classified into four main sections: 1) the characteristics of 
civil society groups (i.e. establishment, founder, main purpose, target group, 
membership, and definition of civil society from each group’s perspective); 
2) the roles of civil society groups (i.e. groups’ policies, main 
activities/projects, groups’ network, and the importance of civil society in 
their opinions, participation from the community); 3) the efficacy of civil 
society (i.e. groups’ performance evaluation, sources of income, groups’ 
structure and funding); and 4) problems and recommendations (i.e. 
difficulties and how to improve groups’ performance). Next, the findings 
were coded according to the elements from SWOT Analysis which will be 
further explained in 3.7.3. Finally, the researcher went through all transcripts 
and matched them together with the codes. 
3.7.2 Mind Map 
 After coding using grounded theory, mind maps were used to 
organise and categorise the coding data. The coding of respondents, 
questions and findings was drawn in the form of mind maps. Mind mapping 
is known as a useful aid of diagrams with connecting lines, colours and 
symbols working together to boost visual perception of the physical map 
and to increase memory retention of the information.218 The term ‘mind map’ 
was first introduced in 1974 by Tony Buzan, a famous British psychology 
author and television personality.219 It speeds up the process of generating 
thought, making decisions, solving problems and studying ideas. It is very 
useful when there are a number of data sources which need to be 
managed.220  
In this research, diagrams of mind mapping were chosen to help 
outline the data from the literature reviews and the interviews. The mind 
                                            
217 Respondent code no.0 is a group for the pilot test. 
218 MindmapsNet, History of Mind Maps, http://www.mindmaps.net/history-of-mind-maps 
(accessed 26 December 2013). 
219 Mind Mapping Blog, Mapping History, http://www.mind-mapping.org/blog/mapping-
history/roots-of-visual-mapping/ (accessed 22 December 2014). 
220 MindmapsNet, History of Mind Maps. 
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map is a very flexible means to collect and organise information during the 
literature reviews. For some sources that include a large amount relevant 
data, the mind map was used to summarise all the data the researcher might 
need on one page. Also, some topics that include information from many 
sources, the researcher used this diagram to combine all relevant data. The 
next steps of data analysis are to describe, compare, categorise, 
conceptualise and develop the findings. The mind map was used to 
compare the data from the interviews which turned qualitative data into data 
one can be calculated. It made the process of data analysis fast, systematic 
and easy for browsing. 
3.7.3 The SWOT Analysis 
In this research, the SWOT Analysis was chosen for evaluating the 
present status of the civil society sector because it is very comprehensive 
and suitable to this topic. It also uses the internal (the 7S Model) and 
external (PEST Analysis) criteria as the guidelines for evaluating the 
potential of civil society groups active in the conflict areas. In order to 
analyse the efficacy of civil society, the SWOT Analysis enabled the 
researcher to transform an abstract, like efficacy, into concrete factors that 
could be measured.  
The SWOT Analysis is a tool from organisational and strategic 
management theory used for assessing both internal and external factors 
about an organisation. Thus, it was sometimes called situation analysis.221 
SWOT Analysis was initiated by Albert Humphrey who led a research 
project at Stanford University in the 1960s and 1970s using data from many 
leading companies in the United States. 222  Many people assume that 
SWOT Analysis is only relevant for business, but in fact it can be useful for 
other types of organisation as well or for making decisions in daily life.223  
                                            
221 Orginasational Theory and Strategic Management, Blog, 4 October 2012, 
http://promrucsa-dba04.blogspot.co.nz/2012/10/swot-analysis-swot-swot-humphrey-swot-
2.html (accessed 4 September 2013). 
222 RAPIDBI, SWOT Analysis, http://rapidbi.com/swotanalysis/ (accessed 17 September 
2013). 
223 Lawrence G Fine, The SWOT Analysis, 2009, http://lawrencefine.com/downloads/ 
SWOT%20-%20PDF.pdf (accessed 4 September 2013). 
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Overall, SWOT Analysis is a technique for understanding ‘Strengths’ 
and ‘Weaknesses’ of the civil society sector, and for identifying both the 
‘Opportunities’ open to the groups and the ‘Threats’ they encounter.224 The 
details of four elements are as follows. 
 Strengths – the advantages that an organisation has over other 
organisations. These factors are within the organisation’s control 
and need to be maintained. 
 Weaknesses – the disadvantages that an organisation has 
internally compared with other organisations. These limitations 
detract from the groups’ ability to achieve their goals. These 
factors are under the organisation’s control and need to be 
changed or improved. 
 Opportunities – current external trends which are waiting to be 
taken advantage of. These factors exist in the environment and 
represent the reason for the groups to develop. 
 Threats – external circumstances which may cause a problem or 
have a negative impact on an organisation. These factors beyond 
the groups’ control, which could lead the groups’ mission to be at 
risk. Threats need to be minimised and managed. 225 226 
The 7S Model  
The 7S Model was used for examining internal factors (Strengths 
versus Weaknesses) of the civil society sector which could be problems or 
benefits. The 7S Model was designed by the American consulting firm 
McKinsey.227 This model is a strategic model that generally can be used for 
examining the current workings, improving organisational performance, 
understanding the most influential factors in an organisation’s strategy and 
                                            
224 Mind Tools, SWOT Analysis, http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newTMC_05. 
htm (accessed 1 June 2013). 
225 Ibid. 
226 Creatly, SWOT Analysis VS PEST Analysis and When to Use Them, 27 March 2012, 
http://creately.com/blog/diagrams/swot-analysis-vs-pest-analysis/ (accessed 9 October 
2013). 
227 Toolshero, 7S Framework (McKinsey), http://www.scienceprogress.info/diagnosis/7s-
model-mckinsey (accessed 9 December 2013). 
 82 
 
determining a new strategy for an organisation.228 This model is mainly used 
to trace performance problems in an organisation in order to maintain or 
improve these factors.229 
 Strategy – This is the organisation’s plan for using resources and 
capabilities advantageously by using mission and vision statements. 
 Structure – This describes how the organisation is structured and 
which hierarchical layers exist. This includes roles, responsibilities 
and accountability relationships. 
 Systems – This is the technical infrastructure that employees use on 
a day to day basis to accomplish their aims and goals. It includes all 
formal and informal methods of operation, procedures and 
communication flows. 
 Shared values – This is a set of traits, behaviours, and 
characteristics that the organisation believes in. It also includes 
standards and values and other forms of ethics within an organisation 
in which vision, corporate culture and identity are the key elements. 
 Style – this is about leadership management styles and the culture 
of interaction. 
 Staff – this is about the employees, staffing plans, their competences 
and job descriptions. 
 Skills – This is the ability to do the organisation’s work. It reflects in 
the performance of the organisation. These factors concern both the 
skills of the organisation and those of the employees. 
PEST Analysis230 
PEST stands for Political, Economic, Social and Technological 
factors. 
 Political – Laws, global issues, legislation and regulations which may 
have an effect on the organisation either immediately or in the future. 
                                            
228 The Organizational Strategist, Blog, 24 April, 2011, http://whittblog.wordpress.com/ 
2011/04/24/mckinsey-7s-model-a-strategic-assessment-and-alignment-model/ (accessed 
9 October 2013). 
229 Toolshero, 7S Framework (McKinsey). 
230  PEST can also be known as PESTLE which includes Legal and Environmental 
factors. 
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 Economic – Taxes, interest rates, inflation, the stock markets and 
consumer confidence all need to be taken into account. 
 Social – The changes in lifestyle, media, major events, ethics, 
advertising and publicity factors. 
 Technological – Innovations, access to technology, licensing and 
patents, manufacturing, research funding, global communications.231 
PEST Analysis is often linked with SWOT Analysis as PEST Analysis 
helps organisations to understand circumstantial factors which can affect 
the organisation’s performance. PEST Analysis looks at overall external 
factors (Opportunities versus Threats) which help organisations to conduct 
directions for change in order to handle environments which are beneficial 
or detrimental.232  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 - The Data Analysis 
Source: Adapted from Lawrence G Fine, The SWOT Analysis, 2009, http://lawrencefine. 
com/downloads/SWOT%20-%20PDF.pdf (accessed 4 September 2013) 
 
                                            
231 Creatly, SWOT Analysis. 
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3.8 Limitations and Recommendations for the Data Collection 
Although the researcher planned the fieldtrip carefully, some 
difficulties were predicted. The following are some limitations of this fieldtrip 
and recommendations for future fieldwork.  
 Challenges of the methods 
Grounded Theory. This coding technique, going word-by-word, is 
time consuming. Dividing the data into individual words might cause the 
analysis sometimes to become lost within the minutia of data.233 Another 
concern is this tool might not be able to detect or to prevent researcher-
induced bias. 
Mind Map. Although a mind map will help to review and recall 
information, creating the map may take time and it is sometime difficult to 
incorporate large chunks of text. 
The SWOT Analysis. One drawback to the SWOT analysis is that it 
gives equal weight to every factor. It does not give weight to the specific 
factors that might be much more relevant or have a greater impact.234 Thus, 
the researcher has to consider how to weigh each factor, which in this 
research was weighed by frequency. 
 Sample groups 
 Before conducting the fieldtrip, the researcher was based in New 
Zealand and had to rely on data about civil society groups in Thailand from 
internet sources. As there are so many civil society groups in Thailand, the 
researcher had to contact them to make sure those groups still existed. It 
was also a good opportunity to introduce the research and to see how keen 
people were to be part of the interviews. When the researcher went on the 
fieldtrip, it was found that there are many more civil society groups that play 
significant roles in these provinces although their data did not appear on 
internet databases. With the snowball sampling technique,235 an additional 
                                            
233 George Allan, A Critique of Using Grounded Theory as a Research Method, 
www.ejbrm.com. (accessed 16 December 2014). 
234 Michael Firth, Limitations of SWOT Analysis, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/ 
limitations-swot-analysis-58212.html (accessed 16 December 2014). 
235 Snowball sampling is a form of non-probability sampling in which the researcher 
begins by identifying an individual perceived to be an appropriate respondent. This 
respondent is then asked to identify another potential respondent. The process is 
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long list of potential samples came up. One recommendation in order to 
meet various people involved in the civil society sector is to attend any 
seminars or conferences about the southern conflict where most of the key 
players would be present. Most of them were keen to give information about 
their groups as well as sharing their opinions about the role of civil society 
sector.  
 Time 
As the researcher wanted to make the most of her time during the 
fieldtrip, all appointments with the civil society groups in each province were 
made during one trip. However, it was not easy trying to arrange all 
appointments in one area at the same time. Some civil society groups were 
quite difficult to arrange an appointment with because they were busy with 
seminars or projects. The researcher had to make two or more visits to each 
province. The researcher also had to make sure that there was a gap 
between each interview because if any of the participants were late, it would 
have affected the next interview. Furthermore, travelling in this conflict area 
needed good plans and arrangements. Public transport was not convenient 
and it was better to travel with someone who knew the area well in order to 
save time between the meeting places.  
 Safety  
 Although these provinces are considered safe to visit, violent 
incidents happen almost daily. Safety was an important issue during the 
fieldwork when going to the area of conflict. The location of the civil society 
groups had to be considered and decisions made if it was safe to travel 
there or not. The interview venues were normally chosen by the 
interviewees which were mostly at their offices. If not, appointments were 
made to meet at other places which were safe and convenient for both 
sides. This is to ensure that participants felt comfortable and safe to take 
part in the interviews. Advice from the local people about how to stay safe 
in this area was kept in mind. 
 
                                            
repeated until the researcher has collected sufficient data. Source: Paul Oliver, The 
SAGE Dictionary of Social Research Methods, http://srmo.sagepub.com/view/the-sage-
dictionary-of-social-research-methods/n192.xml (accessed 24 May 2014).  
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3.9 Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter has provided a detailed description of the 
research methodology used in this thesis. A qualitative research 
methodology was employed to illustrate the role of civil society in building 
peace in the ethno-religious conflict. This chapter also introduced the 
background of twenty-nine civil society sample groups. Two data-collection 
methods were employed including document review and in-depth 
interviews. Some techniques including grounded theory, mind maps, and 
SWOT Analysis were applied in the process of data analysis. Finally, some 
limitations and recommendations for further research were outlined. The 
next chapter provides an overview of the insurgency in the deep south 
including the origins of the conflict, important violent incidents, the 
background of militant groups and how past Thai governments have 
handled the situation by issuing new laws and restructuring key government 
agencies. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE NATURE OF THE INSURGENCY IN THE SOUTH AND 
THAI GOVERNMENT POLICIES RELATED TO THE 
SOUTHERN CONFLICT 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In the past, the southern border region of Thailand was known as a 
place for corrupt and incompetent civilian and military officials. This made 
the predominantly Thai Muslim population feel an even greater degree of 
alienation as a result of government misadministration. Additionally, daily 
life, particularly in urban areas, was continually plagued by a higher level of 
banditry and lawlessness than in the other regions, which made it very 
difficult for the authorities to differentiate between criminal lawlessness and 
insurgent acts commissioned by domestic Thai criminals or Muslim 
separatist groups.  
This chapter will begin by looking at the background to and the 
causes of, the conflict. The following section describes some of the most 
significant violent incidents which were considered to be the beginning of 
the resistance movements and the new round of violence in 2004. The 
nature of the militants, including their demands and tactics, as well as an 
introduction of the ten major militant movements active in these provinces 
are also examined in this chapter. The next section contains an overview of 
government policies and restructuring of key agencies related to the 
problem in the south. Additionally, the special laws issued during the conflict 
are discussed in the last section as these laws were widely criticised by the 
public and the locals as having caused even more tension in the area.  
This chapter aims to create a deeper understanding about the 
conflict; to examine the attempts of the Thai state to resolve the conflict; and 
to discuss why some of these national policies were not successful in 
reducing the violence. It is obvious that the state alone cannot create peace 
as the violent incidents are still ongoing in these provinces. 
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4.2 Background to the Conflict 
The southern violence has been ongoing for more than a decade. It 
is now one of the most violent conflicts in the Southeast Asian region and 
the least talked about in the international media. Unfortunately, no solution 
appears to be in sight - in part, because few people understand what is 
happening and what the root cause of the conflict is.  
First of all, the nature of the conflict should be clearly understood. 
According to the types of ethnic conflict in Chapter 2, the southern conflict 
cannot easily fit into one category as it has some elements which merge 
many categories. It, however, can be classified into Civil rights conflict and 
Ethnic rebellions as both types focus on applying pressure on 
government. 236  The conflict is absolutely not Inter-communal violence 
because it is not a war between the Muslim and Buddhist communities. 
Some have misunderstood this and have tried to link the conflict with 
religion. 
According to the Civil right conflict, the local Muslim people feel they 
are denied access to state resources or to cultural rights as these provinces 
are among the least developed regions of the country. As mentioned in 
Ethnic rebellions, the conflict has an element of wanting to separate itself 
from the state and ideally seek for the establishment of an independent state 
or some form of special autonomous region. The conflict also takes on the 
form of militant attacks which aims to challenge directly the central 
government.237  
In order to understand the background of this prolonged conflict, this 
section provides the terminology of the conflict, the identity of Muslims in 
this region and the root causes of the conflict. 
4.2.1 ‘Insurgency’- A Term Describing the Situation in the South? 
The situation of violent unrest in the southernmost provinces is 
officially called in Thai ‘khwam mai sa-ngop’ which means turbulence or 
disturbance. In this context, the term ‘insurgency’ is more suitable than 
‘terrorism’ or ‘separatism’ when considering the definitions, goals and scale 
                                            
236 Notholt, Fields of Fire, 1.06. 
237 Ibid., 1.08. 
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of the violence. Chris North has defined insurgency (drawn from a US Air 
Force definition) as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 
legitimacy and/or influence over the relevant populations”.238 Furthermore, 
violence in southern Thailand is based on the following three elements of 
insurgency: “(1) ideology or legitimacy claims supporting insurgent action; 
(2) an organisation (however loose and decentred); and (3) a guerrilla-style 
campaign to contest state authority, together with the use of violence and 
intimidation to gain control over people and territory”.239  
The official term ‘khwam mai sa-ngop’ refers to violent actions which 
may have a political objective, but may also simply aim to create chaos for 
pragmatic ends through threatening leaflets, blocking the traffic by spraying 
nails on the road, and arson attacks (e.g. on schools, public telephone 
booths and car showrooms). The Thai state uses the expression ‘khwam 
mai sa-ngop’ as a soft euphemism for the unrest, which tries to elide the 
political dimension of the violence by ignoring the insurgent goals of militant 
groups.240 This is why Thai officials are reluctant to use the English term 
‘insurgency’ in briefings with foreign officials and audiences on the current 
turbulence.  
Today, the Thai government has still not given a clear-cut term to be 
used for violent incidents in the south. However, ‘khwam mai sa-ngop’ has 
been explicitly matched to the English expression ‘insurgency’ which has 
become a widely used term for journalists and academics to summarise the 
violence in southern Thailand. 
4.2.2 Muslim Identity in Southern Thailand 
Over 1.5 billion people, or about 23 per cent of the world’s population, 
are Muslims. The Muslims in southern Thailand have the same 
characteristics as Muslims in Malaysia. The local Muslims in southern 
Thailand could be defined by the term ethnicity as described in Chapter 2 
because they share history, place, religion, race and other social symbols 
(e.g. language, food or dress). Moreover, the typology of ethnic groups 
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shows that Muslims in the south have some of the characteristics of Ethno-
nationalists because these are based on historical traditions of territory and 
violence carried out by militant groups. The Muslims have also the 
characteristics of Indigenous peoples as they are locals who live in the far 
south which is one of the most underdeveloped areas in the country. 
The factors determining the identity of Muslims in the southern border 
provinces are as follows: 
1) Islam – religious rules 
 The majority of the Muslim population in the three southern border 
provinces, like most of the Muslim world, are Sunni Muslims, not Shia.241 
The core beliefs of Islam are that there is only one God and that Muhammad 
is his prophet. The Muslim way of life is bound by the following five religious 
rules. Muslims pray (lamard) 5 times a day; they pay zakat;242 they fast 
every year during the lunar month of ‘Ramadan’; and those who are able to 
go to Mecca do so in order to perform the Hajj.243 Furthermore, Muslims 
have their dietary practices which are based on Halal food. In Islam, other 
forbidden food items include pork and all its products; animals improperly 
slaughtered; alcoholic drinks, including all forms of intoxicants; carnivorous 
animals; birds of prey; and any food contaminated with any of these 
products.244 
2) Culture – way of life 
 The Thai Muslims in the southern border provinces are of Malay 
descent. They speak the Pattani Malay dialect (yawi), which is close to 
Kelantan Malay. The manner of dress for Muslim females is strict. It is 
centred on the ‘Hijab’ which requires that the whole body, except face and 
hands, is covered in public and that the only accessories allowed for women 
is gold. 
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Cleanliness is considered pious in Islam. Muslim houses must be 
clean so as to provide a place for performing religious rites such as prayers 
and reading Al Qur’an. Dogs and their saliva are considered unclean.245 
3) Mosque – community centre 
 Besides being a place for performing religious rites, the mosque is 
also a centre to promote and support activities in the community, and a 
place where Muslims can seek justice. It is also a place to host wedding 
ceremonies. The ‘Kubo’, the Muslim cemetery, is normally located near the 
mosque. The mosque is at the heart of the Muslim community from birth 
until death.  
 Another important role of the mosque is to provide Islamic studies for 
community members. Activities hosted by the mosque include some 
religious teachings by an imam, or khatip, during lunchtime at Friday 
prayers, basic religious knowledge (Falduin) for children from 5-12 years old 
is also provided at the Tadika246 which is normally found in the mosque 
compound, and Islamic studies which focus on morals as well as ethics and 
not only academic subjects.  
4) Ponoh – religious education 
Religion is an essential component of education for Muslims. It is 
compulsory for Muslims to study religious teachings and to follow the 
regulations in their daily lives. Ponohs have been the most important 
informal educational institutes providing religious education for the people 
in the region. The teachers at ponohs, called ‘ustaz’, are normally very well 
respected by the local people.247 
4.2.3 Causes of the Conflict  
Ethno-religious violence in Thailand has multiple causes including 
historical concerns, economic marginalisation, political issues, social and 
cultural differences, educational opportunity inequities and judicial 
discrimination. These have resulted in local grievances and a latent crisis in 
inter-ethnic relations. 
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Historical Issues 
The political history between Siam and the Patani Kingdom was 
overlaid with different perceptions between the Thai state and Pattani. While 
the Thai government in Bangkok perceives Pattani’s history negatively in 
terms of a rebellious place, local people see the region as having a positive 
and brave history related to fighting for independence and an Islamic 
identity. In this sense, the political history of Pattani can be described as a 
“discrepancy of perspectives”.248 The memory of past political history is 
used by local people to mobilise their sentiments against the state. Muslim 
people’s perception of history shows Siam as having tortured Muslims and 
treated them badly. One of the stories relates to how their ancestors were 
captured and enslaved by the Siamese. Their achilles tendons were pierced 
and chains run through them. They were then sent to dig a main canal route 
in Bangkok.249 This kind of anecdotal history has been passed on from one 
generation to another and it has created prejudice amongst Muslims in the 
south against the state.  
Economic Issues 
Thailand’s wealth disparities between the centre and the rural areas 
have resulted in the economic underdevelopment of the south. While the 
northeast is the poorest region, Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat are among 
the least developed provinces in the country.250  
According to statistics from the National Economic and Social 
Development Board in 2011, the poverty incidence in the three southern 
border provinces was Pattani 33.49%, Narathiwat 24.73% and Yala 
13.38%. Each was higher than the country’s average of 13.15%. Although 
the trend is more positive from 2006, poverty incidence in the past showed 
that the three southern border provinces had a high rate compared to other 
provinces in the south and provinces elsewhere.251 The unemployment rate 
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in these three provinces was continuously high, particularly, in Narathiwat 
(1.87%) where the rate was the highest in the country in 2011 while the 
whole country’s average was 0.68%.252 
The government has failed to develop the economy according to the 
local peoples’ needs because of a lack of understanding between the state 
and the people. The government perceives Muslim communities as being 
difficult to access because most people cannot communicate in the Thai 
language which makes it difficult to reach people and develop policies. At 
the same time, Muslim communities perceive outside investors as purely 
motivated by self-interest who are destroying the religious and social 
identities of the Muslim community. An example is the fishing industry, 
where all the owners are non-Muslims, but the labourers are mostly Muslims 
in the community.253 Only the business owners gain advantage and become 
wealthy while the local people still have a poor quality of life.  
Another aspect of the problem is the top-down approach of 
processes of development that are not appropriate for the local culture and 
religion. This is because policies and projects are usually all predetermined 
by the central government without participation from the local people. 
Moreover, several key reasons for consistent poverty in the region are 
related to high birth rates, a lack of education, the lack of local communities’ 
rights in managing their own natural resources, and vocational training that 
does not meet the needs of employers.  
Political Issues 
Although religion is not a direct cause of problems in the south, it is 
used as a political tool to create conflicts. According to ideas in Buddhist 
cosmology, religious rituals and practices are determined and standardised 
by the state in order to securitise and consolidate its power. In Islam, 
however, it is believed that the roles of religious leaders are above the state. 
In the Thai Buddhist state, it is the state that has a role to play and the power 
to regulate religion. Therefore, these different religious frameworks are used 
to credit each side’s own actions and discredit those of the other. When the 
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idea of a Buddhist cosmology is used in the three provinces in the south, 
where the majority is Malay Muslim, a bias is created.  
On the other hand, the ignorance of the state’s mechanisms about 
the Muslim way of life produces bias against the state, for example, security 
forces use sniffer dogs to search the homes and schools of local Muslims 
who consider that they are being disregarded and feel offended as dogs are 
seen as impure and ritually unclean.254 It is undeniable that one of the 
reasons for the unrest in the south is the way the state’s mechanisms 
operate. It is questionable whether the state truly understands Malay 
Muslims in the south. An assimilative policy, which has been successfully 
used to resolve problems with minorities in other places, has not reduced 
violent incidents in the southern region.255 
The failure of the Thaksin government to remedy problems in the 
south indicated that the government was not on the right path. It failed to 
resolve problems by relying too much on political popularity around gaining 
votes.256 The current crisis, however, is also a result of government policies 
that have aggravated the situation in the region. The insurgency problem in 
the south re-emerged after the Thai Rak Thai party-led government decided 
to impose greater central control over a region traditionally dominated by 
the main opponent, the Democratic Party. Upon taking office in early 2001, 
Prime Minister Thaksin announced his intention to make major changes in 
the government's policy in the south.  
Another measure to strengthen the new government's control over 
the region was the cabinet's decision in March 2002 to dismantle the 
successful intelligence and suppression operations against separatist 
groups. Even though the weakness of intelligence has been an obstacle in 
Thailand's security for decades, inconsistencies in the handling of the crisis 
by the Thaksin government aggravated the problem.257  
 The state’s response to the insurgency has been hampered by a lack 
of training in counter-insurgency methods, a lack of understanding of local 
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culture, and rivalry between the police and the army. The army has 
responded to insurgent attacks with heavy-handed raids on Muslim villages 
which only resulted in reprisals. Insurgents have provoked the 
inexperienced Thai government into disproportionate responses, 
generating sympathy among the Muslim people. As most governments only 
had a short term in office, it was hard for them to produce tangible outcomes. 
As the government in Bangkok fails to resolve other urgent problems, it is 
doubtful that the southern conflict will receive the serious attention it 
deserves.  
Social and Cultural Issues 
As stated already, Islam is not only a religion, but also a way of life 
for Muslims. Therefore, religion and culture are inseparable for people in the 
southern border provinces. People’s identity in the region is very different 
from that of Thais in other parts of the country due to differences in language 
and religion. People in the region feel very much connected with those in 
Malaysia because they share similarities in terms of religion, language, 
ethnicity, culture and history.258  
Government officials who are sent to the deep south have very little 
knowledge about the culture and identity of local people. For example, some 
important Muslim regulations which people from outside should be aware of 
are dress and dietary practices which should not be ignored or violated.  
The religious issue is very delicate one which the state must try to 
understand and attach importance to.259 Many Thai people think that in Thai 
society people should all be the same, and those who are different should 
change so as to be the same as the majority of the people.260  
While the vast majority of the population are Thai-speaking 
Buddhists, the southern Muslims are ethnically Malay and speak their own 
dialect (yawi), which few non-Muslims can speak or understand. Social 
capital and civil society are significantly weaker in southern Thailand than 
in the rest of the country. The south also has a reputation as a troubled 
region characterised by a high crime rate, lawlessness, endemic corruption 
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within the bureaucracy, smuggling, small-arms trading and other forms of 
illegitimate business.261 
Education Issues 
Ponohs play the most important role in maintaining and sustaining 
Muslim communities, Islamic teachings, Muslim culture, the Malay 
language, and Muslim ways of life in the region. Because of an imbalance 
among academic, vocational and religious education, only a few graduates 
from ponohs are able to further their professional degrees at the 
universities.  
The state has tried to control the activities, curricula and 
management of ponohs. There were a number of attempts to control and 
transform these ponohs into regular public schools which are normally 
under the control of the Ministry of Education. While most are registered 
with the Ministry of Education, some are beyond official supervision. Funded 
by private donations and founded by ustaz who themselves have 
undertaken religious studies in Pakistan and the Middle East, some ponohs 
became breeding grounds for potential radical Muslims. According to Thai 
government sources, in the past 15 years, 5,000 Thai-Muslim students have 
graduated from religious schools and various Islamic universities in the 
Middle East and South Asia. After returning home, only a few graduates get 
professional jobs with the rest becoming religious teachers at ponohs in 
local communities, thereby contributing to the spread of more intense 
doctrine and radical versions of Islam, such as Wahhabism 262  and 
fundamentalist Islam. Politically radical young ustaz and their students have 
become part of the movement toward militant groups in southern Thailand. 
This has resulted in an expanded pool of aggressive youths who have 
become the main targets for recruitment by extremists. 263  Ponohs, 
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therefore, are seen as a threat to national security because they enhance 
“fundamentalism”.264  
Judicial Issues 
It is agreed that one factor which stimulates problems in the southern 
border region is injustice, often originating from state officials’ discrimination. 
A lack of understanding and acceptance of differences between the 
dominant Thai culture in Bangkok, leads to discrimination against other 
cultural norms. Injustice that derives from discrimination is demonstrated by 
a lack of knowledge and inefficiency to resolve conflict in Thai society.265 As 
a result, people in the south have no faith in national laws and do not rely 
on the state’s justice process. 
People in the south have always thought they are not Thai citizens 
and that they have been ignored by the central government. They consider 
themselves to be second class citizens. There are some cases showing that 
Muslims have been treated unjustly including the tragic examples of the 
Krue Se Mosque and Tak Bai incidents, and the disappearance of lawyer 
Somchai Neelapaijit who represented cases for Muslims and was tortured 
by the state. State officials were suspected in these cases but it seems no 
one has been held responsible for these tragic incidents.266  
According to the report of the JPF between 2002 and 2011, it has 
documented 22 incidents of enforced disappearances which took place in 
southern Thailand, involving 33 people. All victims are Malay Muslim men 
and mostly were under 40 years old.267 Several other measures taken by 
the security forces such as intrusions into unregistered ponohs, the arrests 
of teachers and the army’s frequent search-and-arrest hunts have caused 
mistrust among the locals and state governments and eroded local people’s 
willingness to cooperate with the security forces.268 
State officials have mainly used violent means to solve the conflict. 
Although heavy-handed means might stop immediate violence, the root 
causes of the problems has not been resolved. Violations committed by the 
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police and the military have provoked fear and anger and strengthened the 
cause of the insurgents.  
 
4.3 The Beginning of Resistance Movements 
The beginning of the conflict in the south was when the policy of 
administrative centralisation was introduced in the late nineteenth 
century. 269  The government policies of nationalism and centralisation 
affected Malay-Muslims in every aspect. Tensions between governments 
and local Muslims in the south continued and sometimes intensified. The 
first recognised uprising was the ‘Dusun Ngur Rebellion’ and then many 
resistance movements were formed and active in this area in the late 1960s. 
4.3.1 The Dusun Ngur Rebellion 
The chairman of the Pattani Provincial Islamic Council, Haji Sulong 
bin Abdul Kadir, established the Patani People’s Movement in early 1947. 
Haji Sulong was a modernist religious leader educated in Mecca, Saudi 
Arabia and heavily influenced by a strict Muslim society. The Movement 
petitioned for seven requests including local autonomy, language and 
cultural rights, and implementation of Islamic law.  
Fifty-five leaders in Narathiwat followed Haji Sulong’s lead and 
presented a similar list of demands. Before Prime Minister Pridi 
Banomyong 270  had a chance to respond to their requests, General 
Phibulsongkhram mounted a coup and re-took office in November 1947. 
The military government’s response was to imprison Haji Sulong and 
several other religious leaders on treason charges in January 1948.  
Haji Sulong’s imprisonment was the beginning of serious resistance 
to Thai rule. Malay officials in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat boycotted 
meetings with Thai administrators and planned to boycott the 1948 national 
election. Rebellions broke out in the three provinces, including a mass 
protest outside the police station where Haji Sulong was imprisoned. He 
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was moved out of the southern provinces for trial, but the protest did not 
end. Riots erupted all over Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat. The biggest one 
was known as the ‘Dusun Nyur Rebellion’ in Narathiwat on 26-28 April 1948. 
Hundreds of men were led by a religious leader, Haji Abdul Rahman, 
against the police resulting in the deaths of some 400 Muslims while 
thousands more fled to Malaysia.  
Haji Sulong was eventually released from prison in 1952, but 
disappeared along with his eldest son, Ahmad Tomeena, in 1954, and was 
presumed to have been drowned by the police. The expansion of Malay 
resistance in the 1950s was accelerated and consolidated by the formation 
of militant groups.271  
4.3.2 1960-1990 Rebellion and Conciliation 
Conflict intensified after the 1957 coup led by Field Marshal Sarit 
Thanarat who strengthened assimilationist policies, resettled ethnic Thais 
in the region, and tried to assert control over Islamic schools. As a result of 
that, local Malays formed several militant movements to respond against 
the state and to try to gain independence.272 
Over 60 armed groups, including Muslim separatists and Thai and 
Malaysian communists, were operating in the south in the late 1960s. Their 
tactics, including extortion, kidnap, murder and arson, were identical. The 
goals of the armed separatist movements were broadly similar, but they 
rarely cooperated. There was no leader who could command broad support 
like Haji Sulong had done. Attempts to coordinate all these armed groups 
were ultimately unsuccessful, and internal conflicts significantly weakened 
the major groups.273  
After almost two decades of intense campaigns against separatist 
and communist insurgencies in the south, the government realised that its 
battle had to be political as well as military. In 1981, the government of 
Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanond overhauled security policies and 
administrative structures to pursue political accommodation. The new 
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approach, which emphasised public participation and economic 
development rather than a purely military strategy, was effective. Although 
violent incidents never ceased completely, they were greatly reduced. 
Hundreds of militants, communists and separatists, accepted an amnesty 
and decided to participate in Thai politics.274 
  
4.4 New Round of Violence 
A new round of violence opened on the night of 24 December 2001 
with five well-coordinated attacks on police posts in Pattani, Yala and 
Narathiwat that left five officers and a village defence volunteer dead. The 
simultaneous attacks were more well-planned than the sporadic extortion, 
arson and kidnapping for ransom seen for more than a decade, and set a 
pattern that has continued. This pattern has seen coordinated attacks on 
police posts and raids by masked gunmen to capture weapons.  
According to the Ministry of the Interior’s statistics, insurgency-
related incidents rose from 50 in 2001 to 75 in 2002, 119 in 2003 and then, 
in a dramatic escalation, to over 1,000 in 2004.275 Since the beginning of 
2004, a series of violent events have showed that the insurgency has 
revived.  
4.4.1 The Army Camp Raid 
The first major incident in 2004 was a raid on the Royal Thai Army's 
4th Engineering Battalion in Cho Airong district, Narathiwat on 4 January. In 
a carefully planned, well-coordinated series of attacks at around 2 a.m., at 
least a hundred assailants stormed into the army development battalion 
base and seized some 400 weapons, including assault rifles, machine guns, 
pistols and rocket launchers. The raiders killed four Buddhist soldiers 
guarding the arsenal, but none of the Muslim guards. Not only was the camp 
raided, but insurgents also launched arson attacks on twenty schools and 
three police posts across eleven of Narathiwat's thirteen districts. Within 24 
hours, on 5 January, it was found that several bombs had been planted 
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around the Pattani province. Police defused some, but two bomb squad 
officers were killed attempting to defuse another. The sophistication and 
scope of these simultaneous attacks, as well as the numbers involved, 
troubled the intelligence agencies and security forces.276 
4.4.2 The Disappearance of Lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit 
 Somchai Neelapaijit, a prominent human rights lawyer, disappeared 
on 12 March 2004. He was a Muslim lawyer who, for over 20 years, had 
played a significant role in defending Muslims accused of involvement in 
violence in the southern border provinces. He was representing several of 
the suspects in the January army camp raid who claimed that they had been 
tortured in custody. One month after his disappearance, five police officers 
were arrested in connection with Somchai’s case and charged with coercion 
and robbery. None have been charged with the more serious crimes of 
abduction or other offenses connected to the enforced disappearance. On 
11 March 2011, the Appeals Court dismissed the case against all other 
defendants citing a lack of evidence against them. At present, Somchai’s 
case is under consideration by Thailand’s Supreme Court. 277  Since the 
appearance of Somchai, Angkhana Neelapaijit, the wife of the missing 
lawyer, has played an important role in seeking the explanation for her 
husband’s disappearance and in pursuing human rights issues in the region.  
4.4.3 The Battle of Krue Se Mosque 
On the 28 April 2004, a group of assailants led by Hama Salae 
attacked some security checkpoints where the assailants stabbed one 
police officer and one soldier to death.278 The Commander of the Pattani 
Special Task Force immediately dispatched a patrol team to assess the 
situation. The soldiers blockaded the mosque with a tank and tried to 
persuade the militants to surrender, but their leader repeatedly stated that 
they would fight to the death. Soldiers and militants exchanged gunfire 
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which lasted around an hour. After negotiations failed, Special Forces 
troops were ordered to storm the mosque and shoot to kill.  
The battle at Krue Se Mosque was not the only clash that day. Ten 
small groups congregated before dawn in mosques across Yala, Pattani 
and Songkhla and, after prayers, launched simultaneous pre-dawn raids on 
rural checkpoints, police stations and army bases.279 At the end of the day, 
five policemen and soldiers were killed, while 106 militants lost their lives. 
This included casualties from the siege of Krue Se Mosque in which all 32 
militants who took refuge in the mosque and exchanged gunfire with 
authorities were killed.280 
4.4.4 The Tak Bai Protest 
On the morning of 25 October 2004, during the fasting month of 
Ramadan, approximately 1,500 people gathered outside the Tak Bai police 
station in Narathiwat. They gathered to protest the detention of six village 
defence volunteers who were on charges of allegedly stealing guns from 
the local defence forces. Protestors at Tak Bai claimed the men were 
innocent and had been detained unjustly.  
In fact, not all the protestors were at the police station that day out of 
concern for the six detainees. Some had been asked to come by friends, 
others by their village heads or imams, for a host of different reasons: to 
hear a lecture by the ‘chularajmontri’281 on Islam; to break the daily fast; to 
attend a ‘sembayang hajat’282 for the detainees; to be on hand when Prime 
Minister Thaksin came to hand out money; and to attend a protest. Many 
were simply curious passers-by and got caught in the crowd.283 
Around 11 a.m., some protestors tried to enter the police station but 
retreated when soldiers fired warning shots. High ranking army and police 
officers came to assess the situation and offered to arrange bail for the six 
detainees. Demonstrators continued to demand their release and refused 
to disperse. According to the International Crisis Group, protestors claimed 
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that even if they had wanted to leave, they were trapped. Army trucks and 
tanks were blocking each end of the street and there was a river behind. 
Some claimed soldiers and even the protest leaders prevented them from 
leaving.284  
After some protestors tried to break through the police barrier, 
warning shots, fire engines, water cannon and tear gas were used to 
disperse the crowd. Seven protesters, including a 14-year-old, died while 
another two were shot, but survived. Police and soldiers ordered protestors 
to lie face down on the ground and then tied their hands behind their backs. 
Approximately 1,300 protestors, stacked in trucks up to five or six layers 
deep, were taken to Inkayuth army base in Pattani for questioning. The 150-
kilometre journey to Pattani normally takes approximately one hour and 
twenty minutes, but the trucks took up to five hours. When all the trucks 
arrived at Inkayuth Camp, 78 protestors were dead, mostly of asphyxiation. 
Many others had broken and dislocated limbs and other ailments.  
The majority, which were around 1,172 people, was released on 30 
and 31 October 2004. 58 were charged with possession of unlicensed 
weapons, coercion of officers to act or refrain from action with force and 
weapons, destruction of public property, assembly of more than ten people, 
and causing turmoil, but they were all released on bail on 12 November.285 
In 2009, following the result of an inquest into the 78 deaths in Tak 
Bai, the Songkla Provincial Court ruled that the deaths were caused by 
suffocation, but did not elaborate on the manner of death as required by 
law. Relatives of the victims subsequently challenged the Provincial Court’s 
ruling at the Central Criminal Court, the Appeal Court and later at the 
Supreme Court. In August 2013, the Supreme Court upheld previous court 
rulings on the incident, saying that despite the deaths, security personnel 
were blameless and had only been performing their duties.286 
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4.5 Background of the Militant Groups 
 The nature of the militant groups remains a matter of dispute. Many 
questions concerning the movements behind the violence in these southern 
provinces have never been clearly addressed by conflicting parties or 
relevant actors. None of the militant groups have officially announced their 
responsibility for the violent incidents in the deep south. These unidentified 
groups and unclear objectives make it difficult for the state to resolve the 
conflict. However, the following section will help explain some important 
views of the militant movements active in this area. 
4.5.1 The Purposes of the Militant Groups 
 “What do the militants want?” seems to be one of the most popular 
questions constantly raised. The militants have consistently declined to 
claim responsibility for any violent action in these provinces. In the past, 
these political movements were commonly called ‘separatist groups’ as their 
main objective during that time was to gain independence. In practice, an 
independent, tiny Patani state sandwiched between Thailand and Malaysia 
seems impossible in reality. 
Over time, the main purpose of the new round of violence has been 
changed. An independent Islamic state is no longer their ultimate goal but 
more have called for autonomy and justice as well as the need to boost 
Muslim representation in local politics. A demand by militant groups to settle 
for some form of autonomy has been discussed widely, but it is not easy to 
reach a common solution for the conflicting parties.287 
4.5.2 Tactics of Militant Groups 
 Violent incidents carried out with a wide-range of different tactics 
occur in this area almost every day. Most incidents are caused by ambush, 
bombing and arson. Additionally, three main tactics identified by the police 
authorities are mixed tactics, focused tactics and special tactics.288   
 The examples of mixed tactics are the January 2004 army base 
attack and the April 28 Krue Se Mosque Incident. These incidents included 
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a mixture of targets and different mode of activities, such as arson, 
obstruction, shooting and weapons heists in the same complex attack.289 
 Focused tactics mean tight, specific targets in a limited area, for 
example, a bomb outside the house of a judge in Yala or a series of small 
bombs at key government offices. The use of daily killings and repeated 
small-scale attacks aim to create a sense of constant distrust among the 
population.290  
 Besides these two tactics, special tactics include, for example, the 
use of bombs in busy areas which were set off simultaneously in different 
places and the beheading of innocent victims. This targeting of civilians who 
were not working for the state was a new aim of the militants to create a 
heightened sense of fear.291 
4.5.3 The Ten Major Militant Groups  
Besides these ten major militant groups, more than 60 other groups 
have existed and operated in this area since the late 1960s. It was, however, 
difficult to ascertain whether they were insurgent organisations which 
reflected actual factionalism and divergent agendas or just a division of 
labour in the struggle for a common goal. The following are the ten major 
militant movements active in the deep south and some of them remain 
influential in today’s violence.292 
1) The Barisan National Pemberbasan Patani (BNPP) or Patani 
National Liberation Front 
This group was considered the first organised armed resistance 
group.293 It was founded in 1959 by Tengu Abdul Jalal, also known as Adul 
Na Saiburi, but its origins can be traced to a local revolt which took place in 
1947 in Narathiwat. The main purpose of the group was to gain 
independence from Thailand: autonomy, or joining Malaysia, were 
unacceptable. The strategy of the group focused on guerrilla war. Since 
1990, the group has turned to supporting international separatist 
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movements and has renamed itself the Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani 
(BIPP). From 1989 to 2002 the movement was largely inactive. It was 
believed by Thai state security agencies that the group was involved in the 
attacks in 2003, but the group’s participation in a series of violent events in 
2004 could not be confirmed.294 
2) The Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) or National 
Revolutionary Front 
The original BRN was established on 13 March 1960. There were a 
number of co-founders, but the important ones were Haji Amin Tohmeena, 
Tengku Yalal Nasir, Adul Na Saiburi, Ustaz Karim, Haji Karim Hasan (who 
was a former ponoh teacher in Ruesoh district, Narathiwat) and Abdul 
Kayom (who initiated the first Dawah group295 in Thailand and also an army 
group called Angkatan Bersenjata Revolusi Patani (ABRIP) in 1968) At the 
beginning, the BRN ideology was based on socialist rule, but later turned to 
religious ideology. Since 1978 there have been some internal conflicts and 
the group has split into three politically more moderate factions, namely: 
BRN Congress (armed force); BRN Ulama (religious force); and BRN 
Coordinate (political and religious force). Today, it is believed that BRN 
Coordinate has been the main group active on the ground. The ultimate goal 
of this group was to have independence, but they refused to negotiate with 
the Thai government in any way. They normally attacked any Buddhists or 
Muslims who cooperated with the state.296 However, in 2013, BRN was the 
only militant group who agreed to have peace talks with representatives of 
the Thai state. 
BRN-Coordinated maintained a number of underground cells, which 
were known as Runda Kumpulan Kecil, or ‘small patrol groups’. These 
appeared to not be a separate organisation but simply the operative arm of 
BRN-Coordinate. The BRN-Coordinate's village militia forces were also 
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commonly known as Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani, or Patani Freedom 
Fighters.297 
3) Persatuan Pembebasan Patani Bersatu (PPPB) or Patani 
United Liberation Organisation (PULO) 
Formed on 22 March 1968, by Tengku Bira Kotantila and Kabir Abdul 
Rahman, PULO was the most active group in the 1970s and 1980s.298 
Although there had been some internal conflicts since 1985, it was 
confirmed recently that the group has been reunited again since June 2005 
after the group split for a while into ‘old’ and ‘new’ factions. Later, PULO 
became an alliance with Bersatu. Today, most of PULO’s activities are 
focused on political matters on the international stage rather than engaging 
in violent attacks. In the early 2000s, it operated mainly from exile in Syria, 
where Tengku Bira lived, and Sweden, where its foreign affairs department 
was located. Exiles in Sweden have maintained a number of websites that 
carried news from the region as well as political statements. PULO claimed 
to have a working relationship with BRN-Coordinate. However, the Thai 
state agency continues to watch closely because the PULO movement 
appeared again noticeably in mid-2006.299 
4) Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani (GMIP) or Islamic Mujahidin 
Movement of Patani 
The fourth insurgent group was formed in 1995 by Afghanistan war 
veteran, Nasoree Saesaeng. The group derived its name from an earlier, 
now inactive group, the Gerakan Mujahidin Patani (GMP). According to Thai 
intelligence sources, the GMIP was linked to the Malaysia-based militant 
organisation Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), or the Mujahidin Group 
of Malaysia, which, in turn, was alleged to have close ties with the mainly 
Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiya. It was, however, uncertain how much 
remained of the KMM after a massive crackdown by Malaysian authorities 
in 2001.300 
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5) The United Front for the Independence of Pattani (Bersatu) 
This group was commonly known as ‘Bersatu’, which means ‘united’ 
in the Malay language. It was formed on August 31, 1989 by four leaders of 
BRN, PULO, GMP and BIPP. They first agreed to set up an Umbrella 
Organisation which has changed in 1991 to Bersatu and was presided over 
by Dr. Wan Kadir Cheman. According to Thai state security agencies, 
Bersatu had no power to command any groups, but it served as a strategic 
planner so each group could work in the same direction.301 
6) Pemuda Merdeka Patani (PMP) 
This movement was established by BRN Coordinate with most 
leading members being Ulama (religious intellectuals). ‘Pemuda’ means 
‘youth’ in Malay and had been adopted as the name of a youth movement 
closely associated with BRN-Coordinate. Pemuda members, however, 
rarely had access to firearms, but rather assisted the BRN-Coordinate with 
logistical support and intelligence gathering, and occasionally sprayed 
separatist slogans on walls or took part in arson attacks.302 They have 
developed a new dimension since 1992 by training militant youths and 
setting up armed forces both inside and outside the schools. They promoted 
fighting for Jihad, or holy war, in order to prepare for civilian war or guerrilla 
war. Their operations have been hidden in tadika or ponoh schools and in 
some government institutions as well as local mosques. Their activities 
since 2001 have included armed robbery and ambush. It was believed that 
this group was linked to other groups such as PULO, BRN Congress and 
GMIP.303 
7) Ulama Patani Daruslam 
This is a group of Ulamas who graduated with higher degrees in 
religion from the Middle East and Indonesia. They were normally religious 
teachers, imams and owners of private Islamic schools. The most important 
leader was the founder, Haji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir. He also established 
the first Islamic school in Thailand which was located in Pattani province. 
During the past several decades, the role of the Ulama group was dropped 
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until 24 January 2002 when a group of Ulamas established Ulama Patani 
Daruslam. The 29 members were selected from leading religious teachers 
and provincial Islamic committee in three southern border provinces.304 
8) Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Patani (Selatan Thailand) 
Indonesia (PMIPTI) 
It was founded in 1968 by a group of students in three southern 
provinces who graduated in religion from Indonesia. The first purpose of this 
group was to coordinate education and political issues. Later on, some 
leaders of BRN intervened and distorted the group goal to focus on 
separatism and militant training. Until now, this group has not had less than 
3,000 members mainly teachers, imam, khatip, bilal,305 ustaz and provincial 
Islamic committee representatives.306 
9) Patani National Youth Movement (PANYOM) or Gerakan 
Pemuda Kebangsaan Patani 
It was believed by the Thai state security authorities that this group 
had been established a long time ago, but its operations were secretive. In 
1997, the movement first became apparent by leaving a threatening letter 
in the Pattani area and in 1998 by distributing information through the 
internet. Its content included religious, racial, cultural and historical issues 
that incited Thai Muslims to resist the Thai government. It also advertised 
news and activities of other insurgent groups in order to be accepted on the 
international stage.307 
10) Dewan Pimpinan Parti (DPP) 
This group has served as a strategic, policy and decision maker. It 
was the one which derived the seven steps of revolution308 which used 
religious motivation to persuade the Muslim community to take action 
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against the Thai government. It could be said in fact that DPP was the 
government of the insurgent groups. The organisational structure was 
divided into regional, provincial and village levels. The ultimate goal of the 
revolution was to establish a new state of Patani. Its territory could cover 
the three southern provinces and some parts of Songkhla and Satun.309 
 
4.6 Overview of the Government’s Policies and Strategies Relating to 
the Southern Conflict 
 The stability of Thai politics is considered low and there are always 
short-term governments. Since the resurgence in violence, there have been 
seven governments led by six prime ministers in over a decade. The 
national policies involving the southern conflict from the government of 
Prime Minster Thaksin until the most recent Prime Minister, Yingluck 
Shinawatra,310 are described next. Besides these six prime ministers, the 
two governments led by Prime Ministers General Phibulsongkhram and 
General Prem Tinsulanond are also examined as their policies affected the 
southern situation significantly. 
4.6.1 General Phibulsongkhram 
Phibulsongkhram was the third Prime Minister of Thailand and was 
in office from 16 December 1938 to 1 August 1944 and from 8 April 1948 to 
16 September 1957. In 1938, Phibulsongkhram consolidated his position by 
rewarding several members of his own army clique with influential positions 
in his government. Phibulsongkhram began to increase the pace of 
modernisation in Thailand and he also supported fascism as well as 
nationalism. Together with Luang Wichitwathakan, the Minister of 
Propaganda, he built a leadership cult in 1938 and thereafter. Photographs 
of Phibulsongkhram were to be found everywhere, and his quotes appeared 
in newspapers, were shown on billboards and were repeated over the radio.  
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The State Conventions served as the commandment from the 
government for all people to observe. During the six years, from 1938-1944 
the government passed twelve conventions such as changing the name of 
the country from ‘Siam’ to ‘Thailand’ to go along with the nationality of the 
people. Thais had to learn to respect the National Flag, the National Anthem 
and the Thai Royal Anthem. From Phibulsongkhram's perspective, these 
policies were necessary for Thailand so as to change the minds of 
foreigners who thought that Thailand was an undeveloped and barbaric 
country. One motto that clearly projects the Field Marshal’s policy was: 
“Believe in the Leader and the Nation Will Survive”.311  
These modernisation policies were a big change in terms of culture 
and way of life for all people in the country. It affected Muslims in the south 
unavoidably. Muslims were not allowed to wear traditional dress such as the 
sarong, people were not allowed to speak in their dialect or Yawi, and 
Islamic courts were closed.312 This was the beginning of resistance in the 
south as his modernisation policy affected all aspects of the Muslim way of 
life.  
4.6.2 General Prem Tinsulanond  
General Prem Tinsulanond was the 16th Prime Minister and served 
for three terms from 1980 to 1988. Under General Prem, Thailand 
established a new system of government in which the military shared power 
with parliament through the mediation of the monarchy.313 
The government also initiated a number of administrative and 
political initiatives for the socio-economic development of the provinces in 
the south. In 1981, the Prem administration constituted the Southern Border 
Provincial Administrative Centre (SBPAC), a special unit of the army, police, 
together with the Interior Ministry and the Civilian-Police-Military Task Force 
43 (CPM 43), to oversee security in the region and to work as an advisory 
body to the policy-making establishment in Bangkok. Economic and 
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industrial development projects were also implemented to develop the south 
and to eradicate poverty and backwardness. At the political level, 
democratisation was used as a means to allow the Malay-Muslim 
community to enter into parliamentary democratic politics.314  
4.6.3 Thaksin Shinawatra 
Thaksin Shinawatra is a businessman who served as the Prime 
Minister from 17 February 2001 to 19 September 2006, when he was 
deposed by a military coup and convicted in a case of conflict of interest. 
He started his career in the police service, and later he became successful 
in the telecoms industry and went on to become one of the richest people 
in Thailand. He entered politics in 1994 and founded the Thai Rak Thai 
(TRT) party in 1998. After a landslide election victory in January 2001, he 
became prime minister and the country’s first ever to serve a full term. 
Thaksin introduced a range of partly effective and highly popular policies to 
alleviate rural poverty. His main support base was in the north and northeast 
of the country. 
From the start of his first term in 2001, Prime Minister Thaksin never 
paid much attention to the simmering unrest in the south. This was despite 
the fact that there were the three aforementioned brutal incidents in 2004. 
His responses, particularly his comments, to the incidents made the 
situation even worse. 
Following the army camp raid in Narathiwat, in which four soldiers 
were killed, Thaksin initially dubbed the suspects “common bandits”. 315 
Thaksin told the press that the soldiers on guard deserved to die for failing 
to prevent the raid. After that, he imposed martial law in the three provinces 
and set a seven-day deadline for the authorities to identify and capture the 
perpetrators.  He ordered the deployment of an additional 3,000 troops to 
the Fourth Army Region that covers fourteen provinces in the south, 
including Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, mandating them to make arrests 
without a court warrant. The government insisted that the mounting violence 
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in the southern border provinces was the work of petty criminals and drug 
dealers and dismissed any suggestion that separatist groups may have 
been re-activated. Obviously, the sophistication of the 4 January operation 
made this untenable. Thaksin later admitted the assailants were not 
ordinary bandits, and that they were professional and well trained.316 
Thaksin’s response to the battle of Krue Se Mosque was to praise 
the army for its swift response but to play down the political aspect: “There 
is nothing to be afraid of. These are drug addicts,” he said.  His response to 
the bloody suppression of the attacks was “victory has been achieved”.317 
For the Tak Bai protest, Thaksin’s first reaction was to suggest that the 
deaths in the army trucks were the Muslims’ own fault for fasting during 
Ramadan: “It’s normal that their bodies could not handle it. It’s not about 
someone attacking them”.318  
Thaksin, eventually, sought to create positive news about attempting 
to resolve the southern conflict by asking Thais to produce millions of 
origami cranes to be scattered over the south. This gesture, indicating the 
popular desire for peace, was his initial response to the royal admonitions319 
and was a piece of pure political theatre.320 The tsunami disaster of 26 
December 2004 eclipsed news of the southern unrest for a couple of weeks, 
allowing Thaksin the space to launch his election campaign in early January 
2005. 
Following his landslide election victory in February 2005, Thaksin 
seemed re-emboldened to tackle the unrest in the south – where the TRT 
had been decisively rejected by the voters. Thaksin immediately announced 
that he was sending 12,000 more troops to the southern border provinces. 
Three other initiatives followed in quick succession. The first one was a 
proposal to divide the three provinces into coloured zones based on their 
degree of loyalty to the Thai state, depriving the 358 villages designated ‘red 
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zones’ of government development funds.321 The second proposal was a 
plan to send 25 TRT ministers and MPs down to the south to assess the 
situation and report back. The third proposal was the decision to allow a 
rarely convened joint session of the Senate and Lower House to debate the 
crisis in the south.322  
These three moves, however, were not enough to satisfy Thaksin’s 
large number of critics which grew after the zoning villages idea was first 
introduced to the public. Thaksin’s plan to cut funding to villages deemed to 
support militants in the troubled south had been widely criticised. Thaksin 
defined red zones as the most violence-laden, least cooperative and most 
difficult areas to access, where most people were sympathetic to the 
insurgents. Yellow represented moderate resistance to state authority and 
green zones were simply obedient to the authorities. Religious leaders said 
the plan would push ordinary villagers into the hands of the insurgents. 
Local people questioned the zoning method, saying officials might show 
bias when categorising villages.323  
Although the categorisation of villages was only Thaksin’s proposal, 
and not a policy, it caused further resentment among southern Muslims, 
who already saw themselves as second-class citizens in a mostly Buddhist 
country. 
Thaksin also announced an escalation of military and police activities 
in the region. In March 2005, Thaksin established the National 
Reconciliation Commission (NRC) to oversee efforts to bring peace to the 
south. Instead of the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre 
(SBPAC) that was dissolved by his government, Thaksin established a 
Southern Border Provinces Peace-building Command (SBPPC) in April 
2004. 
Lastly, in July 2005, Thaksin enacted an Emergency Decree to 
manage the three troubled provinces. The decree was an attempt to strike 
a balance between tough security measures and enhanced legal 
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protections.324 It offered some safeguards and transferred overall control 
from military to civilian officials, but bestowed wide-ranging powers on the 
Prime Minister and his designated competent officials; with few provisions 
for parliamentary or judicial oversight. Several human rights organisations, 
such as Human Rights Watch, expressed their concerns that the decree 
might be used to violate civil liberties.325  
Massive protests, however, occurred in February 2006 because of 
controversies including alleged conflicts of interest due to his family's 
holdings in Shin Corporation326 and violent heavy-handed measures on the 
anti-drug policy. Then, on 19 September, a military junta overthrew 
Thaksin's government in a bloodless coup while he was abroad.  
4.6.4 General (ret.) Surayud  Chulanont 
General (ret.) Surayud Chulanont was the head of Thailand's Interim 
Government in 2006 and became the Prime Minister from 1 October 2006 
to 29 January 2008. He was a former military officer who had been Army 
Commander, Supreme Commander, and was currently a Privy Councillor. 
The first significant thing that Surayud’s government did to reduce 
tensions in the south was that Surayud apologised to the people of the south 
for the past abuses, injustices, and the hardline measures committed by the 
previous government in combating the insurgency. He also specially 
affirmed that Islamic law should be given a bigger role in the south and 
explicitly recognised the need for a long-term strategy that combined three 
main strands: reconciliation, security (with a mix of hard and soft 
approaches), and dialogue. 327  These various gestures represented an 
abrupt change in tack from the policies of the previous Thaksin government, 
which consistently refused to engage in talks with the insurgents. 
There were several immediate efforts that the government undertook 
including: working with local Muslim leaders to proactively identify and 
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manage communal-religious tensions; prioritising the development of 
sustainable conflict-resolution mechanisms that were adequately equipped 
to address Malay-Muslim grievances and focusing on human-rights training, 
socioeconomic development; furthering harmonious civil-military relations 
and fostering a better understanding of rules of engagement by reviving the 
old government networks;328 and exploring the possibility of granting an 
amnesty to militants in the Malay-speaking south as part of a government 
strategy to restore peace in the Muslim-majority region. An amnesty would 
guarantee that the surrendered insurgents would not face further legal 
charges for their participation in the insurgency.329 
Furthermore, the government announced a special economic 
development plan for the five southern provinces in an effort to use 
economic means to improve the situation. On the international front, the 
government successfully engaged with the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) to allay concerns of mistreatment of borderland Muslims 
and undercut insurgent claims that the problems in the south were based 
on religious issues.330 Surayud was praised for his formal apology, although 
his policies failed to produce tangible results and it was followed by a sharp 
escalation in violence. The day after he issued his apology, 46 violent 
incidents were recorded, compared with a daily average of 9 in the previous 
month and the casualty rate in 2007 was the highest since the violence 
surged in 2004.331  
An increase in military spending by 35% in 2007, (compared to 2006) 
was approved. The 2008 budget for the Ministry of Defence totalled 140 
billion baht, 24% higher than 2007 and represented 8.6% of the total 2008 
budget. In addition, Surayud received an extra request from the Army for an 
additional 17.6 billion baht to fund counter-insurgency efforts in the far south 
over the next four years on top of an additional 456-million-baht secret 
military budget.332 Surayud’s Cabinet also gave the staff of the ISOC an 
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84.3 million baht ‘extra allowance’ as reward for their hard work with 
increased responsibility, handling national security threats and promoting 
loyalty to the monarchy.333 
When the military was assigned the duty to handle the insurgency in 
the south, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the Army Commander, expressed 
confidence that he could resolve the insurgency. He claimed that he would 
take a new and effective approach to the crisis. After being appointed Army 
Commander in 2005, Sonthi was granted an extraordinary increase in 
executive powers to combat unrest in the southernmost region. Up to 19 
September 2006, however, the Army admitted that they had no idea who 
the insurgents actually were. The drastic escalation of the insurgency during 
his leadership of the Army led to much public criticism of the Army’s 
efforts.334 In 2006, Surayud claimed that the insurgency was being financed 
by a network of restaurants and stalls selling Tom Yum Kung in Malaysia, 
however, there is no evidence to prove this claim is true.335 
Although the government made some attempts to correct Thaksin’s 
heavy-handed measures, Surayud’s government was accused of economic 
mismanagement, human rights abuses, and being unreliable on numerous 
policies.  
4.6.5 Samak Sundaravej 
Samak Sundaravej served as the Prime Minister from 29 January to 
8 September 2008, as well as the leader of the People's Power Party (PPP). 
The government of Samak struggled for political survival and handed the 
military full responsibility for tackling the insurgency. The political turmoil in 
Bangkok continued to distract attention from the violence in the south. 
Samak’s government was threatened on several fronts. Samak designated 
himself as Defence Minister and chose veteran politician, Chalerm 
Yubamrung, as Interior Minister who held a meeting about the southern 
situation with security officials, provincial governors and the director of the 
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SBPAC. As a result of the meeting, various proposals were made on issues 
surrounding the southern crisis. 
Samak’s government endorsed the importance of continuing the 
reconciliation measures by adopting the King’s guidelines of 
‘Understanding, Reaching out, and Development’. 336  During Samak’s 
government, the military was left to lead operations in the deep south and 
made some progress in reducing violent attacks in the first half of the year. 
However, the ‘sweeping operations’ from June 2007 had involved the 
indiscriminate detention of thousands of suspected insurgents and 
sympathisers, and there were credible reports of detainees being 
tortured.337 
The issue of special autonomy for the southern border provinces hit 
the news headlines briefly following a comment by Chalerm on the 
desirability of a public hearing on possible forms of special administration, 
but the idea did not get much attention from the prime minister who declared 
that it was too soon to talk about it, and then the matter was dropped. The 
rapid dropping of the question of special autonomy indicated that Samak 
was deferring to General Anuphong Paochinda, the Army Commander, who 
viewed special autonomy as a dangerous first step to the separation of the 
border provinces. 
General Anuphong announced a four-year-plan for resolving the 
violence in the south in October 2007. The first phase, October 2007-
September 2009, was designed to end violent incidents by emphasising 
aggressive military actions; the second, October 2009-September 2011, 
was to focus on development and community strengthening. Under Prime 
Minister Samak, the military controlled the ISOC with the SBPAC playing a 
useful role, but it was still weak. Thus, the military played the main role and 
had the most power to proceed in any matters relating to the southern 
conflict. 338 
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4.6.6 Somchai Wongsawat 
Somchai Wongsawat entered politics after the 2006 coup unseated 
the government of his brother-in-law, Thaksin Shinawatra. He joined the 
People’s Power Party (PPP), which won the December 2007 elections, 
becoming Minister of Education and Senior Deputy Prime Minister. After the 
government of Samak Sundaravej was terminated, Somchai was 
successfully nominated as the Prime Minister from 18 September to 2 
December 2008.  
Somchai said in his first policy statement that his new government 
was committed to tackling the ongoing insurgency by reaching out to the 
different communities and promoting economic development. He agreed 
that the southern unrest was an urgent agenda. The situation in the south 
had improved according to his sources during that time. He said urgent 
priorities in the troubled southern provinces were improving safety for 
security officials, upgrading their equipment, improving education and 
increasing the price of rubber, the south's key crop.  
His government had to deal with the political crisis as well as the 
global financial crisis. However, Somchai’s government lasted for only three 
months. The PPP was eventually dissolved by the Constitutional Court on 
2 December 2008 and its executive members were prohibited from 
participating in politics for five years due to a vote-buying case. Therefore, 
the policies concerning the southern conflict could not be implemented 
seriously.339  
4.6.7 Abhisit Vejjajiva 
A coalition government, led by Abhisit Vejjajiva of the Democrat 
Party, took office in December 2008 during the political crisis. After Prime 
Minister Somchai was removed and his party was dissolved, the MPs of the 
parties which had been in coalition with the PPP forged a new coalition with 
the Democrat Party, which had been in opposition until then.  
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While Prime Minister Abhisit declared that politics should take the 
lead over military solutions to the southern problem, however, his power for 
manoeuvre in this matter was quite limited. This deal had at least tacit 
support from the military, which had refused to take instructions from the 
Samak and Somchai administrations. The Abhisit government faced a wide 
range of challenges, the first of which was to bridge the huge social divides 
of the past three years that had developed between the ‘pro-Thaksin’ (red 
shirt) and ‘anti-Thaksin’ or ‘pro-monarchy’ (yellow shirt) sides. Other 
challenges included the economic downturn and the public request for 
political reform, including the drafting of yet another new constitution. Abhisit 
could not afford to give the south priority over these other challenges.340 
The main initiatives and policies announced by the Abhisit 
government in relation to the south were as follows. First, a ‘southern 
cabinet’ would be created. It was a committee of ministers and senior 
officials who would be responsible for the southern conflict. Secondly, it 
would revamp the SBPAC to make it a permanent body backed by 
legislation to give it greater power and authority. Thirdly, a programme of 
socio-economic development projects would address material needs in the 
area, as part of a ‘total development concept’. Fourthly, the government 
would renew emphasis on the issues of human rights and proper behaviour 
by government officials. Fifthly, it would increase the use of forensic 
science, CCTV and other technologies to support evidence-based arrests 
and prosecutions. Finally, local people would be encouraged to participate 
in their own security arrangements.341 However, it was contended that the 
policy of this government did not connect enough with the local 
communities, but instead chose to interact with academics who had the 
same views as the government.342 
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4.6.8 Yingluck Shinawatra 
 Yingluck Shinawatra was the first female prime minister and also the 
Minister of Defense from August 2011 to 7 May 2014. She was highly 
criticised as the sister of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and was 
deemed responsible for creating some of the deepest political divisions in 
contemporary Thai society. The government’s policy statement which was 
delivered by Prime Minister Yingluck to the parliament listed the southern 
unrest problem as one of its 16 urgent policies. However, this government 
encountered political crisis and other urgent problems such as the flood 
crisis, protests and investigations into her corruption. Therefore, the 
southern violence has not received much attention from the government. 
The policy statement concerning the southern conflict said, in essence, that 
the government promised to promote the local administration model which 
could be compatible with the local characteristics, but there was still no 
tangible outcome. Furthermore, the direction of the government concerning 
policy in the southernmost conflict was confusing.343  
Having said all this, the government marked an important turning 
point in the southern conflict’s resolution when the first official peace talks 
were held on 28 February 2013 between the Thai state’s representative led 
by the Kingdom's National Security Council (NSC) Secretary-General, 
Paradorn Pattanathabut and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) headed 
by Hassan Taib. After one year, both sides have had three official peace 
talks facilitated by Malaysia, but it still seems a long way from success. Also, 
these peace talks still had some weaknesses, for example, no cooperation 
among relevant Thai authorities (i.e. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ISOC, the 
Royal Thai Army and the National Intelligence Agency); the main actors in 
the peace talks lacked experience, clear plans, roadmaps or timeframes; 
the Thai delegation lacked full powers over making decisions from the 
government; and the talk processes lacked public participation. 344 
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Moreover, the BRN is not the only insurgent group active in the south. 
Negotiation with only one group could create more tension among the other 
militant groups. 
 
4.7 The Restructuring of Key Agencies in the South 
 As conflict areas like these southernmost provinces are sensitive and 
needed extra attention from the state, several state agencies have been 
initiated in this region. These authorities were established by different 
governments for various reasons. The following will give an overview of 
some of the key state authorities operating in the deep south. 
4.7.1 The Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) 
Prime Minister Prem established a new administrative system to 
coordinate a shift from confrontation to negotiation. The SBPAC was 
originally established in 1981 to help contain the local communist 
insurgency, but it also became effective in managing separatist tensions. 
The SBPAC was responsible for designing and implementing political, social 
and economic policies so as to improve community relations and draw support 
away from the insurgents.345 
The SBPAC was initially under the Fourth Army Region Commander, 
and later the Interior Minister. There was a particular emphasis on 
understanding Malay-Muslim culture so training programmes were provided 
for non-Malay officials in cultural awareness and the local Pattani Malay 
language.  
The SBPAC was designed to address two major problems in the 
administration of the southernmost provinces: poor coordination among 
agencies, and corruption and prejudice among officials. The SBPAC 
enhanced mutual understanding and trust between the central government 
in Bangkok and the ethnic Malay-Muslim community, while also improving 
intelligence gathering and coordination among various elements of the Thai 
authorities and security forces. The SBPAC was well known for being able 
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to listen to complaints from the local Malay Muslims concerning corrupt, 
abusive, or inept government officials, and was believed to be able to order 
the transfer of those officials within a day. Over the 1980s and early 1990s, 
violence dropped off significantly.346 By the year 2000, the Thai authorities 
were confident that the ethnic Malay-Muslim insurgency had largely been 
quelled.347 
 After its dissolution in 2002 by Thaksin’s government, the SBPAC 
was re-established during Surayud’s term under Prime Ministerial Decree 
207 on 30 October 2006. The new SBPAC was directed to: “urgently 
facilitate civilian activity in the border provinces”; “compile and propose 
projects and budgets for government agencies”; “direct and coordinate 
action in the area of justice, the preservation of freedom, the administration 
of justice, assistance, compensation and development according to just 
principles”; and “develop civil servants and government officers working in 
the border provinces towards efficiency consistent with the characteristics 
of the society, economy, culture and way of life in the region”.348 The new 
structure of the SBPAC is slightly different from its predecessor. A notable 
innovation in its new structure has been the addition of Justice Ministry 
officials to the mix of its civil servants, adding to Defence, Education and 
Interior Ministry officials. 
4.7.2 The Civilian-Police-Military Task Force (CPM 43) 
The CPM 43 was also established by Prime Minister Prem in 1981 to 
coordinate security operations by reducing military predominance and 
giving civilians and the police greater security roles.349 It was under strict 
orders to ensure that extra-judicial killings and disappearances ceased.350 
Before the control of security was handed to the police during Thaksin’s 
term, CPM 43 helped to maintain a delicate balance between the security 
and intelligence agencies operating in the south.351 In 2002, CPM 43 was 
                                            
346 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand,” Asia Report, 11. 
347 Human Rights Watch, “No One is Safe,” 28 August 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/ 
10779/section/4 (accessed 24 February 2010). 
348 Askew, “Thailand’s,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 198. 
349 Funston, Southern Thailand, 16. 
350 International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand,” Asia Report, 11. 
351 Ibid., 34. 
 124 
 
also dissolved together with SBPAC and then it was revived during 
Surayud’s government.  
4.7.3 The Southern Border Provinces Peace-building Command 
(SBPPC) 
During Thaksin’s term, the SBPPC was established in March 2004 
by prime ministerial order under the ISOC.352 The SBPPC aimed to direct 
and coordinate military, police and intelligence operations in the south, as 
well as to oversee social, economic and education policies of civilian 
agencies. It was an organisation intended to establish permanent peace and 
security through understanding the way of life and social conditions of 
people in the southern border provinces and promoting peaceful co-
existence in Thai society and fostering an understanding of their problems 
and real needs leading eventually to sustainable development. The SBPPC 
strategy was to build peace by using psychological operations together with 
social and economic development, more than by political and military 
operations.353  
The structure of the SBPPC has been revamped several times after 
its establishment. Today, the main strategy of the SBPPC is to promote the 
King’s advice of ‘Understanding, Reaching out, and Development’ in order 
to resolve the conflict in the south.354 
4.7.4 The National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) 
    In 2005, the NRC was appointed by Prime Minister Thaksin to help 
ease problems in the deep south. The order for the formation of the 
Commission was issued on 28 March 2005, with former Prime Minister 
Anand Panyarachun as chairman and a prominent social critic, Prawase 
Wasi, as vice-chairman. It comprised sixteen representatives from the civic 
sector in the affected areas, eleven representatives from the civic sector 
outside the affected areas, seven from the political sector, and nine from the 
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public sector. The Secretary of the Cabinet served as member and 
secretary, with well-known academics Gothom Arya and Surichai Wankaew 
as co-members and secretaries.355 
The NRC was responsible for suggesting policies, measures, 
mechanisms, and methods to create reconciliation and bring peace to Thai 
society, especially in the three southern border provinces. It investigated the 
southern unrest and conducted research studies on southern problems. The 
NRC was entrusted with developing processes to prevent and ease conflicts 
and violence and make these processes known widely among the general 
public. It also educated the public on the adverse effects of violence and 
hatred and the necessity of using peaceful means to stop the violence. At 
the same time, the NRC promoted social justice with respect for social and 
cultural diversity. 
Anand finally submitted the NRC's recommendations on 5 June 
2006. The highlights among them were as follows: 
 Introducing Islamic law; 
 Making ethnic Pattani-Malay (Yawi) a working language in the region; 
 Establishing an unarmed peacekeeping force; and 
 Establishing a Peaceful Strategic Administrative Centre for Southern 
Border Provinces. 
The Thaksin administration assigned a government committee to 
study the report, but nothing tangible came of it. The NRC was terminated 
in March 2006 after the parliament had been dissolved. Since then, they 
have not appointed a new committee.  
4.7.5 The Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) 
The ISOC is a unit of the military devoted to national security issues. 
It was originally set up to fight the communist insurgency between the 1960s 
and 1980s during which it was implicated in numerous brutalities against 
activists and civilians. After Thaksin was deposed in a military coup, the 
junta transformed the ISOC into a ‘government within a government,’ giving 
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it wide-reaching authority over the National Counter Corruption Committee, 
the Department of Special Investigation, and the Anti-Money Laundering 
Office. In June 2007, the junta approved a draft national security bill which 
would give the ISOC significant change in powers to handle any new round 
of violence in the country. After being revamped, the junta gave the ISOC 
more and new powers as well as allowed the ISOC chief to implement 
security measures, such as searches, without seeking approval from the 
prime minister. The ISOC is under the authority of the Office of the Prime 
Minister.356 
 
4.8 Laws Issued during the Conflict 
Three new laws were put in place in the southern border provinces 
granting the military extraordinary powers: Martial Law, the Emergency 
Decree and the Internal Security Act (ISA). This complexity of legislation 
created a climate of impunity and heightened the risk of human rights abuse 
which was often counter-productive. It was criticised that these three laws 
aimed to make the state officials more convenient in arrest, searching and 
detention. These processes can be done faster with these laws. However, 
the processes of investigation, the number of officials, equipment and 
technology remain the same and have never been adjusted to be 
compatible with new laws.357 This is not fair to the locals who could be 
arrested as a suspect easier and faster, but are still stuck in the old process 
of investigation which takes a long time to prove their innocence. It was 
believed that the three special laws deepened mistrust of the security forces 
and increased public discontent. 
4.8.1 Martial Law B.E. 2475 
       The military imposed Martial Law in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat and 
in some districts in Songkhla after the raid on the army depot in January 
2004. The law allowed the military to carry out search and arrest without 
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court warrants and detain suspects for seven days without charge. The 
military was also allowed to terminate any gathering and to control any 
communication in this area.  
 The problems caused by using this law are as follows:358 
 The power of the military was higher than other state 
authorities creating tension among them; 
 Detention of a suspect could be done without any judicial 
process; 
 Repeated detentions annoyed the local people; 
 Relatives of detainees could not contact detainees; and 
 Detainees were not allowed to see lawyers or have any legal 
consultants. 
4.8.2 Emergency Decree B.E. 2548 
Thaksin’s government replaced Martial Law with the Executive 
Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situations (or Emergency 
Decree for short) in the three provinces on 19 July 2005. The decree 
transferred supervisory responsibility for the overall operation of the law 
from the army to the government and gave authority to the police and interior 
ministry officials to carry out security operations alongside the military. For 
the decree to take effect, the government had to designate an area as being 
under ‘a state of emergency’ and the designation was subject to renewal 
every three months. The decree offered some legal protection for an 
accused as it required that military, police and interior ministry officers had 
to jointly sign a request for a court warrant.  
         The decree still authorised harsh measures, however, as it allowed 
security officials to hold suspects without charge for up to 30 days with court 
approval - an increase from seven days under martial law. It was described 
as ‘a license to kill,’ 359  because Sections 16 and 17 granted law 
enforcement officers immunity from civil, criminal and disciplinary penalties 
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and suspended the jurisdiction of administrative courts to prosecute 
officials.360  
       Following the coup, martial law was again imposed, this time 
throughout the country. It was gradually lifted everywhere, apart from the 
deep south, where martial law and the emergency decree were in force 
concurrently. Together, they granted more power to the security forces than 
either measure alone would do. In consequence, security officials were 
using a ‘seven + 30 formula’: they arrested suspects and held them for 
seven days under martial law, then extended the detention for another 30 
days under the emergency decree.361   
 The examples of the problems caused by this law are as follows:362 
 Suspects could be detained for an extended period under the 
Martial Law and the Emergency Decree; 
 Warrants of arrest were issued too easily; 
 The process was too complicated caused delays and 
overlapped with the Martial Law creating confusion; and 
 Some suspects disappeared after being released. 
4.8.3 Internal Security Act (ISA) B.E. 2551 
The ISA also created further public discontent. Under this law, the 
ISOC was in charge of maintaining “internal security,” which was defined as 
“any threat of disorder, destruction, loss of life, limb or property of the people 
or the state”.363 The act made the ISOC the focal point of internal security 
policymaking granting it powers to monitor, investigate and evaluate 
potential internal security threats. The law allowed the ISOC to “prevent, 
suppress, eradicate, overcome or mitigate occurrences that affect internal 
security”.364 Moreover, Section 21 allowed the ISOC Director, with court 
consent, to drop legal charges against any suspect in security-related cases 
if the person confessed his or her wrongdoings and agreed to undergo a six 
month ‘re-education’ training programme under military supervision. This 
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programme was called ‘Peace Development Programme’ and included 
academic, historical, religious, vocational and recreational activities. It 
aimed to change the mindset of the people who used to join militant groups 
so that they were able to go back to a normal life.365 
The military expected this amnesty strategy would entice insurgents 
into surrendering, as it did with members of the Communist Party of 
Thailand in the 1980s. However, there was no suggestion that the southern 
insurgents were in the same position, so the tactic seemed unlikely to work. 
Rather, large-scale detentions were likely to fuel additional resentment.366 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter gave an overview of the insurgency in southern 
Thailand and how various governments have handled the conflict in this 
region. Under diverse circumstances, each government had different 
focuses and directions in trying to resolve the violence in the south and 
these various strategies affected the trend of the violent situation differently. 
Overall, the government policies focused mainly on security issues, 
especially increasing troop strength, implementing laws and reorganising 
the government agencies. Despite efforts to reach out to southern Muslims, 
the government made no serious attempt to address the key substantive 
issues – economic, political, education, social and cultural,– and bring about 
justice for past abuses. Political turmoil in Bangkok has polarised the country 
and distracted attention from the conflict. As long as the state is unable to 
resolve other urgent problems, for example political polarisation, unstable 
government and economic crisis, it is unlikely that the southern conflict will 
receive serious attention from the central government. Therefore, most 
governments have tended to hand over power and responsibility in resolving 
the conflict to the military.  
It was, however, proved that the state’s tools alone, including national 
policy, laws and administrative restructuring cannot resolve the conflict. 
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Even worse, some of those policies have only further provoked tension and 
resentment in the local community.  
The next chapter will examine five cases of ethno-religious conflict in 
South and Southeast Asian countries including India, Sri Lanka, the 
Philippines, Indonesia and Myanmar, and the roles of the civil society sector 
in these conflicts.  
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CHAPTER V 
ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN SOUTH AND 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
After World War II, by international comparison to countries in other 
parts of the world (e.g. Africa) which also have internal ethnic conflicts, Asia 
has been a region that has seen a high number of violent conflicts.367 Many 
governments in South and Southeast Asia have struggled to stabilise their 
countries after achieving independence. One of the main problems has 
been ethno-religious conflict which in many countries was caused by the 
effects of colonial rule. These regions have clearly been destabilised by 
ethno-religious conflict which has resulted in thousands of people dying and 
becoming internally displaced.368 
There are many actors involved in the conflict and peace process. 
The state and the insurgents are the key players, and peace is always 
defined as some form of a balance of power that is obtained between 
them.369 Although the state has retained its main role in making decisions 
in most domestic matters, the importance of the civil society sector in 
peacebuilding has recently been highlighted. The concept of civil society’s 
role in creating peace became popular among countries with ongoing ethnic 
conflicts when the civil society organisations were encouraged to participate 
in the peacebuilding process of the United Nations Peacebuilding 
Commission which was formed in 2006.370 
This chapter will describe the ethno-religious conflicts in South and 
Southeast Asian countries including the Assam conflict in India, the Eelam 
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war in Sri Lanka, the Mindanao conflict in the Philippines, the Aceh conflict 
in Indonesia and the hill tribe conflicts in Myanmar. These cases will create 
a better understanding of the background, nature and causes of the ethno-
religious conflicts in these regions. Moreover, this chapter will show how 
civil society is involved in some peacebuilding activities which would reduce 
the tension in the conflict areas.  
 
5.2 An Overview of Ethno-religious Conflicts in South and Southeast 
Asia 
 South and Southeast Asia have been home to indigenous militant 
groups for decades. Before World War II, most South and Southeast Asian 
countries were dominated by the Western colonial powers. After the war 
ended, most countries became independent when their foreign rulers 
departed either through an independence struggle or voluntarily. In other 
cases, territories were governed by unrepresentative governments that 
were both undemocratic and brutal. In many cases, colonial rule and nation-
building issues affected directly the identities and values of the minorities of 
the country and exacerbated feelings of resistance toward central 
governments, with a huge impact on regional security and stability as a 
whole.371  
 The persistence of ethnic insurgencies in South and Southeast Asia 
has challenged the governments in many countries. Today, most ethnic 
insurgencies in these regions are deeply entrenched, thereby increasing the 
insurgents’ capacity to engage the states in protracted, low-intensity wars 
of attrition, and greatly enlarging the threat posed to these states’ territorial 
integrity and continued sovereign existence.372  
 Ethnic insurgents in South and Southeast Asia have sought ways to 
enhance the durability, visibility and audibility of their movements through 
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several different channels. For example, militant groups in Sri Lanka and 
the Philippines have carried out international diplomatic activities with an 
aim to gain external sympathisers and supporters who could provide 
political, moral, and material support. 373  Almost all the major ethnic 
insurgent groups in these regions have maintained their existence by 
resorting to terrorist attacks. Usually lacking the resources needed for 
conventional military warfare, insurgent groups often resort to terrorism 
because it is cheaper and more effective in creating wider circumstances of 
fear and insecurity. Terrorism is usually more difficult for the state to detect 
and counter and it also attracts broad domestic and international publicity.374 
Moreover, since ethnic conflict cases try to prevent outside states 
from imposing solutions on them, or intervening in their internal matters, 
they may engage in direct violence against other states than the one in 
which they reside. The international targets of ethno-terrorism are, however, 
not exclusively foreign government officers, diplomats, or politicians. 
Terrorist attacks against foreign nationals located in one’s own state also 
help to internationalise an ethnic conflict and bring publicity for the group. 
Furthermore, terrorists may hijack international passenger flights, extort 
ransoms, and resort to kidnapping and assassination of foreign 
businessmen, aid workers, and tourists in order to publicise their movement 
and the reasons for their terrorist activities.375  
In South Asia, the conflicts among different religions and ethnicities 
in India have a complex history. One of the more prominent conflicts is the 
one between India and Pakistan which have fought over the states of 
Jammu and Kashmir since 1947. The Hindu Maharajah of Kashmir decided 
to accede to India in the wake of the invasion by Pakistani forces. After 
becoming part of India, the majority of Muslims in Kashmir have continued 
to fight for autonomy from India whose population is largely Hindu. The 
Kashmir dispute became a main ethno-religious conflict in this region and 
seems to be a prolonged international conflict. 376  There have been a 
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number of non-international armed conflicts and internal disturbances as 
well as the conflicts in the ‘Seven Sisters’ states of India and the civil war in 
Sri Lanka.377 The Northeast of India comprises of seven states which are 
characterised by extraordinary ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic 
diversity. Most states in the region are currently affected by some form of 
insurgent violence and ethno-religious conflict.378 In Sri Lanka, the Eelam 
war between the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils reached its peak in 
the 1990s. The main Tamil insurgent organisation, the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE), demanded a separate state for the Tamils.379 
Most countries in Southeast Asia have faced difficulties after gaining 
independence. In the Philippines, the decades old conflict in Muslim 
Mindanao, which had held out some hope for resolution with the signing of 
the 1996 peace agreement between the Philippines government and the 
largest Muslim rebel group, the Moro National Liberation Front, flared up 
once again in the late 1990s mainly as a result of the government’s failure 
to keep their promise on economic assistance and development for 
Mindanao.380 In the case of Indonesia, one of the most widespread issues 
of contemporary ethnic politics is related to the attempt by the state to deal 
politically and economically with the grievances of Muslims and the 
communities on the other islands who perceive themselves as second-class 
citizens who have been left out by the state’s distribution of wealth.381 In the 
case of Myanmar, one of the dominant issues of contemporary politics is 
clearly that of the ethnic rebellions against the central state, and the 
domination of that state by ethnic Burmese.382  
Overall, internal security issues remain a challenge for South and 
Southeast Asian countries. These regions remain threatened by ethno-
religious separatist insurgencies that have been fighting for their autonomy, 
although there is a huge effort to develop peaceful coexistence, and 
constructive economic and political collaboration. 
                                            
377 Ganguly, “Introduction,” 10. 
378 Das, Conflict and Peace, 75. 
379 Ganguly, “Introduction,” 10. 
380 Ibid., 11. 
381 David Brown, The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 
1994), 31. 
382 Ibid., 30. 
 135 
 
5.3 The Nature of Ethno-religious Conflicts in South and Southeast 
Asian Countries 
 Throughout history, ethnic diversity is to be found almost everywhere 
in the world, but only some countries have been facing the difficulties 
caused by ethnic conflict and violence. Ted Robert Gurr, a leading expert 
on ethnic conflict, concluded in Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South 
and Southeast Asia that there are four factors determining whether or not a 
minority will mobilise against the state dominance.383 
The first one is the degree of economic, social and political disparities 
between groups. Normally, severely deprived groups have a greater chance 
of becoming politically active. Deprivation alone, however, is not enough for 
ethnic conflict to erupt. A group must have other factors to strengthen its 
capacity.384 
The second factor is the salience of group identity. Motivations for 
forming ethnic groups may be material, as in mobilisation for the defence of 
interests or resources. Psychological factors, such as dehumanisation or 
social discrimination, could stimulate cohesiveness within a group and 
eventually increase polarisation between groups. Symbols are important for 
group makers in this process of mobilisation.385 
Third, organisational skills and regional concentration are also crucial 
to the development of political activity. Strong leadership is important to the 
rise and growth of ethnic movements.386 
Finally, ethnic mobilisation must get a response from the state 
against which it is reacting. Interactions are also important factors that have 
to be considered. Conflicts between dominant groups and minorities usually 
involve issues of national identity, the expansion and centralisation of 
nationalist political authority which creates a competitive atmosphere for 
power to control a country’s resources, and for the recognition of ethnicity 
as a basis for resource competition and political access.387  
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 Although there has been no uniform pattern in the emergence of 
ethnic violence in these regions, there are some common causes of conflict. 
These include the following: 
 Ethnic Tensions Caused by Colonialism 
In history, diversities could be found in most countries in South and 
Southeast Asia, however, these diverse ethnic communities had lived 
together without any serious conflict for centuries. Today, the issue of ethnic 
conflict has become an unsolved problem for many countries in these 
regions. A main factor that has fostered ethnic conflict in recent years is 
these regions’ colonial history. Colonial rule played a significant role in 
increasing the ethnic diversity in their territories. Both colonial and post-
colonial politics have been a main influence on today’s clashes between 
ethnic communities and governments. 388  During the colonial period, 
Western powers intervened in every aspect of their colonies’ internal 
matters such as the administrative structure, economics, social structure 
and territory or ethnic zone division. Even the only uncolonised country in 
Southeast Asia, Thailand, was affected by the powerful Britain. 
 Unsuccessful Nation-building  
After decolonisation, most states were weak and lacked internal 
stability. There was no successful process of nation-building for the post-
colonial countries. The governments were not able to deal with existing 
conflicts and often continued with heavy-handed measures to suppress 
ethnic minorities. Moreover, corruption undermined the government’s 
credibility. States faced difficulties in gaining the trust of local people.389 In 
several post-colonial countries, nation-building has been considered as one 
of the most important tasks since they gained independence. In general, all 
countries aim to achieve unity and harmony among ethnic groups. This 
effort, however, is not an easy task because one of the most important 
characteristics of a country is its ethnic diversity. In some countries, the 
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government’s efforts to unite the nation failed due to ethnic and religious 
conflicts.390 
 Migrations Create Demographic Diversity 
The geography of South and Southeast Asia includes peninsulas, 
islands and a mainland on which more than ten countries share borders. It 
was believed that states which share more borders, have increased 
likelihood of ethnic conflict occurring. 391  An increase in the number of 
refugees coming into a country also increases the likelihood of ethnic 
conflict occurring.392 It is common that people would migrate from poor and 
insecure countries to where labour is needed and land is easy to find. One 
of the consequences of the migration is a change in demography in terms 
of religion, language, and ethnicity. The colonial period encouraged 
migration mostly for the development of industry and commerce. For 
instance, the situation in Assam was caused by colonial-era immigration 
which produced a stubborn pattern of conflicts between immigrant 
communities and those with indigenous roots.393 
 Differences in Identities  
Identity refers to more than just the strict adherence to religious 
practices, but also appeals to a common language, culture, heritage, and 
the shared memories of history. Conflicts involving groups that share a 
transcendental view and which have the same religion and language often 
involve more violence than other conflicts.394 Religion, in particular, has 
been shown to be an issue in many worldwide conflicts. Some studies have 
agreed that countries with religious diversity are more likely to experience 
ethno-religious conflict than are those that are highly homogeneous. 395 
There are at least four major religions in these regions including Islam, 
Buddhism, Christianity and Hinduism. Thus, religion is an important factor 
which has an influence on ethnic conflicts in these regions.  
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 Marginal Citizens 
Minor groups which are different from the majority of the country tend 
to think they are treated by the state as marginal people. Economic 
inequality, social discrimination, the lack of opportunities for political 
participation, and repression have made the minorities of a country feel that 
they have been left behind and are not part of the state. In some countries, 
minorities have even been threatened and suppressed brutally. These 
factors have triggered ethnic violence and caused marginalised people to 
fight for their rights and for a better quality of life. The separatist groups 
normally request for independence or some form of autonomy. These types 
of rebellion and violent movements might be supported or sponsored by 
foreign sources that have the same ethnicity or religion or assisted by 
international organisations that see the government as having abused the 
minority’s human rights. 
 
5.4 Case Studies of Ethno-religious Conflict in South and Southeast 
Asia 
South and Southeast Asian countries provide significant case studies 
of ethno-religious conflicts. Most countries in these regions have 
encountered long-run ethnic and religious conflicts. There may be more 
than one conflict in each country and also various actors involved in the 
conflict. The level of the conflict in these countries includes international and 
domestic issues which can be found among two or more communities as 
well as between insurgent groups and the state. Some conflicts have moved 
forward in a peaceful direction while in many countries a solution is still hard 
to find. The most well-known cases of conflict in South and Southeast Asia 
will be discussed in this section.  
The effect of ethno-religious conflicts in these five countries in South 
and Southeast Asia are profound. All cases concern the conflicts between 
insurgent groups or minority groups and the government. The first two cases 
that will be considered are from South Asia: the Assam conflict in India and 
the Eelam War in Sri Lanka. The rest are conflicts that have happened in 
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Southeast Asia: the conflict in Mindanao, the Philippines; the Aceh case in 
Indonesia; and the hill tribe conflict in Myanmar.  
5.4.1 India: The Assam Conflict 
India is an important place for the study of ethnic conflict. Its billion 
people, its many languages and cultures, its crosscutting identities of 
religion, ethnicity and caste - all these contribute to a unique potential for 
learning about ethno-religious conflict. India has nearly 4,693 separate 
communities and eight major religious faiths of the world.396 Hinduism is the 
largest religion in India (80.5% of the population); followed by Islam (13.4%), 
Christianity (2.3%), Sikhism (1.9%), Buddhism (0.8%), and Jainism (0.4%). 
India has the world’s largest Hindu population, and the third-largest Muslim 
population.397 
Furthermore, it is the caste system - a system of hierarchical and 
social organisation-that has formed the basic foundation of India's pluralistic 
social structure.398 Besides various religions and a unique social structure, 
India has various tribal groups and dialects among linguistic groups and up 
to 645 district tribes are recognised in the constitution of India. Some 
religious groups have developed themselves into ethnically self-conscious 
communities that make their claims for a nation or autonomy.399 
India’s social structure is a unique mixture of different religions, 
cultures and ethnic groups. Historically, India was a place for immigrants 
and invaders from Europe and Asia.400 Additionally, British colonial rule, 
especially its ‘divide and rule’ policy, was responsible for Hindu-Muslim 
conflict and the breakdown of communal harmony in India.401 Since then, 
religion, ethnicity and language have been the issues that keep challenging 
the government of pluralistic India. 
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The Assam Conflict  
Assam is one of the seven states known as the ‘Seven Sisters’ 
located in Northeast India. Assam shares international borders with Bhutan 
to the north, Myanmar to the east and Bangladesh in the south. 
The Assam conflict has been continuing for decades and this ethno-
religious conflict was caused by the influx of migrants. 402  One of the 
consequences of this migration has been a significant change in Assam’s 
religious demography.403 The population in Assam was assessed with the 
Hindu population at about 42 per cent and the Muslim population at 77 per 
cent from 1971 to 1991.404 In Assam, the Muslim growth rate was much 
higher than the national average and was disproportionately larger in the 
districts bordering Bangladesh due to the immigration of Muslims across the 
borders.405 Some tensions were created among native Assamese people 
and Muslim migrants as they created pressures on land and caused 
unemployment amongst the Assamese people.406 
Today, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) is the biggest 
separatist group operating in Assam. ULFA originated from the ‘Assam 
Movement’ initiated on 7 April 1979. 407  Thousands have died in three 
decades of violence since ULFA was formed in 1979, demanding 
independence from India which it accused of plundering the region's mineral 
and agricultural resources. 408  According to Assam people, Assam was 
never a part of India at any time in history, but it has been occupied by India. 
The purpose of the movement is to overthrow Indian colonial occupation 
from Assam.409 The people of Assam are confronting various problems 
including national identity, a backward economy, an influx of migrants and 
massive exploitation of its natural resources. India has encouraged the 
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influx of Muslims from neighbouring countries because this is a population 
base that has ethnic affinity with Indians. It was seen as an advantage to 
their long-term security. The people of Assam have launched democratic 
and unarmed peaceful movements many times against the injustice of India 
which, however, has always ruthlessly suppressed and killed hundreds of 
innocent protestors. There are endless lists of gross human rights violations 
during this period by Indian occupation forces. Eventually, the unarmed 
peaceful movement transformed to an armed national liberation struggle. A 
military wing of ULFA, the Sanjukta Mukti Fouj (SMF) was formed on 16 
March, 1996.410 The main intention of this military operation is to suppress 
the legitimate aspiration of the people of Assam, and their basic and 
fundamental human rights such as national self-determination.411 
ULFA earlier agreed to abjure violence and to find a solution to the 
conflict through peaceful negotiations with the conflicting parties. The first 
step to find peace in Assam was a tripartite agreement for the Suspension 
of Operations (SoO) against ULFA signed between the Indian Government, 
Assam government and ULFA on 3 September 2011.412 The main concerns 
and demands of the ULFA in the negotiation were classified into three 
areas: protection of political and cultural identity of the indigenous people of 
Assam; land rights; and illegal immigration.413 
The Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding  
Civil society groups play diverse roles in making peace in India’s 
Northeast, for example, civic representatives, peace groups, bridge-
builders, and popular initiatives.414 Civil society groups have been seen as 
representing the ethnic community and thereby get involved in creating 
conflict resolution in the region.415  The second category of civil society 
groups are those expressly set up with the objective of making the 
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necessary preparations for peace dialogues between conflicting parties, 
working out ceasefire details, and thereby facilitating a process that directly 
supports the signing of peace agreements. 416  As a bridge-builder, civil 
society plays an active role in creating links at the local level thereby making 
the coexistence of different communities possible.417 The final role of civil 
society in creating peace is also located in some loosely organised popular 
initiatives that mark its emergence as a force autonomous from both the 
state and the insurgents. These unorganised initiatives, however, have yet 
to find any significant reflection in the institutionally established frameworks 
of peace making and conflict resolution.418 
Unfortunately, the roles of civil society in the peacebuilding process 
remain limited largely to a secretarial role. Civil society in Assam has largely 
remained in the background, and its roles have been restricted to doing the 
groundwork necessary for the conflicting parties to stop hostilities, and to 
find a negotiated settlement to their problems. In still fewer cases, civil 
society groups have been involved in direct talks with the government.419 
The involvement of civil society groups in the peace process, however, may 
help to infuse the process with the values of human rights, democracy and 
justice.420 The Calcutta Research Group (CRG) is an example of a civil 
society initiative that attempts to bring these values to be a main focus of 
the peace process. The CRG organises a series of dialogues among the 
representatives from different communities to bring together conflicting 
parties so they can feel relaxed and confident with the organisers who are 
not involved as conflicting parties. One more main task of the CRG is to 
bring together experts and academics that can analyse the peace 
agreements of the past, and activists who would attempt to share their 
experiences of some of their conditions for success and failure in order to 
determine the peace process for this region.421 
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In the dialogue between the government and ULFA, one of the 
specified roles of Assam’s civil society is to be part of the resolution process. 
Government sources have said that civil society groups will have a very vital 
role to play in consolidating the many communities that make up the greater 
Assamese community. Lots of the demands concern socio-economic-
cultural issues where civil society must play a very important role.422 Poverty 
and unemployment are serious problems caused by massive political 
corruption as a result of which natural resources are wastefully exploited 
with little benefit for the locals. Social problems including inequalities and 
lack of dignity for the local people is due to unchecked immigration that 
threatens the existence of the identity of local people.423 
5.4.2 Sri Lanka: The Eelam War 
Sri Lanka has a population of about 20 million, which is broadly 
divided into the majority - 74 per cent of Sinhalese, who are mainly Buddhist; 
the Tamils, who are predominantly Hindu (18 per cent); and the Tamil-
speaking Muslims (7 per cent).424 The first Europeans who came to Sri 
Lanka were the Portuguese in 1505. Next, the island was controlled by the 
Dutch for more than a hundred years. Britain was the last nation which took 
over the country in 1796 before it gained independence in 1948.425 
The Sinhalese came originally from India in the third century B.C.,426 
and are mostly concentrated in the southern, western and central parts of 
Sri Lanka. Most of the Tamil population is located in the northern and 
eastern provinces of Sri Lanka and is split into two distinct groups: the Jaffna 
Tamils, who were one of the first tribes that arrived on the island over 1,500 
years ago and the Indian Tamils, who were brought to Sri Lanka by the 
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British as tea plantation workers during the 19th century. 427  Ethnic 
discrimination resulted in the Tamils’ resistance and fighting for a separate 
state. Initially, thirty-five militant groups were created, including the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that gradually emerged as the most 
powerful group in the conflict.428  
The Eelam War 
The Eelam War is the name of the armed conflict between the 
government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, also known as the Tamil Tigers 
insurgent group. An estimated 74,000 soldiers and civilians were killed in 
Sri Lanka’s bloody conflict since fighting erupted between the LTTE and the 
state. 429  The roots of this struggle date back to Tamil resentment at 
Sinhalese preferential policies that were introduced by the government 
during the 1950s.430  The national policies related to language, citizenship, 
and university admission and development aimed at discarding the 
minorities who were gradually marginalised. Protests against the state of Sri 
Lanka were staged mainly by Tamils from the north and developed into an 
LTTE-led militant struggle for Tamil self-determination.431  
Beginning in July 1983, there was an intermittent insurgency against 
the government by the LTTE, a separatist militant organisation which fought 
to create an MNLF independent Tamil state in the north and the east of the 
country. Although tensions between the government and Tamil militant 
groups had been simmering since the 1970s, the war did not break out until 
an attack by the LTTE on a Sri Lankan Army patrol in Jaffna, in the north of 
the country, on 23 July 1983. The attack and the subsequent riots in the 
south are generally considered as the start of the conflict.432 After almost 
two decades of fighting, the first ceasefire agreement was signed between 
LTTE and the government, under Norwegian auspices in February 2002.433  
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The peace agreement, however, could not end the conflict, with the 
violence between the state and the LTTE continuing. In 2006, violent attacks 
began to escalate again, when a suicide bomber attacked the main military 
compound in Colombo in April. The fighting between the LTTE and the 
government in the north-east saw the worst of the clashes since the 2002 
ceasefire. In early 2008, the government pulled out of the 2002 ceasefire 
agreement which launched a massive offensive. Finally, the Sri Lankan 
military defeated the Tamil Tigers, bringing to an end the 26-year brutal civil 
war in May 2009.434 
The Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding  
Civil society in Sri Lanka has largely been shaped by British colonial 
rule and the establishment of the modern, democratic state in the first half 
of the twentieth century.435 It was said that social movements grew in Sri 
Lanka as a reaction to the grave social and economic changes brought 
about by colonial rule. Most of the movements, however, resulted not from 
purely local reactions, but were largely inspired or instigated by Western 
movements.436 
The concept of Non-Governmental Organisations became part of Sri 
Lanka’s civil society in the 1970s. After the government turned from socialist 
to open market economic policies in 1977, foreign NGOs entered the 
country in larger numbers. This trend was reinforced after the outbreak of 
the full-scale civil war between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE in 
1983. 437  The rise of foreign funded NGOs, engaging in social work, 
paralleled the decline and weakening of the welfare state. The relationship 
between the state and civil society actors was sometimes tense.438 Civil 
society groups concerned with peace, human rights and democratic reform 
were formed in Sri Lanka in the 1970s in response to ethnic riots and 
government repression.439 Many of the peace civil society groups aimed to 
raise awareness about the causes of the war in order to minimise ethnic 
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polarisation and conflict. 440  A long-term goal is to build the grassroots 
support needed to legitimate peace negotiations and political solutions 
involving power-sharing and increased autonomy for the Tamil northern and 
eastern parts of the country.441 
 For many years, the civil society sector struggled to build support 
from people for peace negotiations through peace education, exchanges, 
study visits and media campaigns. However, it can be assumed that people 
who had positive experiences of awareness raising projects were more 
positive to negotiations and third party involvement than they otherwise 
would have been.442 The weakness of civil society in Sri Lanka is that it has 
been divided ethnically and geographically between Sinhalese and Tamils 
and between the north-east and the rest of the country. The divisions were 
reinforced by lack of contact and frightful experiences during the war, 
language barriers and lack of information.443 Additionally, many of the peace 
NGOs are highly dependent on foreign funding sources. 
Ultimately, the conflict was eventually ended by state military action, 
however, a number of civil society groups including human rights, 
academics, students, religious and journalists groups attempted to build 
peace in the conflict area. Although civil society organisations did not make 
up a significant movement for peace in Sri Lanka, and the post-war 
environment for civil society action has been highly limited, it cannot be 
denied that the contribution of civil society and people’s support were 
important in conflict resolution and also that took place after the war. The 
post-war period has seen the emergence of a number of new civil society 
organisations and networks. Youth have played an important role in civil 
society’s activities which have helped to mobilise large support from other 
countries and international organisations.444 
In conclusion, although other factors such as government policy were 
clearly more important, an indirect role by the civil society sector is 
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necessary. The peace work carried out by civil society organisations helped 
reduce tensions between conflicting parties and opened up a public space 
in the conflict area, for example, supporting non-violent popular mobilisation 
to pressure the government to negotiate with the LTTE in 2001.445   
5.4.3 The Philippines: The Conflict in Mindanao  
The Philippines comprises 7,107 islands categorised into three main 
geographical divisions including Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. The 
population is approximately 94 million. A multi-ethnic and multi-cultural 
composition is found throughout the islands.446  
 The Philippines was a colony of Spain for over three hundred years 
since the Spanish expedition in 1542.447 Later on, Spain lost the war against 
the United States and it became a protectorate of America in 1897 and was 
finally granted independence on 4 July 1946.448 Since independence, the 
Philippines has suffered from severe internal conflicts between its two 
religious communities – Muslims and Catholics. Muslims, known as ‘Moros’, 
comprise only 6 per cent of the total population but are concentrated in the 
Mindanao region located in the southern part of the Philippines.449 The 
Mindanao region was once an independent kingdom and has been 
influenced by Islam since the 8th century. In 1565, the Spanish arrived and 
started to attack the Muslims in Mindanao. Spanish rule created a deep 
alienation between the Muslims and the Catholics, and each community 
developed negative images about the other.450 Later on, the Philippines was 
occupied by the United States which adopted some policies of assimilation 
that created a deep sense of frustration in the minds of the Muslims in 
Mindanao.451 After independence, the Philippines’ government continued 
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the policy of repression of the Muslims by encouraging the influx of 
Christians to Mindanao. By the 1960s, the Muslims had become a minority 
in Mindanao.452 The conflict in Mindanao is the longest existing insurgency 
of any Asian country.453 
The Conflict in Mindanao  
Mindanao has a population of approximately 20 million with 
approximately 25 per cent being Muslims. However, the majority of the 
people in Basilan, a province in Western Mindanao, are Muslims while 
Christians comprise around 35 per cent of the population. The incidence of 
poverty and illiteracy in Mindanao is higher than the national average. 
Furthermore, land disputes are a prolonged problem. There are four main 
Muslim secessionist and separatist movements operating in the Philippines 
including the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Bangsamoro 
Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). Security problems in Mindanao have 
focused on the Muslim secessionist and separatist movements led by the 
MNLF since the early 1970s, followed by the MILF since the late 1980s, as 
well as the more radical ASG in the past decade.454 Later on, the BIFF broke 
away from the MILF in 2008. 
The Moro insurgency in the Philippines is related to political tensions 
and the violence began in 1969 between the Muslim rebel groups and the 
government of the Philippines. The first political movement led by Professor 
Nur Misuari was formed after the Armed Forces of the Philippines killed 68 
Filipino Muslim military trainees who were believed to be part of an 
upcoming rebellion. The incident was known as the ‘Jabidah Massacre’.455 
In 1973, the MNLF made the first move for the independence of 13 
provinces from the Philippines. It entered into the ‘Tripoli Agreement’ with 
the government in 1976 and its peace agreement with the government 
under the auspices of the Organisation of Islamic States was made in 
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1996.456 The Tripoli Declaration agreed to “the establishment of autonomy 
in the southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines”.457 In the areas of autonomy, 
Muslims are able to set up their own court which implements the Islamic 
Shari’ah laws. Besides matters of justice, they have the right to set up their 
own educational institutions, administrative mechanisms and financial 
systems.458  
After the MNLF entered into the Tripoli Agreement with the central 
government, a new group called the MILF was formed in 1987 by Hashim 
Salamat who was originally a member of the MNLF. The government has 
tried to seek peace with the MILF through dialogue and negotiation to 
develop depressed Muslim communities. 459  The government, however, 
emphasises that it will not allow Philippine sovereignty and territorial 
integrity to be compromised. In 2008, the government announced a peace 
deal that would have given the MILF some autonomous areas but it failed 
after the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional.460 461 
Later on, Ameril Umbra Kato, a leader of the largest armed unit of 
the MILF, established the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) 
because he was not included in the peace process between the Philippines’ 
government and the MILF. Moreover, he felt that the MILF may have lost 
sight of its original intent: “to liberate the Moro people from the local 
colonisers which are the Filipino people, and the Philippines’ 
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government.”462 After the ceasefire failed in 2008, many more separatists 
from MILF went to his side. His supporters are now estimated at around five 
thousand, which at the very least constitutes, almost half the entire MILF 
fighting force.463 
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), is the smallest and most radical of the 
Islamic separatist groups operating in the Philippines. It was founded in the 
mid-1980s with the objective of the establishment of a separate 
Bangsamoro homeland.464 Their main insurgent activities are bombings, 
assassinations and kidnappings, and they are unusually ruthless to 
Christians who try to disrupt their operations.465 In fact, the ASG has all the 
characteristics of a modern international terrorist organisation, constantly 
changing in ways that make it very dangerous and difficult to counter.466 
The government finds it hard to deal with the ASG because mislabelling it 
as an ordinary criminal group has caused misconceptions among those 
having to deal with it. The government has to accept that it is a 
contemporary terrorist organisation.467 Pursuing a military solution without 
any political, social, or economic components in the strategy to counter the 
insurgency makes terrorist groups such as the ASG more aggressive.468 
The Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding 
The conflict situation in Mindanao is quite complex. To understand 
the effect of civil society’s efforts to end the long-running separatist war, 
context is required. It must be remembered that violent conflict in the 
southern Philippines is not only as a result of the Muslim-Christian 
communal problems or Islamic separatist insurgencies. There is banditry, 
focusing on kidnapping, a communist insurgency, and endemic tribal 
conflict. All these variables affect efforts to resolve this separatist 
insurgency.469 
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Civil society groups in Mindanao have showed their interest in 
peacebuilding efforts since the ensuing armed war in Mindanao in the 
1970s. It was considered that civil society groups in Mindanao could 
contribute significantly in terms of managing the conflict and ultimately 
achieving lasting peace in Mindanao. Encouraging the locals to establish 
‘spaces for peace’, where combatants are requested not to be in a particular 
community, was one of the successful activities supported by the civil 
society.  
Moreover, the civil society groups help the government to move 
toward peace by promoting interreligious dialogue and involvement of civil 
society in the official peace process.470 They also help to reduce the level 
of conflict by pushing for a restoration of the ceasefire. Furthermore, the civil 
society sector can also promote the discussion of options for peace - 
including draft peace agreements devised by both sides - allowing 
exploration of ideas that cannot be officially taken up by either side.471 In 
addition, civil society is officially represented on the Local Monitoring Teams 
formed by five members from the government, the MILF, two non-
governmental members and a religious leader.472 The objectives of these 
groups are to observe, monitor and investigate the implementation of the 
agreement on peace.473 Interestingly, civil society can also assist elements 
of the government to undertake conflict management. The Local Monitoring 
Teams was set up to assist police in order to provide a buffer between the 
government and MILF sites in the 2001 cessation of hostilities. Moreover, 
civil society groups with a monitoring role have been praised by both the 
government and the MILF for helping provide impartial analysis of different 
accusations.474 
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5.4.4 Indonesia: Aceh  
 Indonesia is the world's fourth most populous country and it has the 
biggest Muslim population in the world. There are around 300 distinct native 
ethnic groups in Indonesia with more than 300 different languages and 
dialects.475 As a result of that, Indonesia has faced many ongoing conflicts 
between people of different religions, tribes and cultures.  
The beginning of the mid-1990s, saw a sudden rise in violent ethnic 
conflict in Indonesia. After the downfall of Suharto's regime, economic crisis 
and the beginning of democratisation, ethnic riots and violent conflicts 
escalated in several parts of the country.476 From 1995 to 2002, there were 
a large number of violent conflicts involving various ethnic groups in different 
parts of the country: clashes between Muslims and Christians in the mid-
1990s across Java; some of which were anti-Chinese in Jakarta; Dayak-
Madurese conflicts in West Kalimantan (1997) and Central Kalimantan 
(2001); the eruption of a new Muslim-Christian conflict in Maluku (1999) and 
in Sulawesi (1999); and the intensification of conflict and resurgence of 
violence in Aceh, East Timor, and Papua (1999). By the end of 2002, the 
violence had largely decreased in these areas, with the notable exception 
of Aceh.477   
 The conflicts in Indonesia can be divided into two levels including 
intra-society conflict, and a conflict between the state and a particular group 
within the nation. 478  Kalimantan, Maluku and Sulawesi are cases of a 
conflict within the society itself or intra-society conflict which is a conflict 
between at least two different cultural or religious communities under a 
single political authority.479 Aceh and Papua are conflicts between the state 
and a particular group within the nation. Conflicts in Papua, like in Aceh, 
also took the form of a secessionist conflict. In this province, which officially 
became part of Indonesia in 1969, the main resistance organisation, the 
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Free Papua Organisation, 480  clearly aimed for the creation of an 
independent state separate from Indonesia. For decades, the Indonesian 
military has used excessive force to suppress the rebellion, resulting in 
widespread abuses of human rights, including arbitrary killing, rape and 
torture.481 
The Aceh Conflict 
Aceh – the northernmost province on the island of Sumatra – is 
presented both as a war over resources and as an ethno-religious conflict.  
Aceh is the stage for one of the oldest domestic conflicts both in Indonesia 
and in Southeast Asia as a whole.482 Aceh is a historically famous region for 
its battle against the Dutch and then for its resistance against the central 
government in Jakarta since 1953. Aceh has experienced long-term conflict 
in its history since it became the last region to be conquered by the Dutch 
between 1847 and 1914. In fact, the conflict in the province began to take 
form as a secessionist conflict only in the mid-1970s with the establishment 
of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM stands for Gerakan Aceh Merdeka in 
Indonesian). The conflict ended in 2006 and the demand shifted from 
independence to the acceptance of ‘Special Autonomy Plus’.483 
Many factors led to the successful peaceful solution. The turning 
point was the change of presidency in 2004 from Megawati to Yudhoyono. 
At that time, the Megawati presidency had weakened the GAM but 
Yudhoyono changed the strategy from a military solution to a political one. 
On the GAM side, the leaders became more flexible since the Indonesian 
state agreed to a peaceful solution. 484  Finally, the 2004 tsunami and 
earthquake disasters paralysed GAM supporters, and this ceased the 
violence. GAM’s decision to renew peace negotiations, however, was made 
before the tsunami disaster which was just an accelerating factor.485 This 
position of special autonomy offered by the government was pushed to ‘self-
government’ by GAM with the Helsinki MoU and although GAM did not 
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succeed, it still achieved ‘Special Autonomy Plus’. This new administrative 
model gave the Acehnese more power in politics, such as the permission 
for the existence of local political parties, and in economic matters, such as 
increased oil and gas revenue.486 
The Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding  
In Indonesia, the formation of civil society was dependent upon the 
growth of democracy.487 After the fall of Suharto in 1998, the concept of civil 
society became very popular and gained prominence in Indonesian political 
discourse - especially among researchers and social/political activists.488 
The process of peacebuilding needs to look at how to link each level of 
society as well as how to link the activities done inside and outside the 
conflict areas. As such, the involvement of civil society is needed as they 
can act as elements of change in a protracted conflict like Aceh.489 
For best results, the peacebuilding process should be initiated from 
within and should involve all parties who are in the conflict and are feeling 
the impacts of the conflict. The members of civil society in Aceh are most 
likely victims as well, making it more important that they achieve their 
targeted objectives. They are the most important actors for peacebuilding 
which are concerned with building the foundation for peace, and they 
present themselves as both an alternative voice and a catalyst for change 
in the transformation of society.490  
In the context of Aceh, civil society groups are led and initiated by the 
students, NGOs, religious leaders, intellectuals, and journalists who have 
tried to promote the values of peace, non-violence and humanity. Their 
activities, however, have been obstructed by the ongoing conflict between 
the armed parties, the government and the GAM. The peacebuilding 
activities carried out by civil society in Aceh include the raising of awareness 
and advocacy; lobbying and pressuring the Indonesian government and 
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GAM to stop the violence; capacity building and education especially in 
promoting peace including peace education and peace studies; research 
and data gathering, especially about human rights abuses; and legal and 
non-legal advocacy for the victims of the conflict.491 
5.4.5 Myanmar: The Hill Tribe Conflicts 
Myanmar is the most ethnically diverse state in mainland Southeast 
Asia. Myanmar’s diverse ethnic population is a result of the country’s 
strategic location. It shares borders with China in the northeast, India in the 
northwest, Bangladesh in the west, and Laos and Thailand in the east. As 
a result, different ethnicities have migrated to settle down in the extremely 
fertile land around the Irrawaddy River.492 
The conflict in Myanmar is slightly different from the above-
mentioned cases in which religion is a strong element of the cause of the 
conflicts. For the case of Myanmar, ethnic and indigenous identities play a 
more important role than religion in creating the conflict.  
Myanmar has been torn by the world’s longest-running civil war, 
which is rooted in ethnic conflict.493 Since achieving independence after the 
Second World War, Myanmar has isolated itself from the outside world. The 
Burmese are the majority which forms an estimated 68 per cent of the 
population, but there are still more than a hundred ethnic groups in the 
country. The major non-Burmese ethnic groups are the Arakanese, Chin, 
Kachin, Shan, Karenni, Karen, and Mon, all of which have their own states 
in which they are the dominant ethnic group. All these states have ethnic 
insurgent activities of varying intensities against the Myanmar military.494 
The largest of the ethnic minorities are the Shans (9%) and the Karens (7%). 
The Burmese dominate the major cities along the river while the hills 
bordering the neighbouring countries are populated by ethnic minorities. 
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These ethnic groups have long resisted Burmese domination. 495  Most 
Burmese are Buddhist, whereas the Shan and the Karen are predominantly 
Christian. Buddhism entered Myanmar from India from the 7th century while 
Christianity was introduced during British rule. Thus, there is a contrast 
between the minority groups and the Burmese, who are largely Buddhist.496 
The Hill Tribe Conflicts 
The failure to manage Myanmar’s immense diversity has resulted in 
ethnic conflicts, and some of them started even before independence. The 
main demand of the ethnic minorities is greater autonomy and acceptance 
of their cultural and religious identity in the process of their integration into 
Myanmar’s mainstream.497 In response to the civil war caused by ethnic 
conflict all over the country, the civilian government asked the army to run 
the country for a period in the late 1950s. The military returned to take power 
again in 1962 and since then, the army has insisted on ruling Myanmar as 
they claimed that only the military can keep the country together against the 
minority forces that would tear it apart. In other words, military rule in 
Myanmar is the product of ethnic violence.498 
Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts are rooted in colonial state-building and 
rule. During the colonial period, the British impact on Myanmar was 
profound as it was governed as a minor part of the British Indian Empire.499 
The models of administration were imposed by the British who had little 
understanding or respect for local social structures. A major consequence 
of British rule was to strengthen the division between the Burmese and 
ethnic minorities.500 Therefore, the violent civil wars erupted shortly after 
independence and ethnic minority groups struggled for territorial and 
cultural autonomy.501 
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In 1947, Aung San became a hero of the Burmese independence 
movement who tried to negotiate independence from the British in 1948 and 
compromise with all minority groups. There were some attempts to meet 
with leaders of the various ethnic minorities to discuss their status after the 
independence of Myanmar.502 Tragically, Aung San and six members of his 
cabinet were assassinated in 1947. Since then the country has been in 
turmoil. The ethnic minorities had no trust of the central government. The 
hill tribes wanted to govern themselves in their own ways because their 
identities differ from that of the Burmese, especially with respect to 
language, religion, and culture.503 
When Myanmar became independent in 1948, many ethnic 
minorities feared that the majority Burmese would oppress them. Some 
tribes wanted independence, and others would agree to merge only if the 
constitution gave them special protection.504 Some ethnic minorities took up 
arms because they believed that the constitution did not provide them with 
enough self-determination, and the military seized control in response.505  
The Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding  
State weakness was one factor which has led to the emergence of 
civil society spaces in Myanmar. Spaces for civil society actors do exist 
within at least two areas of state weakness: firstly, in sectors where the 
welfare state fails to perform its function and, secondly, in some of the partly 
autonomous ethnic ceasefire areas.506 The state, however, affects how civil 
society is able to develop itself. Thus, whether Myanmar’s civil society will 
be confined to serving a facilitating function or whether it can play a vital 
part of political change as well eventually also depends on the state.507 
Furthermore, it was believed that the ceasefire agreements between 
the state and most of the armed ethnic resistance groups in the 1990s have 
led to the emergence and enlargement of spaces for civil society.508 Since 
                                            
502 Matthew J. Walton, “Ethnicity, Conflict, and History in Burma: The Myths of Panlong,” 
Asian Survey 48, no. 6 (November/December 2008): 889. 
503 Williams, “Ethnicity, Elections,” Law & Ethnics, 102. 
504 Ibid., 100. 
505 Ibid. 
506 Lorch, “Stopgap or Change Agent?,” Internationales Asienforum, 23. 
507 Ibid., 47. 
508 Ibid., 39. 
 158 
 
then, they have been carrying out important roles as monitors of the ongoing 
conflicts and tentative ceasefires.509 Some peace-aimed civil society groups 
have improved the relations between ethnic minorities and the state in a 
positive way. As the talks proceed, the key roles for local peacebuilders will 
be in the areas of monitoring, advocacy and reconciliation processes.510  
It is important that a sustainable peacebuilding process should 
provide space for the participation of a wide range of stakeholders, including 
civil society organisations, communities or international aided groups.511 
There is, however, a warning that an influx of foreign aid could distort local 
priorities, overwhelming the limited local capacities and marginalising local 
organisations.512  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter described the backgrounds of ethno-religious conflicts 
in South and Southeast Asian countries where most conflicts have been 
entrenched for decades. Differences in identities and ways of life as well as 
discrimination are believed to be the root causes of the ethno-religious 
conflict in these countries.  
Although some conflicts share common characteristics and patterns, 
it is also important to recognise that each conflict has its own distinct history 
and unique causes, thus demanding different solutions.513 This is why it is 
difficult to find a peacebuilding model which could be a universal method to 
use for resolving all conflicts. There is no guarantee that the method which 
had been successful in one country could be used in the other cases. There 
are some variable factors that can contribute to successful peacebuilding 
including the state leaders, the government’s policy, militant leaders, 
regional security and international circumstances. In multi-ethnic countries, 
government policies to manage conflicts are essential. State tools can be 
used to manage conflicts such as the constitution, laws, public policies, and 
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security authorities (i.e. the police and military). 514  Public policy is an 
effective tool to manage a conflict but the government must know the limits 
of their intervention to enable people to manage conflict as well.515 
It is clear that the state’s strategy alone cannot resolve a conflict. The 
civil society sector plays a significant role in creating a better atmosphere 
for peacebuilding which includes providing popular support for peace, and 
promoting negotiation and reconciliation between polarised groups.516 The 
involvements of civil society and the grassroots are very important to 
maintain peace.  
The next chapter will discuss in more detail the roles of civil society 
in creating peace, the importance of civil society being involved in the 
peacebuilding process, the concept of peacebuilding and the framework of 
civil society’s roles in building peace in an ethno-religious conflict.  
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CHAPTER VI 
THE ROLES OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN PEACEBUILDING 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The non-state sector has become an obvious influential actor in 
contemporary conflict. The roles of civil society in the process of 
peacebuilding are now widely acknowledged in conflict-affected 
countries.517 Today, the main question is no longer whether civil society has 
a role to play in peacebuilding, but how it can realise its potential.518 Besides 
a key role in fostering democratic governance in peaceful societies, civil 
society also plays significant roles in the peace process in a conflict area.519 
In order to understand the relationship between civil society and 
peacebuilding, this chapter will begin with the concept of peacebuilding, 
followed by peacebuilding actors and approaches, the importance of the 
civil society sector in the peace process with a final analysis of the general 
roles of civil society in creating peace. 
 
6.2 Understanding the Concept of Peacebuilding  
First of all, the concept of peace should be explained. Galtung has 
differentiated between negative and positive peace, whereby negative 
peace describes peace in a narrow scope as the absence of war or direct 
physical violence while positive peace also includes an increase in social 
justice and the creation of a culture of peace among people within and 
across societies.520 Thus, peace in a positive way is not only a matter of 
control and reduction of the use of arms or violence, but is also referred to 
as development and social healing.521 So, this means that peace theory is 
intimately connected not only with conflict theory, but also development 
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theory.522 Nonetheless, most scholars agree that peace is a complex, long-
term and multi-layered process.523 
Later on, the term ‘peacebuilding’ emerged from the concept of 
positive peace because peacebuilding aims for not only a limitation of 
physical violence but sustainable peace. 
6.2.1 The Origins of Peacebuilding 
Peacebuilding can be defined in many different ways. Scholars, 
policymakers, and practitioners have all developed different conceptions of 
peacebuilding.524 
The term peacebuilding was first created nearly 40 years ago through 
the work of Galtung. In 1975, ‘peacebuilding’ emerged in his work called the 
Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and 
Peacebuilding. 525  His understanding of peacebuilding is based on his 
conceptual distinction between negative peace and positive peace.526 The 
creation of peacebuilding structures was to promote sustainable peace by 
addressing the root causes of violent conflict and supporting the locals’ 
capacities for peace management and conflict resolution.527 
John Paul Lederach, another key scholar in the field of peace 
studies, has called for expanding an understanding of peacebuilding. 
According to Lederach, peacebuilding “is more than post-accord 
reconstruction” and “is understood as a comprehensive concept that 
encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, 
approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more 
sustainable, peaceful relationships”. 528  Thus, the term involves a wide-
range of activities that both precede and follow formal peace settlements. 
Other peace scholars have been conducting research along similar 
lines since the 1980s. The peacebuilding concept has received interest 
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throughout the world from well-known international organisations, local 
NGOs and community networks who are working to help victims, 
communities and societies from civil wars or international conflicts.529 
Besides ‘peacebuilding’, two other terms that should be clarified are 
‘peacekeeping’ and ‘peacemaking’. Their different definitions make it easier 
to understand the concept of peacebuilding. Peacekeeping involves third-
party intervention to keep apart warring groups in order to maintain the 
absence of direct violence or to reduce it. Peacemaking, on the other hand, 
refers to the negotiation process that takes place between decision-makers 
directed towards reaching an official settlement or resolution to specific 
conflicts. Finally, the third term, peacebuilding, refers to a wider scope which 
involves a variety of activities such as the re-establishment or development 
of normal, peaceful relations between people, organisations, and their 
societies through socioeconomic reconstruction. It focuses more on the 
people and the context of the conflict than on the issues or the interests 
being fought over.530 
6.2.2 Definition 
It is quite difficult to find a simple, clear-cut definition of 
peacebuilding. There are many possible definitions of peacebuilding and 
varying opinions about what it involves. Peacebuilding has a complicated 
meaning because of its wide-range of activities focusing on the social, 
psychological and economic environment at the grassroots level. 531 
Peacebuilding differs from peacemaking, which is the use of negotiation or 
a peace agreement to end violence, and peacekeeping, which is the threat 
of the use of force to prevent actors from re-engaging in armed conflict.532  
The initiator of the term peacebuilding, Galtung, said that 
peacebuilding achieves positive peace by creating structures and 
institutions based on justice, equity, and cooperation. 533  Peacebuilding 
became a familiar concept within the United Nations in 1992 from the report 
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An Agenda for Peace by Boutros Boutros-Ghali which defined 
peacebuilding as action to solidify peace and to avoid relapse into conflict. 
The UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee has described 
peacebuilding thus: “Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted 
to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening 
national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the 
foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding 
strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country 
concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully 
prioritised, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed 
at achieving the above objectives”.534 
This thesis defines peacebuilding as activities aimed at preventing 
and managing conflict, and sustaining peace after the violence has ended. 
Peacebuilding is concerned with issues that go beyond a narrow definition 
of conflict issues and covers the wider economic, political and social 
dimensions of countries before, during and after the end of violent 
conflict.535  
6.2.3 Theoretical Approaches to Peacebuilding 
Studying some relevant theories and schools of thought is needed 
for a profound understanding of the field of peacebuilding because the 
history of these schools is closely linked to the history and evolution of 
peacebuilding. There are five schools of thought that can be distinguished. 
These schools have different terminologies, conceptual frameworks, 
approaches, understandings, and actors. The different schools have had 
different influences on peacebuilding and its practice has adopted elements 
from different schools.536  
The following are the five main schools of thought - conflict 
management, conflict resolution, complementary school, conflict 
transformation and alternative discourse. 
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1) The Conflict Management School  
This is the oldest school of thought which is linked to the 
institutionalisation of peacebuilding in international law. This approach aims 
to end wars through diplomatic initiatives. The peacebuilding actors within 
the meaning of this school are external diplomats from bilateral or 
multilateral organisations. Its theoretical approach is referred to as an 
outcome-oriented approach which aims to identify and bring leaders of the 
conflicting parties to the negotiating table. Its main focus is on the short-
term management of the armed conflict.537 
The Conflict Management School has been criticised because 
mediators tend to focus only on the top-level leadership of the conflicting 
parties, and the approach overlooks deeper causes of conflicts.  Thus, this 
approach cannot guarantee the long-term stability of the peace agreement. 
Conflict Management approaches, however, have recently moved beyond 
a concern with a ceasefire agreement and now also focus on the conditions 
for successful implementation of post-conflict peacebuilding. Therefore, it is 
now possible to distinguish between traditional and modern approaches to 
conflict management.538 
2) The Conflict Resolution School  
This school was established in the 1970s, adopting strategies from 
socio-psychological conflict resolution at the inter-personal level. This 
approach aims to solve the root causes of conflict and rebuild destroyed 
relationships between parties involved in the conflict. Under this approach, 
relations need to be rebuilt not only between the top representatives of the 
conflicting parties, but also within an overall society. As the approach 
evolved, additional actors, such as international or local NGOs, as well as 
individuals and communities entered the field and have had more roles in 
the peace process. Workshops are designed to rebuild relationships 
between the conflicting parties’ representatives who can influence their 
leaders and do not represent a government or an international organisation. 
All actors work to solve the root causes of the conflict under a long-term 
resolution-oriented approach. The examples of activities used in this 
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approach are dialogue projects between groups or communities, and 
conflict resolution training to enhance the peacebuilding capacity of actors 
perceived as agents of change.539 
The Conflict Resolution School has been criticised, especially by 
supporters of the Conflict Management School, because the process takes 
too long to stop armed conflict and because improving communications and 
building relationships between parties to the conflict does not necessarily 
result in a ceasefire agreement.540  
3) The Complementary School  
This school focuses on combining the strengths of both the conflict 
management and conflict resolution schools. Three different approaches 
have been proposed in this school. The first approach is Fisher and 
Keashly’s Contingency Model for third party intervention in armed conflicts 
which aims to identify the appropriate third party method and the proper 
timing of interventions. Based on Glasl’s Conflict Escalation Model, the 
approach is to de-escalate the conflict from phase to phase. For resolution-
oriented approaches, it is appropriate to use power mediation when the 
conflict escalates. After a peace accord has been agreed by the conflicting 
parties, it is time to adopt resolution-oriented approaches. Critics of this 
approach have pointed out that in practice different types of interventions 
can take place at the same time.541  
Bercovitch and Rubin developed the second approach from the 
contingency model by shifting the perspective from approaches to actors. In 
this approach, it is not important which mediators are the most effective, but 
who is more effective at different stages of the conflict. Hence, the result is 
that the more the conflict escalates the more powerful the third party 
becomes. A weakness of this approach is that it does not fully address the 
issue of coordination or the possibility of simultaneous application of all 
approaches.542  
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The third approach of this school is the Multi-Track Diplomacy 
Approach proposed by Diamond and McDonald which, while recognising 
that different approaches and actors are needed to reach peace, seeks to 
make a clearer distinction between the different approaches and actors by 
adopting a ‘Track Concept’. Track I involves formal diplomatic peacebuilding 
initiated by governments through formal negotiations which are in line with 
the Conflict Management School. Track II represents the original conflict 
resolution school by improving communication and creating a better 
understanding of each party through unofficial and non-governmental 
channels.543 
Overall, the Complementary School has not been criticised widely 
nor has it resulted in major debates among researchers. This is due to the 
evolution of the Conflict Transformation School that absorbed the results of 
the Complementary School and was taken over by mainstream research 
and, most of all, by practitioners.544 
4) The Conflict Transformation School 
This approach focuses on the transformation of deep-rooted armed 
conflicts into peaceful ones based on a different understanding of 
peacebuilding. Lederach developed the first comprehensive transformation-
oriented approach. His approach is to resolve the underlying causes of 
conflict and to build sustainable peace by supporting both short-term conflict 
management and long-term relationship building. According to the Conflict 
Resolution School, he sees the need to rebuild destroyed relationships, 
focusing on reconciliation within society and the strengthening of society’s 
peacebuilding potential. Lederach divided society into three levels: top-rank, 
middle-range, and grassroots, which can be approached with different 
peacebuilding strategies. A key element of this approach is to focus on 
peace constituencies by identifying mid-level actors and empowering them 
to create peace and support reconciliation. Empowerment of the middle 
level is assumed to influence peacebuilding in the whole community 
including the grassroots. Third party intervention should concentrate on 
supporting internal actors and coordinating external peace efforts. 
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Moreover, sensitivity to the local culture and a long-term time frame are 
considered necessary for peacebuilding.545 
5) The Alternative Discourse School  
There is an emerging literature analysing peacebuilding through the 
perspectives of discourse analysis and encouraging an alternative 
approach to peacebuilding. The most important contribution of this school 
is its focus on ordinary people, oppressed voices, the analysis of power 
structures, and an assessment based on realities instead of normative 
assumptions.546 
6.2.4 Dimensions of Peacebuilding 
Peacebuilding is based on an assumption that violent conflicts do not 
automatically end with the signing of a peace agreement or the deployment 
of military forces. Peacebuilding is not a rapid response tool, but a long-term 
process of ongoing work in the following three dimensions (see figure 
6.1):547 
1. Altering structural contradictions is widely considered as 
necessary for sustainable peace. The important elements are state-building 
and democratisation measures; the reform of structures that reproduce the 
conflict such as the education system; economic and sustainable 
development; social justice and human rights; empowerment of civil society; 
and constructive journalism. 
2. Improving relations between the conflict parties is a vital part of 
peacebuilding to reduce the effects of war-related parties and disrupted 
communication between the conflicting parties. They deal with the non-
material effects of violent conflict. The examples of their healing activities 
are programmes of reconciliation, trust-building and dealing with the past 
which aim to transform damaged relationships and to achieve justice as an 
ultimate goal.  
3. Changing individual attitudes and behaviour is the third dimension 
of peacebuilding. It means strengthening individual peace capacities, 
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breaking stereotypes, empowering formerly disadvantaged groups, and 
healing trauma and the psychological wounds of war. Training people in 
non-violent action and conflict resolution is one frequently used measure for 
strengthening individual peace capacities.  
Many peacebuilding measures seek to have a greater impact by 
combining strategies which encompass all three dimensions. An example 
of these strategies is the bringing of former conflicting parties together to 
work on improving their economic situation and thus changing individual 
attitudes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 - Three Dimensions of Peace 
Source: Berghof Foundation, ed., Berghof Glossary on Conflict Transformation: 20 
Notions for Theory and Practice (Berlin: Berghof Foundation Operations GmbH, 2012), 
63. 
 
6.2.5 Phases of Peacebuilding 
Peacebuilding was seen as the third phase of the conflict resolution 
process, following the enforced cessation of violence (peacekeeping) and 
the negotiation of a settlement agreement (peacemaking). 548  In fact, 
peacebuilding is recognised as dynamic having something to contribute in 
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every phase of a conflict and always moving in response to the situation and 
the stage of the peacemaking efforts. 549  Although most peacebuilding 
happens once conflict has ended, some peacebuilding tasks can start even 
during conflict.550 
There are three phases of peacebuilding. 551  First, preconflict 
peacebuilding aims at preventing the start of violent conflict. The second 
phase is peacebuilding during armed conflict or conflict management. This 
phase aims to end armed conflict and to reach a peace agreement. Even 
though the concept of peacebuilding includes interventions at the stages 
before and during the conflict, most peacebuilding activities concentrate on 
the post-conflict stage. Many peacebuilding scholars, however, advocate an 
increased focus on pre-conflict peacebuilding in the future. 
The last phase, and the most important, is the post-conflict phase 
which is the stage after the end of large scale violence. The post-conflict 
phase can be divided into two sub-phases, the immediate aftermath of 
armed conflict (1-5 years) and the period after (5-10 years). Many 
researchers found that there is a high risk of reverting to large scale violence 
within the first five years after the end of war.552  
Furthermore, post-conflict peacebuilding has been divided into three 
dimensions: stabilising the post-conflict zone, restoring state institutions, 
and dealing with social and economic issues. The first dimension aims to 
reinforce state stability after the armed conflict and discourage former 
combatants from returning to war through activities such as disarmament, 
demobilisation, reintegration programmes, security sector reform, and arms 
control for light and heavy weapons systems. Second dimension activities 
focus on building state capacity to provide basic public goods and increase 
state legitimacy. Finally, programmes in the third dimension are to build a 
post-conflict society’s ability to manage conflicts peacefully and to promote 
socioeconomic infrastructure development.553  
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The main focus of post-conflict research is the durability of peace 
agreements including how peace agreements can be successfully 
implemented in the immediate aftermath of wars and sustained 
thereafter.554 Armed conflicts and wars, however, do not follow this path, but 
rather evolve in recurring cycles of peace and violence.555  
 
6.3 Peacebuilding in Action 
 Having described the concept and theory of peacebuilding above, 
the following will discuss the practice of peacebuilding and the actors who 
have important roles in the process of peacebuilding. There are some 
attempts to classify actors in peacebuilding although the people involved in 
creating peace are various and complex. For example, Lederach has 
explained the key actors in peacebuilding by using the pyramid of 
leadership.  
6.3.1 Actors in Peacebuilding  
Most of the literature on peacebuilding distinguishes between ‘local,’ 
‘national,’ and ‘international’ stakeholders. This classification of actors in 
peacebuilding can be quite problematic and contentious in some 
circumstances. For example, a national actor coming from the central 
government or another social group may well be considered as an outsider 
when entering a specific community; this is why some distinguish between 
a ‘national’ and a ‘local’ level, but the criteria for making this distinction are 
unclear or overlapping.  
The concepts of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ create a better 
understanding and are more flexible. Some academics have defined 
insiders as “those vulnerable to conflict, because they are from the area and 
living there, and who in some way must have experienced the conflict and 
lived with its consequences personally. Outsiders are those who choose to 
become involved in the conflict and who have personally little to lose”.556 It 
is also important to understand how the relationship between insiders and 
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outsiders is defined in a particular context. Even when the distinction 
between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ seems to be obvious, it has to be closely 
considered. In many cases, outsiders when working with a civil society claim 
to be working with the locals, but are actually collaborating with other 
outsiders.557  
Although external agents can facilitate and support peacebuilding, 
the best practice must be driven by internal actors or local people. 
Moreover, outsiders, such as international organisations, are seen to be 
limited in what they can do. Their peacebuilding work is criticised for being 
too bureaucratic, having short-term commitment, and being financially 
dependent on the government for donations and therefore being 
accountable to them but not to the people on the ground.558 A successful 
peacebuilding process cannot be imposed from the outside.559 
6.3.2 Levels of Leadership 
Lederach found it helpful to think of leadership in the population 
affected by a conflict as being in terms of a pyramid (see figure 6.2 on page 
174).560 The pyramid can be used as a way of describing the numbers within 
a population in simplified terms. The pinnacle, or top level leadership, 
represents the fewest people. The base of the pyramid represents the 
largest number of people; the grassroots. The pyramid also shows the types 
of leaders, the sectors from which they come at each level and the conflict 
transformation activities that the leaders at each level may undertake.561 
Level 1: Top Level Leadership 
 The top level leadership comprises of the key political and military 
leaders in the conflict. These people are the highest representative leaders 
of the government and opposition movements. A great deal of attention is 
paid to their movements, statements, and positions. These highly visible 
leaders are generally locked into positions taken with regard to the 
perspectives and issues in conflict. They are under considerable pressure 
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to maintain a position of strength against their adversaries and in their own 
constituencies.562 
Level 2: Middle-range Leadership 
 Middle-range leaders are persons who function in leadership 
positions within the setting of a conflict, but whose positions are not 
necessarily connected to or controlled by the government or major 
opposition groups.563  
Middle-range leadership can be described in several different ways. 
One approach is to focus on persons who are highly respected as 
individuals and/or occupy formal positions of leadership in sectors such as 
education, business, agriculture, or health. A second approach is to 
consider the primary networks of groups and institutions that may exist 
within a conflict area, such as religious groups, academic institutions, or 
humanitarian organisations. A third approach is to concentrate on the 
identity groups in conflict, and to locate middle-range leaders among people 
who are well known as belonging to a minority ethnic group, or who are from 
a particular geographic region within the conflict and are respected by the 
people of that region, but are also known outside the region. The final 
approach is to focus on people from within the conflict setting but whose 
prestige extends much farther.564 
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Figure 6.2 - Actors and Approaches to Peacebuilding. 
Source: John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided 
Societies (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 39. 
 
 The key actors within this level have significant features: they have 
contact with top level leaders, but are not influenced by the elite level, and 
their position is not based on political or military power. Similarly, they have 
experience of people living at the grassroots level but they are not struggling 
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with the survival demands that the violence affected victims face. They have 
good connections with both the top and the grassroots levels.565  
Level 3: Grassroots Leadership  
 The grassroots represent the masses, the base of the society. In 
some cases, people at this level are involved in an effort to survive and keep 
their lives safe. The leadership at the grassroots level also operates on a 
day-to-day basis. Leaders in this level include people who are involved in 
local communities, members of indigenous non-governmental organisations 
carrying out relief projects for local people, health officials, and refugee 
camp leaders. These people understand intimately the fear and suffering of 
the local people; they also have an expert knowledge of local politics and 
know on a face to face basis the local leaders of the government and its 
adversaries.566 
6.3.3 Approaches to Peacebuilding 
As each level of leadership has different features, their individual 
ways in dealing with peacebuilding should be described. Almost all 
approaches to peacebuilding involve increased contact and cooperation 
between people.567 
Level 1: Top Level Approaches  
The top level of leadership uses the ‘top-down’ approach to 
peacebuilding. This approach has the following characteristics. First, the 
people who emerge as peacemakers, often seen as intermediaries or 
mediators, are from elite groups in the community. Second, the goal is to 
achieve a negotiated settlement between the high-level leaders in the 
conflict. Third, the peacebuilding approach at this level is often focused on 
achieving a ceasefire agreement as a first step that will lead to a broader 
political and substantive negotiation. At the end, the agreement will create 
the mechanisms for a political transition from war to peace.568 According to 
this model, the ultimate goal is to achieve a peace agreement with the 
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leaders of the parties in the conflict.569 Thus, it first involves efforts aimed at 
achieving a ceasefire agreement at the leader level. Next, a process of 
national transition is initiated involving the political leadership in creating a 
framework that will lead to a democratic solution. Peace in the early stages 
depends on achieving a ceasefire agreement and in the later stages on 
broadening and including more sectors of the society. This assumes a step 
by step, issue-oriented, and short-term achievement process engaged in by 
top level leaders.570 
Level 2: Middle-range Approaches  
 The middle-range offers what is called a ‘middle-out’ approach to 
peacebuilding. It is based on the idea that the middle-range contains a set 
of leaders with a certain location in the conflict who might provide the key to 
create an infrastructure for achieving and sustaining peace.571 The following 
are examples of middle-out approach activities. 
Problem-solving Workshops. These workshops, referred to as 
‘interactive problem-solving’ or ‘third-party consultation,’ provide a venue for 
persons who unofficially represent the conflict parties to interact in a process 
of ‘collaborative analysis’ of the problems that separate them. 572  The 
problem-solving approach has a number of important features as a tool of 
middle-range peacebuilding. First, middle-level participants are typically 
invited because of their knowledge of the conflict and their close connection 
to key decision makers, but top level actors are not invited to be involved in 
any middle-range activities. Second, the workshop is designed to be 
informal which creates an environment for adversaries to interact in friendly 
and relaxing settings. The established environment enables direct 
interaction with adversaries and encourages the development of 
relationships, as well as flexibility in looking at the parties’ shared problems 
and possible solutions. The workshop also provides a politically safe space 
for testing ideas. Finally, the third-party component in the workshop 
provides multiple functions which are the convening of the parties, 
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facilitating the meetings, and providing expertise on the analysis of conflict 
and processes of conflict resolution.573  
Conflict Resolution Training. Training, in the conflict resolution 
field, generally has two aims: raising awareness and imparting skills for 
dealing with conflict. In this context, training programmes are developed to 
educate and provide participants with an understanding of how conflict 
operates, the general patterns and dynamics it follows, and useful concepts 
for dealing with the conflict. In terms of developing skills, training has the 
more concrete goal of teaching people specific techniques and approaches 
for dealing with conflict, often in the form of analytical, communication, 
negotiation, and mediation skills.574 
 Peace Commissions. The third activity of middle-range 
peacebuilding involves the formation of peace commissions within the 
conflict setting. The form and application of the commissions are varied 
depending on the conflict’s situation and context.575 
 The above approaches suggest that the middle-range should hold 
the potential for helping to establish a relationship based on infrastructure 
for sustaining the peacebuilding process. A middle-out approach builds on 
the idea that middle-range leaders can be cultivated to play a useful role in 
resolving the conflicts. Activities in middle-range peacebuilding have varied 
forms, from efforts directed at changing perceptions and growing new ideas 
among actors to the policymaking process, to training in conflict resolution 
skills, to the establishment of teams, networks, and institutions that can 
mainly play a conciliation role within the setting.576 
Level 3: Grassroots Approaches 
 The grassroots level faces different challenges to those that the top 
and middle-range levels are confronting. First, at this level, there are large 
numbers of people. It is difficult for strategies to be communicated to the 
masses. At best, strategies can be implemented to reach the leadership 
working at local and community levels. Second, many of the grassroots 
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people are in a survival mode which is meeting the basic human needs of 
food, shelter, and safety. An effort to gain peace and conflict resolution can 
easily be seen as an impossible attempt. Some strategies at the grassroots 
level are outlined below.577 
 Bottom-up Approach. This approach involves a process of first 
achieving discussions and agreements to end the fighting at local peace 
conferences by bringing together contiguous and interdependent individuals 
guided by the seniors of each sub-group.578 
 Programmatic Peace Efforts. This approach is the effort to provide 
an opportunity for grassroots leaders and others to work on issues of peace 
and conflict resolution at the community level. These kinds of programmes 
frequently work through existing networks such as religious groups or health 
associations. These grassroots level programmes are also characterised by 
their attempts to deal with the important issues that the war has produced, 
especially among the youth.579 
6.3.4 Peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Conflict 
To understand the dynamic of conflict, Adam Curle has proposed the 
‘Progress of Conflict Model’. This is to explain the movement toward peace 
through the roles that emerge in a typical progression of conflict through 
four major stages (see figure 6.3 on page 179).580 
In Quadrant 1, conflict is hidden because people are unaware of the 
injustice and imbalances of power that affect their lives. At this point, 
education in the form of moral values is needed. The role of educator in this 
latent conflict stage is aimed at erasing ignorance and raising awareness as 
to the nature of the unequal relationships and the need for addressing and 
restoring equity from the view of those experiencing the injustices.581 
Quadrant 2 represents the pursuit of change which involves some 
form of confrontation. In this stage, confrontation brings the conflict to the 
surface and it is no longer hidden. Change will require a rebalancing of 
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power in the relationship by which all those involved recognise one another 
in new ways.582 
In Quadrant 3 confrontation moves toward negotiations if those 
involved increase the level of awareness of their interdependence through 
mutual recognition. Negotiation means that the various groups involved 
recognise they can neither simply impose their goal nor eliminate the other 
side, but, rather, must work with one another to achieve their goals. Shared 
recognition is a form of power balancing and a prerequisite of negotiation. 
The roles of conciliation and more formal mediation are aimed principally at 
helping to establish and support the movement from violent confrontation 
toward negotiation.583 
 
UNPEACEFUL                           Relations                              PEACEFUL    
      STATIC                         UNSTABLE                         DYNAMIC 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
3. Negotiation 
 
 
 
 
4. Sustainable Peace 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    1. Education 
 
              
     Latent conflict 
 
 
 
2. Confrontation 
 
                     
             Overt conflict 
 
 
LOW                                                     HIGH 
    AWARENESS       OF          CONFLICT 
 
Figure 6.3 - The Progress of Conflict 
Source: see Adam Curle cited in John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable 
Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 1997), 65. 
                                            
582 Ibid. 
583 Ibid., 65. 
P
O
W
E
R
 
U
N
B
A
L
A
N
C
E
D
 
B
A
L
A
N
C
E
D
 
 180 
 
Finally, Quadrant 4 shows that successful negotiations and 
mediation will lead to restructuring the relationship that deals with the 
fundamental substantive and procedural concerns of those involved. This 
refers to increased justice or more peaceful relations.584  
However, at any point in the progression, conflict can skip any step, 
or cycle between several of the quadrants for an extensive period of time. 
For example, confrontation does not always lead to negotiation.585 
 
6.4 The Importance of Civil Society in Creating Peace 
It has been said that in contemporary wars, both state and non-state 
actors have played important roles in resolving the conflict. Where states 
had failed, or took part in conflicting violence, civil society actors were seen 
as a necessary party for conflict resolution. Moreover, the aim of 
international diplomacy is no longer only to settle disputes, but also to 
prevent future conflict through transforming and democratising societies. 
This is impossible without involving those that have been marginalised in 
the conflict. This results in increasing recognition for civil society in building 
peace in the conflict. Indeed, it is suggested that civil society should 
participate in formal peace processes. Consequently, some peace 
strategies have been developed to enhance the participation of civil society 
in solving conflicts.586 
At the beginning of peacebuilding theories, non-governmental actors, 
including civil society, play a limited role in the Conflict Management School. 
Civil society rarely has a place at official negotiations based on the 
assumption that the lower the number of actors involved in negotiations, the 
easier it is to reach agreement. Although civil society actors are sometimes 
assigned a significant role as official mediators, their actions and behaviour 
remain limited and not different from official governmental mediators.587 
Later on, civil society networks became the key actors in the Conflict 
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Resolution School and Conflict Transformation School. The focus is on the 
roots of conflict and relationships among conflict parties and society, and 
both schools understand that these issues should be handled by non-state 
actors. The main difference is that the Conflict Resolution School tends to 
focus on external actors while the Conflict Transformation School does so 
on internal actors.588 Other approaches try to link the public to the official 
negotiation process through broad information campaigns, or public opinion 
polls, which allows civil society to play a key role in the communication 
process. It is, however, very challenging for civil society to organise 
channels for communications from the conflict parties to the population and 
to have a flow of communication from the population to the negotiations.589 
In practical terms, civil society groups have been seen as alternatives 
to the state in providing conflict solutions. Furthermore, they are also 
important contributors to good governance and democracy. 590  The civil 
society sector significantly influences the nature and implementation of 
peace agreements and plays an obvious role in the post-settlement 
phase. 591  In fact, civil society can play roles at every stage in the 
development of conflict and its resolution, for example, bringing situations 
of injustice to the surface to prevent violence, creating conditions conducive 
to peace talks, and setting a policy agenda to heal war-affected psyches.592 
However, the methods and roles of civil society groups generally only focus 
on non-military measures and activities to heal the society torn by 
violence.593 
  
6.5 The Roles of Civil Society in Peacebuilding  
There have been some attempts to classify the roles or functions of 
civil society involved in the peacebuilding process. It is recognised that civil 
society roles are complex and varied, and there are many grey areas and 
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overlaps. The core roles of civil society offer a suitable framework to better 
understand the potential contribution of civil society to peacebuilding.594 The 
following are some researchers who have attempted to reach conclusions 
on the general roles of civil society in conflict resolution.  
Paffenholz, an expert in conflict and peacebuilding, applied the 
proposed analytical framework to assess the different functions of civil 
society in peacebuilding. These functions can be helpful to analyse civil 
society’s functions more systematically. 595  Paffenholz classified seven 
functions of civil society in peacebuilding: (1) Protection; (2) Monitoring and 
accountability; (3) Advocacy and public communication; (4) Socialisation 
and culture of peace; (5) Conflict sensitive social cohesion; (6) 
Intermediation and facilitation; and (7) Service delivery.  
Das outlined four types of organisations and initiatives that help to 
explain the role of civil society in making peace or producing conflict in 
India’s Northeast which are (1) Civic representatives; (2) Peace groups; (3) 
Bridge-builders; and (4) Popular initiatives.596  
Barnes mapped out the main functions of civil society in 
peacebuilding in an article called Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Mapping 
Functions in Working for Peace. These roles are mapped out into eight main 
functions of civil society in peacebuilding: (1) Waging conflict 
constructively; 597  (2) Shifting conflict attitudes; (3) Defining the peace 
agenda; (4) Mobilising constituencies for peace; (5) Reducing violence and 
promoting stability; (6) Peacemaking/conflict resolution; (7) Community-
level peacemaking; and (8) Changing root causes and building cultures of 
peace.598 
 Based on an analysis of a collection of works on civil society’s roles 
and functions in peacebuilding, and the researcher’s own experience, eight 
general roles of civil society were found. The aim of categorising the roles 
of civil society is to determine the roles of civil society involved in creating 
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sustainable peace and to enhance the effectiveness and impact of civil 
society’s in peacebuilding. These roles can be useful to analyse civil society 
contributions to build peace in the ethno-religious conflict in the three 
southernmost provinces of Thailand. The following presents the eight roles 
of civil society in peacebuilding.  
6.5.1 Security Protector  
Protecting the country and keeping civilians secure in their lives and 
properties are the most important duties of a state. The tasks of the civil 
society are to remind the state of this warrant or to initiate their own security 
mechanism in the community.599 It is very difficult for people to support and 
engage in creating peace when their basic security is threatened. This is 
one of the reasons why those who want to ruin a peace process escalate 
violence against civilians. While state security forces can play an important 
role in protection, they are often a part of the problem or fail to fulfill their 
responsibilities. The military sometimes deploys too few soldiers, is too late 
or is inadequate in providing sufficient protection for the civilian 
population.600 In some cases, providing too much military force also has a 
negative effect on the daily life of the locals because it creates fear and an 
insecure atmosphere in the community. The main activities for civil society 
within this security protector role are international accompaniment, 
watchdog activities, the creation of ‘zones of peace,’ humanitarian aid, and 
civil society initiatives for human security such as supporting local capacities 
and leadership to enable local response strategies to conflict.601 
State security forces or international peacekeepers, however, are not 
the only actors to respond to violence effectively. In many cases, violence-
affected communities have been able to take action to protect themselves 
and to relieve the effects of armed conflict. Civil society at the community 
level – especially when they cooperate with central authorities and 
international organisations – can monitor developments and take proactive 
steps to reduce violence. In a number of places torn by violence, one of the 
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most effective ways to solve this problem is for communities to become 
proactively involved in trying to prevent the violence.602 
When a state weakened by armed conflict is often unable to protect 
its citizens, civil society is usually initiated during a conflict and its aftermath 
to protect citizens’ lives, rights and property against threats by conflict actors 
or the state. For example, communities in the Philippines have negotiated 
zones of peace called ‘spaces for peace’ where no arms are allowed.603 
Another aspect of protection is support for security-related issues such as 
demining, arms control and disarmament, demobilisation, and the 
reintegration of ex-combatants.604  
6.5.2 Representative 
Civil society is seen to represent the forces in favour of peace in a 
society and it can play a significant as the public’s representative in the 
peacebuilding process. They are closer to the grassroots than government 
authorities.605 Civil society acts as a representative of the public to express 
what local people want and need. Besides contributing to good governance 
and a democratic state, strengthening the civil society as a representative 
of the grassroots will lead to successful peacebuilding.606 
In general, the public can participate in the peace process directly or 
through representatives. The civil society sector is one of the most effective 
and convenient channels. Civil society also has an opportunity to voice 
views and to propose recommendations where all interested individuals 
engage in a process of developing and implementing agreements to end 
the conflict.607 Some peace processes have structures that enable the wider 
public to engage directly in the formal negotiations. This process is usually 
aimed at reaching comprehensive agreements on new administrative 
structures and other key issues of the conflict. Thus, civil society actors can 
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be very useful because they are typically motivated more by the locals’ need 
to promote sustainable change than by the quest for governing power.608  
6.5.3 Bridge-builder 
Civil society is known as a bridge between civilian and other 
conflicting parties including the state and it is also seen as a catalyst of 
community building and integration. Public participation in civil society 
organisations helps to bridge societal cleavages, create civil virtues, and 
foster social cohesion, also satisfying the needs of individuals to develop 
bonds and attachments.609 
Civil society is attributed special roles in healing societies torn apart 
by conflict. It can build inter-communal links between conflicting parties to 
promote dialogue and reconcile people within groups and on different levels 
of society. 610  Furthermore, civil society has a role as an intermediate 
between state, citizens and interest groups, and can ensure a balance 
between central authority and social networks.611 
The main activities within this function are facilitating both formal and 
informal initiatives between state, armed groups, communities and external 
agencies.612 Many grassroots peacebuilders in societies promote people-
to-people dialogue across the conflict divides to shift entrenched conflict 
dynamics. This is often facilitated by establishing direct communication 
between people with some common attributes, for example, a similar 
occupation, identity characteristic, or common experience of the conflict.613 
In the bridge-builder role, enhancing social cohesion is an important 
function for civil society as conflict usually destroys trust among conflicting 
communities. Restoring bridging as a social capital can help to restrain 
violence among communities and revitalise group interactions, 
interdependency and solidarity. Participation and engagement in voluntary 
associations has the potential to build and strengthen social capital, but 
rather than building bonding ties within groups, the aim should be to 
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strengthen relationships across adversary groups. Main activities to 
enhance social cohesion focus on joint activities between groups such as 
joint associations, joint cultural events, or sports games. This can also 
include joint service delivery activities designed specifically to strengthen 
social cohesion through mixed or joint development committees.614  
6.5.4 Relief Worker 
In a conflict, while the role of the civil society is often diminished, their 
actors can be engaged in some functions including being involved in relief 
work. It is important for war-affected communities to have emergency 
assistance promptly. Conflict victims normally need some help immediately 
such as shelter, food, money and other things needed in daily life. 615 
Besides material necessity, it is also very important to heal psyches and 
transform the mindsets of those who have been affected by the conflict. 
These changes can be supported by reliable civil society actors, who rely 
essentially on creativity to generate experiences that allow people to 
connect across divides and to inspire changes in perceptions.616 
Relief work, or service delivery, is seen rather as a task of the state. 
There is no doubt that as the state weakens during conflict, service provision 
by civil society groups is extremely important for violence-affected people. 
The objectives of this role might be seen as being for primarily economic or 
humanitarian objectives, and being of only indirect and limited relevance to 
peacebuilding. It is, however, an important role for civil society to assist the 
local people when a state is unable to respond to their needs immediately. 
Direct service provision to communities is an important function for most 
civil society groups, particularly in weak states and during conflict.  
Furthermore, the civil society can play a role between aid agencies 
and conflict parties to deliver services directly to communities. In some 
conflict areas, the local civil society acts as a facilitator where government 
or foreign aid groups cannot operate or need facilitation to better understand 
the local context.617 The civil society sector can not only be more efficient 
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than the state, but they may also be more effective in reaching marginal 
groups which may be at the roots of the conflict. This is because local civil 
society members speak the same language and have a similar cultural 
background.618  
6.5.5 Monitoring Observer  
Civil society groups can monitor the conflict situation, make 
recommendations to decision makers, provide information to advocacy 
groups, and provide inputs for early warning of a conflict situation.619 The 
monitoring-aimed civil society groups can be uniquely influential in creating 
sufficient stability and space to support official political negotiations and to 
address the local dimensions of wider conflict contexts. Civil society 
monitors usually provide credible, independent information and analysis 
that is accepted by the conflicting parties and outsiders. 620  The main 
activities related to the monitoring function are the creation of conflict-
relevant data collection, early warning systems and reporting on human 
rights abuses.621 Some groups have created and developed the database 
system which could be used by a variety of actors such as military 
authorities, government institutions, international agencies, researchers 
and the public. This data system is very useful as they typically draw upon 
detailed local knowledge of the specific dynamics and developments that 
can trigger conflict escalation.622 
In addition to monitoring formally agreed ceasefires, civil society 
monitors can become involved in activities that help to generate public 
confidence, such as monitoring developments in state authorities or 
relations between communities.623 Members of civil society are often the 
best source to identify the reasons for a conflict and the motivations, and to 
suggest specific actions that could lead to a more peaceful direction. These 
insights can support the development of highly targeted strategies that do 
not require extensive resources or coercive measures, especially when 
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addressed at an early point in a conflict cycle. While the civil society sector 
can be the source of vital inputs for shaping international responses to 
conflict, it is also important to encourage the locals to respond to the risk of 
violence.624 
6.5.6 Academic  
In a peaceful situation, civil society plays a vital role in growing 
democracy at the community level. People learn how to deal with their basic 
democratic rights including the capacities of being citizens, participating in 
public life, developing trust, confidence, tolerance and acceptance. This 
also supports the decentralisation of power, and the creation of solidarity 
among citizens, which act as defense mechanisms against possible attacks 
on their freedom.625  
In circumstances of turmoil, the main activities for civil society in an 
academic role are to brainstorm with experts in peace, to address sources 
of structural violence, to promote human security, and to do research to find 
a potential solution for the conflict. From a long-term perspective, the civil 
society can encourage new generations to become aware of peace studies, 
dynamics in ethnic diversity and citizenship awareness, and to promote 
tolerance and a culture of peace. Often target groups of this civil society are 
focused on youth, who may have greater capacities for change than older 
generations. Summer camps, integrated schools and cultural exchange 
programmes can all promote what has become known as ‘next generation 
work’.626  
People of all ages, however, can be empowered to address conflicts 
from the grassroots upwards. One of the means of doing this is through 
indoctrination and supporting constructive responses to conflict by peace 
and conflict resolution education. Moreover, the development of a civic idea 
can be a key to prevent conflict in the community. Finally, a widespread, 
inclusive and vibrant engagement within civic life can be the beginning for 
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the institutions needed to resolve conflict peacefully and to generate more 
responsive and better governance needed to make peace sustainable.627 
6.5.7 Public Communicator 
Independent media plays an important role in peacebuilding by 
reaching a broad range of the population, facilitating public communication, 
expanding the audience for advocacy campaigns, and raising awareness of 
non-violent solutions. The most important, but difficult task, is disseminating 
unbiased news and non-partisan information, such as the facts on mass 
killings, human rights violations and reconciliation efforts, and is the media’s 
contribution to peacebuilding.628 Often the media has been used as a tool 
by conflicting parties to discredit the opposition or propagate their side. 
Civil society offers a space for public communication which is its core 
function in democratic countries. It stresses the importance of a free public 
sphere, separated from the state and economy, where people have space 
for debate, participation and democratic decision-building. Civil society and 
its networks have a major role to play in establishing this democratic public 
space and acting as a watchdog. Members of civil society groups, 
organisations, and social movements are able to collect concerns and 
problems and transfer them from the private sphere to the political 
agenda.629 
Advocacy within a democratic context is often referred to as 
communication as it entails civil society promoting relevant social and 
political themes on the public agenda. 630  Advocacy is one of the core 
functions in peacebuilding and primarily a role for civil society which can 
reconcile the interests of social groups, especially marginalised groups, and 
create communication channels to raise public awareness and facilitate the 
inclusion of issues in the public agenda.631  
The main activities within this role are: disseminating to outsiders the 
facts of the conflict situation; agenda-setting by local civil society actors, 
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such as bringing themes to the national agenda in conflicting countries; 
lobbying for civil society involvement in peace negotiations; and creating 
public pressure.632 
6.5.8 Peace-builder 
 This role focuses on civil society’s direct involvement in the 
peacemaking process and in reaching a ceasefire agreement. Negotiations 
to end armed conflict are often viewed as the duty of the state and the top 
leaders of militant groups. This process means that the potential 
contributions of civil society were overlooked. Since the 1990s, many civil 
society peace initiatives, however, have revealed their potential for 
supporting the prospects of a sustainable agreement.633 
Before the conflict erupts, sometimes the prevailing power structures 
in a society are deeply oppressive. While there may not be full-scale 
warfare, some groups are impaired by profound violence, often combined 
with threatened direct violence. Civil society actors can play important roles 
in changing these situations by bringing the conflict to the surface 
nonviolently to generate the necessary changes. Using both international 
human rights machinery and the domestic judiciary, they are sometimes 
able to use existing institutional and legal systems to judge or to solve 
injustices.634  
Civil society actors can also help to develop the agenda for peace by 
identifying problems that have been overlooked and policy gaps. 
Furthermore, they can help to shape peace policy by analysing issues and 
recommending solutions. In short, they can identify the key agenda of 
issues that need to be addressed in responding to a conflict situation and 
dealing more widely with peace and security issues. Civil society groups can 
engage in policy making to address conflicts; mobilise advocacy campaigns 
to generate political will among decision-makers; and implement strategies 
to achieve the desired results. In short, civil society tries to raise public 
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awareness about the conflict with efforts to motivate political decision-
makers to take action to resolve the problems.635 
In addition to encouraging an atmosphere conducive to peace 
negotiations, civil society actors sometimes have a direct peacemaking role. 
They can help provide channels of communication among parties in conflict. 
Using their unofficial status, which makes engagement possible without 
being involved in formal conveying legitimacy, they can provide confidential 
unofficial channels to convey messages between opponents. 636 
Furthermore, civil society can also initiate and participate in unofficial 
dialogues, involving influential academic, religious, and NGO leaders and 
other actors who can interact more freely than high-ranking officials.637 
These informal tracks provide opportunities for both official and non-official 
actors who are close to government leaders and armed opposition groups 
to brainstorm for sustainable peace.638 The unofficial dialogues have at 
least three different tracks. First, Track I ½ includes unofficial actors who 
intervene between official government representatives to promote a 
peaceful resolution of conflict. Secondly, the unofficial intervention with 
unofficial actors, or Track II dialogue, is an informal interaction between 
members of adversarial groups or nations to find out ways that might help 
resolve the conflict. Finally, Track III is an unofficial intervention at the 
grassroots which are from various sectors of their society to find ways to 
promote peace in the settlement of violent conflict. This Track III aims at 
building broken relationships among people in the conflict affected 
community.639 
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6.6 Conclusion  
In finding conflict resolution, peacebuilding is the most difficult 
process because it involves and engages a variety of people working at 
different levels and roles focusing on various aspects of the conflict. 640 
Peacebuilding has been presented as a process made up of a multiplicity 
of interdependent roles, functions, and activities. Thus, the goal of 
peacebuilding is to create a sustainable peace toward restructured 
relationships.641 It requires widespread attitudinal and behavioural change, 
usually linked with social and economic changes made at the interpersonal, 
organisational, community, and societal levels. This cannot be done quickly 
or easily.642 
Most peacebuilding schools assume that the influence of civil society 
on conflict management is indirect and generally limited to a supporting or 
facilitating role.643 However, in almost every case, it has been proved that 
sustainable peace cannot rely on a state or a single actor to transform 
conflict in divided societies. 644  This chapter has also analysed the 
importance of civil society and its role in creating peace. It cannot be denied 
that civil society plays a significant role in the peacebuilding process. It is 
no wonder, therefore, that numerous international NGOs and UN agencies 
have integrated support to local civil societies in their peacebuilding policies. 
They have seen the civil society sector as being the most appropriate entry 
point and an effective tool to work well for peace.645 Civil society can make 
unique contributions to peacebuilding during all phases of conflict, with or 
without external support.646  
The next chapter will discuss civil society in Thailand providing an 
understanding of the civil society sector in a Thai cultural background. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN THAILAND 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 Public participation is a fundamental right for citizens in every 
democratic country as well as a basic concept in the formation of a civil 
society and other sectors. Civil society in Thailand, however, has not been 
well-developed because of social circumstances, economic foundations 
and especially the history of its politics which is different from western 
countries where original patterns of democracy have existed for many 
years.647 Civil society groups in Thailand vary from one another in terms of 
background, ideals, objectives, size, assets, and these give rise to different 
problems and complex issues at various levels. Civil society groups have 
various roles in Thai society. These include offering public services, 
supplementing government agencies in providing social support for the poor 
and other disadvantaged groups, monitoring public organisations and their 
activities, and advocating for justice, human rights, environmental protection 
and anti-corruption measures.648 
The increasing usage of the term ‘civil society’ among prominent Thai 
scholars in Thailand reveals that the country is entering into a new stage of 
grassroots community awareness concerning citizenship rights and 
democracy. Its emergence, however, is still in its infancy.649 
 This chapter will examine the overall background of the civil society 
sector in Thailand which is distinct from that in other countries. The chapter 
begins by discussing how the term ‘civil society’ emerged in Thai society; 
then explains the history of the civil society sector in Thailand; and finally 
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analyses several aspects of Thai civil society such as its position, its 
formalisation, its different categories, the difficulties challenging it and the 
factors that promote it. 
 
7.2 The Emergence of Civil Society in Thailand 
In Thailand, different terms have been used to define civil society 
such as ‘civil movement’, ‘people’s participation’, and ‘new social 
movement’. Civil society, however, seems to be the most suitable term for 
Thailand. One reason for this is that the term ‘civil society’ has been used 
more widely and tends to replace the other words because the term ‘civil 
society’ refers to people wanting to share their opinions, while other terms, 
like ‘people’s participation’, means that the state allows people to participate 
as a part of the state’s work. The term ‘civil society’ is used widely in the 
private sector and also in the government sector which shows a positive 
trend in the growth of civil society. Because of this, the Thai government 
has encouraged the establishment of civil society organisations.650 
 For Thailand, a civil society sector has gradually emerged since the 
time of King Rama V. The first civil society organisation was the Thai Red 
Cross Society which was established in 1893. In the early period, civil 
society organisations were formed with the main purpose being social 
assistance. Civil society groups grew with the purpose of meeting the 
country’s development needs with many being formed by 1967. Finally, the 
purpose of promoting democratic participation emerged after a major 
political event in 1973.651 
 Civil society groups have generally increased in number and become 
more widely spread in society over subsequent decades; a phenomenon 
which means that the country is moving in a positive direction towards 
sustainable development. Thailand has also seen an increase in the 
strength of its middle class; not only in terms of its absolute or relative size, 
but also in the general level of education and awareness that citizens now 
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have of their rights. Although Thais in general have traditionally been 
content to mind their own affairs, members of the middle class have 
increasingly become active participants in public issues.652  
The earliest voluntary organisations in Thailand were the Buddhist 
and Christian groups which served the poor in the early 20th century.653 
Traditionally, most civil society groups are formed to provide relief to the 
needy in times of disaster and hardship. There are also a large number of 
non-profit organisations which have been established under royal 
patronage to receive funds from people’s donations through the royal family 
such as the Sai Jai Thai Foundation, the Thai Rice Foundation and the 
Zoological Park Organisation.654 Furthermore, local NGOs are found in all 
areas of Thailand, particularly in the rural areas, due to increased rates of 
poverty. Despite this, many civil society groups have a short life span, fading 
away as quickly as they form. 
 
7.3 The History of Civil Society in Thailand 
 The evolution of the civil society sector in Thailand is tied to history 
and culture. The background to Thailand’s civil society can be traced back 
to the era of absolute monarchy including Sukhothai, Ayutthaya and the pre-
democratic period in the Rattanakosin period. To understand the 
background of civil society in Thailand, the country’s history needs to be 
explained.  
 Thai history is commonly divided into four eras from Sukhothai to the 
present era, Rattanakosin. Here, the focus will be more on the Rattanakosin 
Era where key events became turning points for the growth of civil society. 
However, a brief description of the situation before the Rattanakosin Era will 
be provided in order to explain those circumstances before the formation of 
a civil society sector which have affected its evolution. For the purposes of 
this thesis, the Rattanakosin Era will be divided into four periods. Each 
period has important incidents aligned to the growth of civil society.  
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7.3.1 The Sukhothai, Ayutthaya and Thonburi Eras 
 In the past, Thai society did not encourage a civil society for political 
reasons. One of the most famous kings during the Sukhothai Era was King 
Ramkhamhaeng. His national policy was ‘Father Governs Children’. King 
Ramkhamhaeng created a concept of ‘paternal rule’ in which the King 
governs his people as a father would govern his children. If civilians were in 
trouble, they could ring the bell in front of his palace to call for the King’s 
help. As a result of that, civilians absolutely relied on the ruler.  
 During the Ayutthaya Era, a king’s status was that of absolute 
monarch with a semi-religious status. According to Hindu religion, the king 
is a descent of God in human who was born to be a defender of the people. 
Besides the Hindu tradition, Buddhism believed that the king is the righteous 
ruler, aiming at the well-being of the people. Therefore, civilians were 
considered under the ruler as servants or followers. Slaves remained under 
the control of rich or noble families. They had no freedom or concept of 
civilian awareness. The kings of Ayutthaya, especially King Trailokanat, 
created institutions in support of rule including bureaucracy and a system of 
‘Sakdina’655 as well as the creation of ‘Rachasap’,656 the language which 
was reserved exclusively for addressing the king or talking about royalty. 
The king’s power was absolute and sovereign: he was the ‘Lord of the Land 
and Lord of Life’. The king was also the chief administrator, chief legislator 
and chief judge. Therefore, the king was the centre of all laws, orders, 
verdicts and punishments.  
 After Ayutthaya was burnt and destroyed by Burmese troops in 1767, 
King Taksin decided to move the capital from Ayutthaya to Thonburi. This 
Thonburi Era lasted fifteen years with constant civil wars throughout the 
period. There was no opportunity for the people to create any sense of 
civilian awareness; their only thought was to try to survive the war and 
restore the country to order.  
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7.3.2 The Rattanakosin Era  
 The Rattanakosin Era (from 1782 to the present) began with 
Bangkok as the capital. Four important incidents concerning the civil society 
sector in Thailand are described below. 
 1) The Change to Democracy in 1932 
After the Thonburi Era, Thailand remained an absolute monarchy 
from King Rama I until King Rama VII. Democracy first emerged in Thailand 
when the military imposed constitutional limits upon King Rama VII who 
relinquished control to the people in 1932. The military came to power in the 
bloodless Siamese revolution of 24 June 1932 which transformed the 
government of Thailand from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional 
monarchy. Initially, the government was run by elites and the military in a 
one-party state.657 In practice, because it was not a fully democratic system, 
and an absolute state economic system existed, most economic activities 
depended on the state’s decision-making with civilians having no power or 
rights to participate in any political or economic resolutions. However, 
following changes to the ruling system from an absolute monarchy to a 
democracy, the idea of a civil society sector formed among the upper class 
many of whom had been educated overseas.  
 2) The Revolution of 14 October 1973 and 6 October 1976  
Although Thailand has been a democratic system since the reign of 
King Rama VII in 1932, the state has retained absolute power mostly with 
the control of military governments. This political period is known as ‘semi-
democracy’. The main regimes have been mostly led by military dictators 
such as General Phibulsongkram, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat and Field 
Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, who kept rotating their turns as the top power 
brokers in the country. 
The first non-government development organisation was formally 
registered with the government in 1967. It was called the Thai Rural 
Reconstruction Foundation (TRRF) which was founded by the Director of 
the Bank of Thailand and the President of Thammasat University. The King 
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subsequently accepted the TRRF under his royal patronage and the 
influence of the non-government sector in rural development expanded.658 
Although the military has ruled Thailand for the majority of years 
since 1932, dissatisfaction with the military and police grew among people 
from the rural regions and the educated middle class.659 Demonstrations by 
students started in 1968 and the numbers of protesters increased in the 
early 1970s although the government had banned political gatherings. In 
June 1973, nine university students were expelled for publishing an article 
in a student newspaper that criticised the government’s corruption and its 
leaders’ inappropriate manners.660 Shortly after that, thousands of students 
held a protest at the Democracy Monument in the capital. As the crowds 
were breaking up the next day - 14 October - many students found 
themselves unable to leave because the police attempted to control the flow 
of the crowd by blocking the exit roads and using teargas and gunfire. More 
than a hundred students were killed and many of them disappeared.661 
However, the protest in October 1973 ended the military dictatorship and 
promulgated a new constitution.662 
 Following the student demonstration of 14 October 1973, the Thai 
people generally became more politically active and many NGOs were 
formed by committed people from a variety of professions. Moreover, 
educational opportunities and exposure to mass media sources increased 
during the Vietnam War period. Many university students learned more 
about ideas related to Thailand’s economic and political systems which 
resulted in a revival of student activism. The Vietnam War period was also 
the time when the Thai middle class grew and gradually developed its own 
identity and consciousness. After the 14 October 1973 incident, political 
freedom in Thailand flourished for three years. The most active movements 
were those of students, the worker’s union and farmers. The incident is 
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usually referred to as a victory for students but, three years later, the 
students were condemned as troublemakers and accused of being 
communists.663 
 From 1973 the army and right-wing parties664 began a propaganda 
war against student liberalism. By late 1976, moderate middle class opinion 
had turned away from the activism of the students with their base at 
Thammasat University. Tension between workers and factory owners 
became serious as the civil rights movement became more active. However, 
the main cause of the demonstration on 6 October 1976 was the return to 
Thailand of former military dictator Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn who 
had left the country after the bloody incident on 14 October 1973. Over a 
hundred students from various universities who protested at Thammasat 
University in Bangkok were brutally killed by the government on the 6 
October 1976. On the same day, the military took over in order to control 
the crisis.665  
  Overall, the end of 1970s and early 1980s, marked a low period for 
the development of civil society groups and civil activities. Several hundred 
members of the active core of the movement fled to the communists in the 
jungle. However, a few years later, they were granted amnesty and many 
have become respected politicians or university professors.666 The country 
was under several appointed prime ministers and military governments from 
the coups in 1976 and 1977. Finally in the late 1980s, the military 
government stepped down, allowing for elections. 667  Since then, many 
NGOs emerged and became more active due to an increase in social 
problems associated with development and the government’s failure to 
tackle the problems.668 
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 3) ‘The Black May Event’ 1992 
 After the political crisis in October 1976, Thai politics had been 
peaceful under the government of Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda for 
nine years from 1979 to 1988. He remained personally popular, but the 
revival of democratic politics led to a demand for a more challenging leader.  
 The 1988 general election brought former General Chatichai 
Choonhavan to power. From 1988 to 1991, his government focused on 
expanding Thailand’s economic policies and during his term the country’s 
economic boom, saw the annual growth rate reach as high as 13 per cent. 
However, his government came to be known for its high levels of 
corruption.669 
 On 23 February 1991, a coup was staged by the junta led by 
Generals Sunthorn Kongsompong and Suchinda Kraprayoon. Chatichai’s 
government was charged with being a corrupt regime. The junta called itself 
the National Peace Keeping Council or NPKC for short. Anand 
Panyarachun, who was popular because of his anti-corruption and 
straightforward measures, was selected by the junta to be prime minister. 
Although the NPKC promised to return power to the people after a new 
constitution had been approved, the new constitution only seemed to 
encourage the NPKC to gain more power. This was the reason for the 
resistance by the people, especially the middle classes. After the general 
election on 22 March 1992, the winning coalition failed to form a government 
because their leader was on the drug blacklist of the United States. 
Therefore, they appointed one of the coup leaders, Suchinda Kraprayoon, 
to become Prime Minister.  
 Suchinda’s becoming prime minister brought hundreds of thousands 
of people out on the streets in the largest demonstrations in Bangkok, led 
by the former governor of Bangkok, Major-General Chamlong Srimuang. 
The strong protests exploded from 17 to 21 May 1992. Most protesters were 
middle-class, business owners and working age people which was a 
different cohort from past protests in Thai political history where most 
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protesters were university students. This mob became known as the ‘middle 
class mob’, ‘cell phone mob’, or ‘car mob’ because during that time, cell 
phones and cars were affordable for the middle classes, but not for the 
ordinary grassroots people. 670  Suchinda tried to suppress the 
demonstrations by military force, which led to a massacre and riots in the 
heart of the capital in which hundreds died. It was one of the biggest protests 
for democracy in Thai history and the incident was called ‘the Black May 
Event’. Amidst the fear of civil war, King Bhumibol (King Rama IX) 
intervened to improve the situation and end the conflict peacefully. He 
summoned Suchinda and Chamlong to a televised audience and urged 
them to reach a compromise. This meeting resulted in Suchinda's 
resignation.671 After the incident, Anand Panyarachun was again appointed 
to serve as prime minister. This was the beginning of the drafting of the first 
people’s constitution.672 
Civil society has become a catchword among Thai intellectuals in the 
last few decades especially after the events of May 1992. The May incident 
proved that the urban middle class, previously thought of as politically inert, 
was quite capable of political public action. This incident seemed to have 
brought people involved in the non-government sector into much closer 
collaboration. 673  Overall, the civil society movement became stronger 
during the 1990s when the need for political and social reforms was 
recognised. People became more self aware, responsible, and participated 
in political reforms. Civil society organisations have played an active role in 
political movements since that time.674  
4) Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 1997 
Demands for a new constitution and people’s participation in the 
drafting process were made between 1992-1997. It became clear that the 
1997 Constitution was the most advanced in terms of political reforms in 
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civil society history as it was drafted with public participation and is always 
referred to as the ‘People’s Constitution’. Monitoring the impact of the 
economic crisis in 1997 and disseminating information on corruption cases 
have become important roles for civil society over the last decade. The 
activities of the civil society sector include anti-globalisation, anti-
international financial institutional activities (including those of the World 
Bank, IMF, and the Asian Development Bank) as well as poverty eradication 
projects.675 
Therefore, the most influential period for civil society in Thailand was 
when groups had a role in drafting the 1997 constitution. As a result of that, 
the importance and role of the middle class and grassroots people in Thai 
society has been highlighted to participate in political activities. This 
constitution contained new clauses which have never existed in previous 
ones such as human rights, social and economic rights, and community 
rights in matters such as environmental management. Additionally, some 
independent government agencies were established to increase checks 
and balances.676  
 
7.4 Where is Civil Society in Thai Society? 
As some concepts of the position of civil society in general have been 
described in Chapter 2, this section analyses where the civil society sector 
is placed in the Thai society. Thailand has a different concept of civil society 
from Western models where each sector of society seems to play an 
individual role. In Thailand’s context, more actors are involved in building a 
civil society sector which includes political, economic and citizen sectors.677  
According to the make-up of Thai society, the Political Sector seems 
to share the biggest portion, in terms of roles and power, involving state, 
laws, parliament, government agencies, courts and political parties. The 
second part is the Economic Sector. Profit-based organisations, private 
companies, and investors are all considered integral to the economic sector. 
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Although Thailand has a liberal market system, the state remains involved 
in many important issues which affect the overall economic system. The 
Citizen Sector is the third sector which includes all people in the country. 
The newly formed and most important sector for a democratic 
country like Thailand, but the one which shares the least power in Thai 
society is Civil Society. The civil society forms in the citizen sector according 
to the Western concepts because it does not have any involvement by state 
or business interests. However, in Thailand’s case, civil society groups are 
formed in any individual sector. Moreover, there are some areas of civil 
society which overlap between the political, economic and citizen sectors. 
These overlaps are associations, communities, networks or groups which 
are formed by grassroots communities but supported by the government 
and/or sponsored by the business sector. This is why the civil society sector 
in Thailand is different from Western’s models. The civil society sector in 
Thailand is still in its beginning stages, so it is the smallest portion in Thai 
society. 
 
7.5 The Formalising of Civil Society in Thailand 
In Thailand, there are more than 18,000 civil society organisations in 
different categories based on the International Classification of Nonprofit 
Organisations (ICNPO). These include both full-time workers and 
volunteers working for civil society organisations.678 Various forms of civil 
society organisations are found such as working groups, centres, councils 
and foundations. 
These organisations are involved in charitable or public interest 
concerns and do not operate for a profit. Only some of them have officially 
registered with the government because to be registered as a civil society 
organisation, they need to reach certain criteria such as board member 
numbers, capital requirement and committee obligations. The registration 
process may take up to a year although normally it takes a few months to 
complete.679  
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The establishment and oversight of NGOs in Thailand is governed 
by the Civil and Commercial Code of 1992. 680  Different government 
departments register civil society organisations based on the proposed 
organisation's form, aims and declared activity areas. Relevant government 
agencies responsible for registration and oversight are the Ministry of the 
Interior, the Ministry of Tourism and Sports, the Ministry of Culture, the 
Prime Minister’s Office and the National Police Office.681  
Two types of registration which most civil society organisations in 
Thailand comply with relate to foundation and association and their help in 
analysing the status and the difficulties of civil society groups involved in 
peacebuilding which occurs in Chapter 9. 
 Foundation 
According to Thai law, a charitable organisation may be registered 
as a foundation. The Thai Commercial and Civil Code defines a foundation 
as one whose assets are arranged solely for the purpose of charity, religion, 
arts, science, literature, education, or any public interest that is duly 
registered under the regulations of law. Furthermore, no trustee, director or 
any member may directly benefit from the profits earned by the foundation 
incidental to its operation. 682  While non-Thais can act as officers of a 
foundation, it is advisable to have at least one Thai national on the board to 
help with every day practical matters. A minimum of three board members 
is required in total to register a foundation.683 The newly formed foundations 
are required to have a minimum bank account statement of THB 200,000 
(NZD 8,000) in endowment.684 
 Association 
An association is a group of persons sharing similar interests. This 
type of civil society is appropriate for activities such as sports clubs, hobby 
clubs and religious organisations.685 An association is a form of legal entity 
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that is registered with a government agency according to its main purpose. 
A registered association requires an official name, objectives, address, 
rules, and member fees. An association is different from a foundation as an 
association may be created for continuously and collectively conducting any 
lawful activity other than sharing earned income. Associations are also 
permitted to engage in activities useful to the public, however, by description 
associations are organisations of members who act together to achieve 
specified objectives. Associations can earn income, but must comply with 
the Revenue law and other laws of Thailand. Moreover, associations must 
file annual reports with the relevant government authorities. This includes 
an income and expense audit report certified by an accountant and a copy 
of the minutes of the annual meeting.686 
 
7.6 The Categorisation of Civil Society in Thailand  
 The classification of civil society groups in Thailand is still unclear. 
Some scholars have divided civil society groups according to their 
definitions, group purposes, target groups, general characteristics and 
status. These commonalties aside, there are also many differences 
between civil society organisations. 
According to Wayne Hudson, in Civil Society in Asia, civil society 
organisations can be divided into four broad categories.687 The first type is 
Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) formed by, and comprised of, 
persons who know one another or are linked by kinship ties. These provide 
a medium for mutual assistance and exchange to benefit members of the 
community and where members participate and there is no hiring of staff or 
professional managers. The second is Traditional Philanthropic 
Organisations based on various benevolent goals such as welfare or the 
promotion of ethnic groups, health or gender issues. Generally, these 
involve elite-based or prominent persons who have community respect. 
Their major focus is giving assistance to the poor or the needy or to specific 
underprivileged groups. They are tacitly approved by the government. The 
                                            
686 Ibid.  
687 Hudson, “Problematising European Theories,” 93. 
 206 
 
third category is Religion-Based Civil Society Organisations based around 
Buddhist temples and Muslim mosques. Some Buddhist temples engage in 
charitable or social development activities, however, such efforts are usually 
entirely voluntary. Finally, Urban-Based Civil Society Organisations are 
professional associations who monitor matters concerning their professions 
in order to manage their external environment including raising levels of 
professionalism, standards, ethics and social expectations.688 
According to Busabong Chaichareonwattana in Civil Society and 
Southern Local Community Development, civil society groups are further 
classified by their general characteristics into five categories.689 The first 
type is State-Based Civil Society where the government gives opportunities 
for people to get involved but the main decision is still in the state’s hands.690 
This type of civil society is found in developing countries and is different 
from the Western civil society concepts. The state remains powerful, but 
decentralises people’s participation while the state retains the decision 
making capacity. A Capital-Based Civil Society is the second category set 
up to reduce the state’s role in economic and social sections. Here civil 
society groups focus on competition and market mechanisms with most 
members being middle class managers or entrepreneurs who want the 
market to be free from state control or intervention.691 Thirdly, there is the 
Freedom/Volunteer Civil Society which focuses on ‘citizenship’ and 
‘democratic awareness’. This group centres around the middle class who 
have democratic and citizenship awareness.692 Fourthly, Community-Based 
Civil Society is full of various civil society groups who cooperate with each 
other. They are not against the state, but see the state as necessary to 
maintain law and order.693 The state still plays the main role in promoting 
cooperation among people.694 Finally, there is a new concept of civil society 
called the New Social Movement which is a movement by people who try to 
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change structures, rules and societal perceptions.695 Civil disobedience by 
these people does not mean they want to take over or control state power 
rather they are more interested in using public spaces to make changes in 
their communities.696 
 Banphot Virasai and Sukhum Nuansakul, both renowned academics, 
categorise these civil society sector groups into three areas. 697  The 
Motherland Group does not have a role in requesting benefits or assistance 
from the state but encourages bonding between people who are from the 
same provinces, schools and institutions. Next is the Voluntary Group who 
gathers to provide support or organise political activities. This civil society 
group formed after the ‘Black May Incident’. Most activities are concerned 
with democratic campaigns. Finally, the Professional Group is formed by 
members who have the same career or business interests.  
 According to Thirayuth Boonmee, a famous democracy activist, five 
types of civil society exist: voluntary organisations which cooperate with 
each other in social development, economic and professional activities; 
independent mass media groups; academic groups such as research 
institutions and universities; groups for cultural activities; and private 
foundation organisations.698 
The above-mentioned categorisations aim to give an overview of how 
the normally quite broad and diverse civil society groups in Thailand are 
divided. This thesis argues that there is no formal categorisation of civil 
society in Thailand and that the boundaries are blurred. However, the 
above-mentioned categorisations help to classify the civil society groups 
used for this research. There are three main components used in this thesis 
for categorising them: same career/professional groups (e.g. academic, 
media and government agencies), same targeted groups (e.g. youth and 
women) and same main purposes (e.g. public health, religion and culture). 
For the purposes of this research, civil society groups have been classified 
into eleven categories which are natural resources issues, human rights, 
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media, academic, religion and culture, economic, public health, women, 
youth, multi-purpose and government agencies.  
 
7.7 The Challenges to the Development of Civil Society in Thailand 
 This section will outline some of the difficulties that civil society 
groups have encountered. Some factors are external circumstances which 
are hard for civil society groups to manage. The following are the factors 
which affect the formation, administration and growth of the civil society 
sector in Thailand.  
7.7.1 Financial Challenges 
Funding is one important issue that most civil society groups face. 
There are generally various major sources of revenue among different 
categories. Major financial sources would be donations from communities, 
private companies, foreign organisations and the government. Despite this, 
some civil society groups have struggled to find funds. For religious groups 
such as Buddhist temples, most revenue comes from donations on the basis 
of merit and alms giving. For Buddhist culture, activities related to religion 
tend to get more attention from people as they believe in karma and 
reincarnation. They believe that if they do good things, like making 
donations to temples, they would enjoy a happy and wealthy life, or a better 
next life. It is common to hear criticisms that most temples are far too rich 
while some civil society groups which target social development tend to get 
less attention and fewer donations from people.  
Some civil society organisations have been receiving funds from 
foreign donors such as the EU, Oxfam and the UN which are not sustainable 
sources.699 This is why the impact of funding on civil society can be high. 
Effective communication between fund sources and civil society groups is 
also necessary as civil society groups have to rely on foreign financial 
resources which have a different working culture and lack knowledge about 
situations and root causes of the problems.700 
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7.7.2 Political Factors 
The concept of civil society commonly develops along with 
democracy in a country. According to history, Thai politics have been 
preserved by a ‘tripartite cooperation’ of the monarchy, military and civil 
administration. The military has been a key factor in achieving equilibrium 
whenever power tends to be imbalanced. 701  While the number of civil 
society groups continues to grow, this growth has not always coincided with 
gains in democratic forms of government.702 Thus, it should be noted that 
civil society in Thailand did not develop in a uniform pattern, but varied 
across time, space, and sector. In particular, the state had an important role 
in determining the strength and shape of civil society. Moreover, the growing 
strength of civil society in Thailand has not unequivocally had democratic 
implications. 703  Rather, political circumstances are one factor which 
distracts from the growth of a civil society network in Thai society.  
7.7.3 The Capacity of Civil Society 
As Thai civil society groups are still in their formative stages, they 
have a limited capacity to make any major changes to their communities. 
Most civil society groups that exist are cooperative associations organised 
by the government to which Thai rural people belong as a condition of 
access to government markets and subsidies.704 Problems with cooperation 
among civil society groups is another issue which could affect the working 
capacity of the groups. There are difficulties when civil society groups which 
have the same long-term goal, but different short-term targets, cooperate 
with one another because one group’s progress might go against that of 
another. For example, both the human rights groups and the peace talk 
groups have the same ultimate goal which is a peaceful community. 
However, the human rights groups normally use a hard-line approach such 
as condemning and suing cases in court while the peace talk group tends 
to be more compromising by using negotiation and avoiding using violent 
methods. The human rights groups want to proceed with an absolute law of 
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punishment for the militants while the peace talk groups want to give 
chances to people mistakenly involved in militant groups to return to their 
community.705 
7.7.4 Culture and Perception 
The old political beliefs implanted in Thai culture were that citizens 
were followers. Civilians were ruled by the king who was seen as the head 
of the family in the Sukhothai Era and the Lord of Life in the Ayutthaya Era. 
As a result of these beliefs, Thai citizens have become good followers but 
not good initiators which constrains citizenship awareness in Thai society.  
The ‘Thai way’ was referred to by Katia Balassiano in Support for a 
Civil Society in Thailand.706 It offers a series of behavioural characteristics 
which affects the growth of a civil society in Thailand. Firstly, Thai culture 
avoids confrontation so as to preserve surface harmony. Secondly, Thais 
avoid openly questioning public officials, especially between civilians and 
government agencies. They tend to keep quiet if there is any trouble and 
wait until government agencies solve problems. Thirdly, fate is quickly 
blamed when damages or injuries are incurred while luck is believed to be 
a reason for being wealthy and successful. Thus, people do not believe in 
their potential and capability to make things better or to prevent problems 
from happening. Fourthly, top-down authority is still relied upon, even as 
decentralisation is expected. This hierarchy is not supportive of the idea of 
citizenship awareness.707 
7.7.5 Human Resources Issues 
Although there is some stability and continuity at the leadership level 
in some civil society groups, the issue of human resources remains a 
problem. Group initiators become the leaders of various groups, with most 
groups encountering problems retaining capable younger staff members. 
Younger members often move on to other jobs, preferring larger incomes 
and more stable jobs with more clearly defined career paths, so the civil 
society sector finds itself constantly needing to train new staff members. 
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The view that non-profit organisations should be staffed with volunteers, 
with paid staff kept to a minimum, also contributes to the less than ideal 
state of pay and career advancement in the sector.708 That is why it is 
difficult to persuade young people to join civil society groups and make 
differences in their communities.   
 
7.8 The Factors Promoting Civil Society in Thailand 
The political circumstances and social structures in the country have 
affected the development of the civil society sector. An environment that 
supports public participation and citizenship awareness could lead to an 
increase in civil society networks. In Thailand, the significant political 
incidents of the past have produced generations of active citizens who 
subsequently became important catalysts for Thai civil society while some 
are prominent critics of Thai society.709 The following are several key factors 
that could shape the dynamics of civil society in Thailand. 
7.8.1 The 1997 People’s Constitution 
Although today the 1997 Constitution was succeeded by 2007 and 
the 2014 (temporary) Constitutions, it was considered a positive step toward 
democracy and the strengthening of the civil society sector. The 
Constitution filled a gap in the public arena by shaping public participation. 
The Constitution was considered a positive step toward democracy and the 
strengthening of the civil society sector. The Constitution contained some 
following are important provisions which could support the development of 
the civil society sector.710 
Election Reform. Voting was made compulsory in order to ensure a 
high turnout and to make vote buying so expensive it would be untenable. 
The independent Election Commission was established to ensure 
transparent elections, and a central site to count votes was intended to 
discourage vote buying.711 
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Human Rights. In addition to the freedom of speech, open assembly 
and association, property rights, freedom of religion, the right to due process 
of law, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and equality of 
rights between men and women, the Constitution also specified a number 
of new human rights as well. These included rights for children, the elderly, 
and the handicapped; the right to information; and the right to public health 
and education.712 
Devolution of Government. Locally elected governments including 
Subdistrict Administrative Organisations and Provincial Administrative 
Organisations were given new authority.713 
Public Hearings. This measure aimed at promoting democratic 
participation with the constitution supporting having a public hearing before 
any decisions could be made on certain government projects.714  
Freedom of the Mass Media. Thailand’s broadcasting industry has 
seen big changes since the 1997 Constitution.715 A free and open media 
has had an impact on the state and the growth of civil society networks. 
State ownership of broadcasting frequencies ended and was replaced by a 
frequency reallocation scheme aimed at serving public interests. The two 
independent regulatory bodies - the National Broadcasting Commission and 
the National Telecommunication Commission - were established to allocate 
frequencies for television, radio and mobile phones. The most significant 
impact under this new regime is that the broadcast media can now act as a 
channel for citizens to impart information and express their opinions, instead 
of being under the control of the state or big business. Broadcasting 
frequencies, are considered a ‘national resource’ under the new 
constitution, and have been re-allocated to three groups including public 
use, private business group and local communities. 
Independent Government Agencies. The multiple checks and 
balances provided by the 1997 Constitution aimed at making government 
transparent in order to build trust.716 The four new independent government 
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agencies, including the Election Commission, the Office of the Ombudsman, 
the National Anti-Corruption Commission and the State Audit Commission, 
were established to play a vital role in checking and monitoring how 
government managed its policies717 These organisations are very important 
in solving the corruption problems which have plagued Thai society for a 
long time.718 They provide more channels for civil society to get involved in 
the political sphere by monitoring the government. 
        All of the above advantages show that the 1997 Constitution had an 
important role in boosting civil society movements as it contained significant 
principles associated with maintaining the mutual interests of the Thai 
people and encouraging the participation of people in political matters which 
had never occurred before in Thai political history. 
7.8.2 The National Economic and Social Development Plans 
The government’s recognition of the role of civil society organisations 
in development activities was first seen in the Sixth National Economic and 
Social Development Plan (1987-1991). It was clearly stated in the section 
on the promotion of local organisations that the civil society sector should 
actively participate and the groups should work together in rural 
development.719 This plan encouraged people’s participation in community 
development by acknowledging the problems in the community and the 
community resolving the problems together. The government acted as a 
stimulator to get cooperation from the state, people and private sector to 
collaborate with one another. In the past, action plans to encourage the 
private sector’s involvement had not developed until the Sixth National 
Economic and Social Development Plan was devised with the private sector 
playing an important role in promoting development activities.720  
The Seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(1992-1996) included economic and business organisations as well as 
philanthropic and social development organisations in its plan. The Seventh 
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Plan also recognised a need for the development of human resources, 
quality of life improvements, and the conservation of environmental and 
natural resources.721 
In the Eighth National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(1997-2001), the Thai government put even more emphasis on human 
resources. The Eighth Plan introduced a new approach called ‘people-
centred development’ which also focused on the role of the civil society 
sector in social development. In terms of the changing role of civil society, 
the government shifted its policy from one of control to one of policy 
support.722 It means the state provides more opportunities for people to 
initiate and manage some matters in their community which would help the 
civil society sector to grow and strengthen.  
After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the philosophy of a sufficiency 
economy was the main guideline in the Ninth National Economic and Social 
Development Plan (2002-2006) with its practical application becoming 
evident during the Tenth National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(2007-2011). One of the principles of the philosophy of a sufficiency 
economy was based on having strong communities that encouraged 
cooperation in solving problems which is a fundamental for creating civil 
society. 
The main concept of the Eleventh National Economic and Social 
Development Plan (2012-2016) derived from the last three years’ guiding 
principles based on the philosophy of a sufficiency economy. People-
centred development and participation were integral to the national 
development processes. 
7.8.3 Tax Exemption 
Tax exemptions by the Ministry of Finance are a factor that shows 
the government’s commitment to the formation of civil society organisations. 
To qualify for a tax exemption, an organisation must be registered with the 
appropriate government agencies for at least three years, have its books 
endorsed by a certified accountant, and submit an application. Further, in 
                                            
721 Lowry, “Civil Society,” 81. 
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order to obtain exemption from taxes, for example, VAT, land tax and 
custom duties, a NGO must show that it spent no more than 25 per cent of 
its budget on overheads for two years prior to the application for an 
exemption. Today, approximately 300 civil society organisations have full 
tax benefits. 723  Donations given to civil society organisations by 
corporations have tax-exempt status and are tax deductible up to two per 
cent of their profits before tax. In addition, individuals are allowed to deduct 
up to 10 per cent of their taxable income for contributions made to tax-
exempt foundations and associations. These deductions require approval 
from the Ministry of Finance.724 
 
7.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the overall background of Thailand’s civil 
society sector from its formation to the present day. The chapter helps to 
understand the characteristics of the civil society sector through its political 
history. In sum, it has identified the factors which have encouraged the 
growth of civil society networks and examined the factors which have 
influenced the development of a civil society sector.  
 Currently, the role of civil society organisations in Thailand is still 
quite tentative and at the formative stage. They mainly engage in activities 
associated with the distribution of information and resources or are bridges 
between people and government. This is a positive development. It extends 
participation and promotes pluralism in ways that affect state-citizen 
relations and also encourages government to be more responsive to 
citizens’ concerns. The concept of civil society in the country’s National 
Economic and Social Development Plans has encouraged local powers to 
cooperate with government and other social sectors in preventing and 
resolving social problems.725 
The general knowledge about civil society in Thailand will help to 
explain and analyse the categories, roles and efficacy of civil society in the 
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southernmost region, as some weaknesses or strengths have their root 
causes in the history, formalisation and laws of civil society in Thailand. 
These basic factors will affect the potential and capability to develop the civil 
society sector in the conflict region. That is why we should understand these 
factors before further analysis is carried out. 
The next chapter will examine the findings from fieldtrip inquiries 
concerning the role and efficacy of civil society groups as they attempt to 
build peace in the ethno-religious conflict in the southernmost provinces. It 
will also explain the problems faced by civil society groups involved in the 
southern conflict and make recommendations to improve their functioning. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS INVOLVED IN BUILDING PEACE 
IN THE DEEP SOUTH 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter gave an overview of the civil society sector in 
Thailand and its role in Thai culture. This chapter will focus on civil society 
groups involved in building peace in the deep south. 
The information in this chapter was mainly obtained from the 
fieldwork in Thailand consisting of in-depth interviews. The interviews took 
place mainly in the southern provinces of Songkhla, Pattani, Yala, and 
Narathiwat.726 The interview guide was used for the thirty interviews. The 
fieldwork was well supported by representatives of all the selected civil 
society groups.  
 
8.2 Respondents 
The fieldwork was first planned for approximately twenty civil society 
groups. The first selected group list was based on data found on the internet. 
When the fieldwork was proceeding in Thailand, more groups were 
introduced. With the snowball sampling technique, the fieldwork ended up 
with interviews of thirty civil society groups of which one group was a pilot 
test. 
The total of 29 sample civil society groups represented eleven 
categories: natural resources issues (one group), human rights (three 
groups), media (two groups), academic (six groups), religion and culture 
(three groups), economic (two group), public health (one group), women 
(two groups), youth (three groups), multi-purpose (four groups), and 
government agencies (two groups).  
                                            
726 One civil society group which was not interviewed in the south was the Institute of 
Human Rights and Peace Studies, Nakhon Patom province. 
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The interviews included at least 30 respondents who play important 
roles in the civil society sector involved in trying to build peace in the 
southern conflict. Only a few groups had more than one participant in each 
interview. Most participants were leaders or key persons from each civil 
society group. There was, however, a group whose leader suggested 
interviewing their field-staff to get more detailed information. 
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, types of civil society actors can be 
diverse. In Thailand, the civil society sector has various organisational forms 
and names. This research comprised of seven foundations, four groups, 
three networks, three associations, three institutes under a university, two 
groups/projects under a university, two working groups under the 
government, two centres, one council, one organisation and one chamber. 
  
8.3 Interview Questions 
 The questions used in the in-depth interviews were classified into 
four main sections: 1) the characteristics of civil society groups involved in 
peacebuilding in the south; 2) the roles of civil society groups; 3) the efficacy 
of civil society groups; and 4) problems and recommendations. 
 The interviews used open-ended questions that enabled the 
respondents to express their opinions. 
  
8.4 Overview of the Civil Society Sector in Southern Thailand 
 The civil society sector was formed in the south more than ten years 
ago. The history of ethno-religious conflict began in this area when it was 
ruled by Siam. Since the central government of Siam attempted to change 
the administrative structure and rules in this area, it became unavoidable 
that Muslim elites, together with religious leaders, would fight for the rights 
of local people’s identity against the central government. This kind of 
movement in the south against the state has been seen since 1975.727 
                                            
727 Political Science and Public Administration Southern Region Network, National 
Research Council of Thailand and United Nations Development Programme, Civil Politics 
with Social Movements, Politics and Policies in the South, Political Science and Public 
Administration Regional Conference 2008 (Southern Region), 2009, (v). 
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 The second period of the civil society movement occurred when other 
problems were created such as the destruction of natural resources. 
Moreover, the key players in civil society networks became more varied and 
no longer included only the local elite or religious leaders as was the case 
in the past. The new generation involved in the civil society sector was 
comprised of graduates from the general state education system. The early 
civil society groups in this period were formed to fight for their rights over 
lands or local natural resources. One of the prominent leaders who 
protested against government projects which affected local people and the 
ecological system is a local Buddhist lecturer at the Prince of Songkla 
University. From fighting for various causes like local fisheries to Islamic 
identity, today’s civil society sector includes gatherings of people who have 
knowledge gained from various types of institutions together with religious 
studies, while some groups consist of local politicians. They are all powerful 
groups of people who can form an effective civil society sector.728  
 Two scholars have made some comments concerning the civil 
society sector in the south. The first scholar, Chalit Tavornnukitkul, found 
that the beginning of civil society formation in the southernmost provinces 
was based on an attempt to conserve their identity and to be representatives 
of local people to the state. Two kinds of civil society groups were found in 
the south at the early stage. The first group was formed to maintain their 
identity and religious customs and to keep the balance of power between 
the locals and the state. The second type of civil society groups mostly 
gathered to fight for the community’s interests over issues such as natural 
resources.729 The second scholar, Mark Tamthai, assessed the general 
work done by civil society in the deep south and found that there are two 
types. The first type is planned work which has been well organised. The 
second one is work which happens unexpectedly and needs to be done 
immediately. He argues that both types of work are important for the solution 
to the violence in the south.730 
                                            
728 Ibid. 
729 Deep South Watch, “Civil Society and Peace Process (Vol. 4): Dynamics, Roles and  
Potential of CSOs in the Deep South,” http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/node/3470. 
(accessed 12 September 2012) [in Thai]. 
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 According to the fieldwork, ten out of twenty-nine groups have settled 
in the south before 2004, but only two of them have shifted their scope to 
deal with the conflict after an eruption of violence. Eleven groups were 
suddenly established after 2004 and the rest were initiated during the period 
2009 to 2012. 
 The first formal organised civil society groups formed in the 
southernmost provinces were the groups that worked for the local natural 
resources reservations. The Pattani Bay reserve group and the Saiburi 
River reserve group that have been active in the south for 20 years are the 
prime examples of this. Besides reserve groups, there are some groups run 
by the community such as the Mosque committee and village career groups. 
Provincial Chambers of Commerce are also one of the civil society groups 
formed in this area before the upsurge of violence as they were set up in 
every province throughout the country.731 
 The overall purpose of the civil society sector in this region before 
2004 was concerned with social infrastructure such as activities based on 
identities and religions, local natural resources management, and 
community occupational groups; their aim was not to resolve the ethnic 
conflict. The turning point in the civil society’s role in the south was the 
upsurge in insurgent disturbances in 2004. Many existing civil society 
groups shifted their focus to help people affected by the violent situation.732  
 After the violence erupted in 2004, civil society groups have boomed 
with the main task being to help the victims of the violence. Many groups 
spontaneously formed after the upsurge in violence. Some of them had a 
short life while some have remained. A number of civil society groups have 
been developed into formal organisations in terms of legal registration. The 
target groups for most civil society groups are both Muslim and Buddhist 
people who have been affected by the violence. 
 As the violent situation has been ongoing in the region, many civil 
society groups have been recently established. The second round of growth 
in the civil society sector occurred from 2009 to 2012. It is noticeable that 
this occurred again only after the violence returned in the area. It could 
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732 Deep South Watch, “Civil Society (Vol. 4).” 
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mean that the existing civil society groups are not able to respond to the 
needs of the people. 
 
8.5 The Characteristics of Civil Society Groups Involved in the 
Attempted Peace Building in the South  
 Civil society groups in the south have the following characteristics 
that will be described as follows. 
 Names 
When asked why they called themselves ‘civil society’, most of them 
said their performances and intentions were more important than what they 
are called. The definition of civil society for people who work in this field is 
“everybody who works for the community and for the local people”. One 
respondent answered, 
 
We do not expect any benefits but we work with a volunteering spirit. Civil society’s 
work is based on the community; community is the purpose and goal.733 
 
For people who are working in the civil society sector, it seems it is 
not important to them what they are called. Some of them have never called 
themselves ‘civil society’. One respondent said, 
 
We have never called ourselves civil society. I do not like this word because it 
sounds limited, discriminating and it is only used by the high ranking levels. We are 
always classified into a civil society sector by the others although we have never 
said that.734 
 
 Civil society groups usually have their names based on their target 
groups and purposes. It is easy to assume what these groups are working 
on from their names.  
 Key Persons / Initiatives 
 Interestingly, there are not many key persons involved in the civil 
society sector. It does not take too long to become familiar with the people 
                                            
733 Respondent 17, Interview. Pattani Provincial Health Security Coordinating Center. 4 
July 2012. 
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who play key roles in the groups. It is to be noted that one person could be 
involved in one or more civil society groups or projects.  
There is no doubt that most civil society groups in the deep south 
were formed by Muslims as they are the majority in this region. There are, 
however, some groups initiated by the Buddhists and some attempts to mix 
all cultures including Muslims, Buddhists and Chinese into one organisation. 
Although the religions of civil society groups are different, they were 
established to help all victims, no matter what religious group they belong 
to. When asked what their group’s main purpose is, the answers were 
various, but the top three ones were: to do relief work, to build peace in the 
region, and to create a network. One respondent stated, 
 
We want to see this region get back to peace again by gathering 
representatives of three religious groups: Muslims, Buddhists and Chinese. 
The conflict made people misunderstand each other. Our group selected the 
representatives who are well-known and respected by their community to be 
our group’s members. We plan and work together as one team to show that 
we can live together based on understanding among all differences.735 
 
The groups’ founders are also diverse. Many groups that work for 
resolving the problem in the south are based at the universities. One 
university could have at least three or four groups working on the southern 
conflict. For example, the Prince of Songkla University has at least four 
groups such as the CSCC, the Institute for Peace Studies, the DSCC and 
the Southern Border Natural Resources Network. Besides academic 
networks, professionals such as lawyers have also formed groups to help 
poor local people who have to deal with the legal issues, particularly the 
victims, arising from special laws in the southern region. 
 Organisational Form 
Only 15 per cent of civil society organisations in the south have been 
registered with the government. 736  Today, many groups have been 
upgraded from casual networks into registered foundations or associations. 
As a result of this, some groups have gradually changed their names 
                                            
735 Respondent 18, Interview. Thai-Muslim, Buddhist, Chinese Association. 4 July 2012. 
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 223 
 
slightly. The reasons for registration with the government concern 
sponsorship, stability and continuity. The registered groups are seen as 
being more trustworthy to apply for sponsorship or funding.  
Some civil society groups are registered as foundations or 
associations. Both types are non-government organisations which have 
slightly different purposes. A foundation is a legal non-profit organisation 
that will typically either donate funds and support other organisations, or 
provide the source of funding for its own charitable purposes. An association 
is a group of individuals who entered into an agreement as volunteers to 
form a body to accomplish a purpose.737 
 Group Members 
Most civil society groups do not have membership requirements. 
They are open to all who are interested in their projects and activities. Since 
civil society groups lack a formal process for keeping membership records 
and then it is difficult to estimate the numbers of group members accurately. 
It is more like a casual network in the community. It can, however, be said 
that the networks and members of the civil society sector have enlarged. 
Only members in groups which are under the government or security 
authority have hardly increased because they are not volunteers but 
government officials.  
 Location 
The location of the civil society groups determine how stable the 
groups are and how easily they can be connected to the community.738 A 
suitable location for a civil society group is one that the community can 
conveniently access. Many groups, especially in youth fields, host some 
activities in their compound. Besides the Sukaew Foundation which has a 
perfect compound for hosting their activities such as the leadership youth 
camp, 739  most groups’ offices are located in the town area which the 
community can access easily.  
 
                                            
737 The Thai Encyclopedia for Youth, Vol. 12. Source: Department of Cultural Promotion, 
Website, www.culture.go.th (accessed 12 November 2012). 
738 Evaluation Department of Development of Democracy. The Evaluation, 12. 
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8.6 The Categories of Civil Society Organisations 
Civil society groups in southern Thailand have various 
characteristics. There have been attempts to classify civil society groups, 
but there is no acceptable pattern for it. It would be easier to classify civil 
society organisations if each group has only one purpose. Many of them 
have more than one main target or activity which means each group’s 
functions overlap among the categories.  
This research has classified the civil society groups that are involved 
in building peace into eleven categories which are based on the types of 
work. These civil society groups can also be divided into two groups. The 
first group includes civil society groups which are extensively involved in 
building peace (i.e. human rights, media, academic, religion and culture, 
women, youth, multi-purpose and government agencies) and the second 
group refers to civil society groups which are less involved in peacebuilding 
activities (i.e. natural resources issues, economic and public health). 
8.6.1 Human Rights 
Human rights civil society groups mean those groups which identify 
the transgression of human rights and discrimination, promote the judicial 
process for conflict management and encourage common laws to be used 
in the south instead of special laws. 
Most human rights groups were formed before the violent upsurge in 
2004. They began forming groups in Bangkok and worked for those who 
were marginalised and human rights issues in other parts of Thailand. After 
the return of violence, they played more roles in the deep south’s conflict. 
They focused on people, particularly Muslim victims, who needed 
assistance in legal issues and who were being treated unjustly by the 
state.740  
Human rights is the issue believed to be the root cause of the conflict. 
Many local people, especially Muslims, have been affected by the three 
special laws in the southernmost provinces. Under these laws, some 
Muslims have been detained and accused of being involved in militant 
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groups. It is unavoidable that human rights civil society groups are seen as 
being opposed to the state.741 A respondent said that in a conflict area laws 
alone could not solve the problem, but that a political solution is needed. 
This is because some conflicts cannot be ended in court.742 
One respondent from three groups in the human rights category 
mentioned funding sources: 
 
It is quite hard to find a financial source which understands our jobs. Our work 
focuses on human rights which is based by law with the assistances of justice as 
a tool. This task has been seen by international organisations as the duty of the 
state.743 
 
8.6.2 Media  
Media civil society groups mean those groups which create a public 
space for the locals and outsiders to communicate about the conflict. They 
are also part of a group that creates a better understanding about the facts 
of the situation and the conflict. Creating various channels for the locals to 
show their opinions is what they aim for as well. 
There are approximately thirty civil society groups in this category 
operating in the south.744 Two broad types can be found for media civil 
society groups; one is the news agency which is based on reporting news 
and articles on websites and the other is the broadcast programmes on 
radio stations.  
One of the most popular news sources is the DSW that publishes 
news, journals, academic articles and relevant statistics concerning the 
situation in the south. It is the only group in this fieldwork funded by a 
Japanese organisation; in this case the Sasakawa Foundation. They avoid 
receiving money or support from the United States because this is a 
sensitive area and they want to remain unbiased. Support from the United 
States might affect the image of the organisation because they see the 
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United States as not having a good relationship with the Muslim world since 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The DSW has three strategies: to work with media; 
cooperate with academics; and encourage civil society groups to build 
peace in the conflict. The DSW focuses on the issues of decentralisation, 
justice procedure and peace talks. They work as a network with other civil 
society groups which they call ‘Track Two’.745 ‘Track Three’ means villagers 
with whom they hardly cooperate directly, but they use civil society groups 
in Track Two as a link between them. They aim to create political space 
without fighting with weapons or using violence.746 
Another prominent media civil society group is the Bungaraya Group 
formed by students at the Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus.  
As people tend to hear only a negative side of the deep south, the group 
opened a space for locals to publicise good stories about their 
community.747  
8.6.3 Academic 
Academic civil society groups in the south play significant roles in 
creating a body of knowledge, developing paradigms, and producing some 
research and journals in conflict resolution. This is to encourage peaceful 
measures to be used in the conflict area. Both local and outside universities 
have established some institutions which focus on Peace Studies. The PSU, 
Pattani Campus, created the two well-known organisations which are the 
CSCD led by a famous academic, Dr. Srisompob Jitpiromsri, and the DSCC 
initiated by a group of PSU lecturers. The PSU, Hat Yai Campus, 
established the Institute for Peace Studies. The Mahidol University’s 
Institute for Human Rights and Peace Studies (formerly the Centre for 
Human Rights and Social Development) is the only outsider which plays a 
significant and continuous role in the south.  
Lecturers have to contribute time for researching about model 
solutions. Many groups from political backgrounds support political 
solutions such as autonomous areas and decentralisation. They have 
                                            
745 This use of Track II differs from that employed in International Relations. 
746 Respondent 8, Interview. Deep South Watch (DSW). 22 June 2012. 
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produced a variety of databases concerning the southern conflict. The weak 
point of researching is that not much work has been published because 
there is a lack of process in transferring research to published work. This 
makes it difficult to publicise and make the most of these useful 
researches.748 The unique point and strengths of academic civil society 
groups are their structural flexibility and credibility. They are seen as 
impartial groups whose arguments are based on theory and knowledge, not 
feeling. Being a trustworthy organisation makes it easy for it to access 
funding. Besides getting funded from the government annually, they are 
also able to request for funding from other sources for their research 
projects.749 
The Volunteer Graduate Group commented that they wanted to see 
the power of university students to solve the conflict in their community. 
They should not just be in the classroom while their homes are on fire.750  
8.6.4 Religion and Culture 
This category includes those civil society groups that aim to conserve 
their identity. Their work is to teach people to be good by following their 
religious teaching. It is common to find people in the same culture and 
religion forming groups such as the Buddhist Association or the Imam Club 
which can be found in almost every district. 
Religious civil society groups were formed in the Muslim community 
a long time ago. A mosque is the centre of the Muslims’ way of life; the same 
as the temple is for the Buddhists. Muslim males of all ages normally go to 
pray at the mosque every Friday. It is a good opportunity to update news in 
the community. Furthermore, the offices of the Provincial Islamic Committee 
were established in every province throughout the country. Religious 
leaders have an important role in the community to shape people’s good 
behaviour. Their main funding sources are from villagers’ donations with 
some support from the government and local administration. They are also 
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supported from the business sector in the community for hosting religious 
festivals.751 
Their work, however, does not involve resolving the violent situation 
directly, but their teaching concerns good Muslim behaviour and anti-drug 
campaigns. This is a partial solution for social problems which is one of the 
southern conflict’s root causes.  
An Imam in Pattani commented that language is a barrier for local 
people to communicate with government officials. He also said that the trend 
in drugs usage, especially habit-forming ones, is rising in their community 
after the violence erupted.752  
A new association was recently established in 2012 called the ‘Thai-
Muslim, Buddhist and Chinese Association’. It is the first civil society group 
which combined the three different identities of the members together. Their 
strategy is to bring the elites of the three cultures, who have the same hope 
which is to see the people along the borders of the southern provinces live 
peacefully together in their homeland again. Creating a better 
understanding under varied religious contexts is their vital task for being 
able to live in a diverse society. 
A participant from the Islamic Cultural Foundation of Southern States 
defined culture in the Muslim way which means concepts and ideas 
including politics and education. They are now focusing on a political 
solution, decentralisation and good governance. They are trying to generate 
support for the idea of ‘Pattani Metropolitan’- an autonomous administrative 
structure by using radio as a publicised channel. Furthermore, they have 
been creating a political network for the Young South Border Muslim 
Academics.753 
8.6.5 Women 
The women’s civil society groups were established by groups of 
women to cooperate and campaign on any issue. Unfortunately, the role of 
females in Muslim society remains limited. There is no doubt that the 
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numbers of women in civil society groups are very few. Before the upsurge 
of violence in 2004, women civil society groups were gathered for 
manufacturing local products. Today, women civil society groups focus on 
healing the victims from the conflicts. Most of their activities are all organised 
by a group of women. 
The Civic Women’s Network for Peace in the Deep South is a 
network that gathers the heads of each woman’s group. They are good at 
communicating as they have three media channels including radio, journals 
and a website.754 They have their own radio programme which is called 
‘Voice of the Deep South Women’. Female victims share their experiences 
on the programmes which are on air in the 14 stations of the southernmost 
provinces. After the first successful broadcasting of a series of 70 
programmes, they developed their programmes into Bahasa Melayu.755  
The Deeppeace was formed by a group of students who wanted to 
help their community. They do not depend on any funding sources. Their 
main income is from donation boxes located in public places to provide their 
group’s finance.756 
8.6.6 Youth 
The civil society groups which gather groups of youths to work on 
any problem are considered in this category and also groups which work 
with youths. Children and young people are seen as the cause of, and the 
solution to, the conflict. People in the youth civil society groups think that it 
is easier to shape a good spirit in youths than adults. That is why youths are 
the key players in conflict solutions. They agree that if youths grow up in 
good circumstances they would not join the militant groups or become 
involved with drugs or violence. Most youth civil society groups were 
established by groups of university students, especially from the Prince of 
Songkla University, Pattani Campus. The founders were mostly former 
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student leaders who played significant roles in universities when they were 
students.  
The Southern Youth Network aims to fill the gap that exists in 
financial assistance for the orphans of the conflicts and normal orphans. 
They are concerned about orphans who are not eligible to receive 
assistance or compensation from the government. This group initiates funds 
for these orphans by selling calendars and postcards and running a small 
business in their community.757 
The Lookrieang Group has been working for the community for at 
least ten years and recently registered their status from a working group to 
an association in 2012. The activities before and after the resurgence of 
violence were shifted from promoting HIV knowledge to healing the victims 
from the conflict. This is because the problem was no longer far removed, 
but had started to affect their routine life.758  
8.6.7 Multi-purpose 
It is difficult to classify some civil society groups that have various 
activities and target groups because some purposes overlap among the 
categories. Visiting the victims, giving money and consultations for mental 
problems are the examples of tasks for civil society groups in this category. 
When the DSRR visits the community, they normally send a team of 
psychologists which cooperates with the military for the safety of the 
members of the foundation. The staff from the foundation said that the 
feelings of the people in the southern provinces are very important which is 
not influenced by financial assistance.759 
The Asian Resource Foundation has various purposes such as 
development, healing, human rights and peaceful solution. It is said that 
their job is to develop people not to create activities. Their aim is to create 
a body of knowledge for local people.760 
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The Sukaew Foundation was established by Dr. Rung Kaewdang, a 
former local politician who had a broad vision to solve the conflict. The all-
Buddhist-staff foundation started with a goat farm project aiming to improve 
the local economy in the south. As most Muslim households have goats, 
they invited professionals to teach them how to increase productivity in goat 
farming that will increase their income. Today, this project has been 
developed to become the Goat Bank which has networks all over the three 
southernmost provinces. Their next project was the Youth Leader Camp. 
The purpose of this project is to forge a closer relationship between 
Buddhist and Muslim youths. As they are separated unintentionally by the 
schooling system, that creates a big gap between the two cultures. The 
project aims for learning by doing. The foundation trained teenagers to 
manage cultural performances in the community. The project was 
successful in terms of creating leadership for the youths and strengthening 
friendships between the two religions.761 
Creating a network of civil society groups is the mission of the Civil 
Society Council of Southernmost Thailand. Today, the network includes 22 
civil society groups who agree that working as a combined group will 
facilitate changes more easily than working as individual groups. They have 
four strategies to reduce violence in the south by 2020: to support 
democracy by decentralisation; to maintain justice and human rights in the 
region; to raise the standard of living of the local people; and to encourage 
their normal way of life, identity, religion and culture.762  
8.6.8 Government Agencies 
This category includes groups that are state-run and their 
responsibilities are to promote the working of the civil society sector and to 
support and coordinate with other civil society groups.  
The state has been supporting the civil society sector as Thailand is 
a democratic country. There are two notable government agencies which 
play key roles in the south: these are the SBPAC and the CSCWG. SBPAC 
is an agency under the Ministry of Interior while the CSCWG is under the 
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ISOC; an agency of the state security authority. CSCWG works as a link to 
create a better understanding among civil society groups, the community 
and the state.  
The aims of SBPAC are to support and coordinate all sectors to work 
together for the peace of the southern border provinces. The four main tasks 
for the SBPAC are developing education, supporting religious institutions, 
stimulating the local economy, and encouraging a strong Thai identity for 
Thai people overseas. The Consultancy and Development of the Southern 
Border Provinces is a civil society group which was established under the 
SBPAC in April 2011. The committees were selected from five southern 
provinces including the three southernmost provinces, Songkhla and Satun. 
They are from eight different fields: the local administrative organisation; the 
head of the sub-district and of villagers; the Provincial Islamic Committee, 
the imam; the abbot; a social developer; a lecturer; women; and the 
Chamber of Commerce.763  
CSCWG is a small, flexible unit which provides information for their 
leaders to use for decision making and implementing policy. They have 
been working with the civil society groups to create better relationships 
between the state and the locals. They hope to see civil society groups focus 
more on the locals’ needs and not the groups’ needs.764  
When asked about cooperation with other civil society groups, a 
group which represents government agencies said, “We do not want to use 
the term ‘cooperation’ but a keyword is ‘participation’ based on people’s 
needs. Normally the state uses people as a tool but today we work as a tool 
for the people”.765 
8.6.9 Natural Resources Issues 
One of the problems in the south is environmental degradation and 
the struggle for possession of natural resources among the locals, the 
government and outside investors. Development which leads to 
                                            
763 Respondent 26, Interview, Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre 
(SBPAC). 6 July 2012. 
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environmental changes affects not only the way of life of the local people, 
but it also creates a conflict of ideas.  
The civil society groups considered in this category are the groups 
that try to promote environmental conservation and protection. They try to 
learn and understand the changes in their local natural environment which 
will lead to a sustainable solution. These groups encourage the community 
to be involved in resolving their own environmental problems. 
It could be said that the oldest civil society groups in the region are 
the groups which have fought for their natural resources in the community. 
They work with the community as a partnership by helping villagers to form 
a group which works towards conserving their natural resources. Fisheries 
seem to be a source of major conflict among the community, wealthy 
investors and government policy makers, resulting in some key group 
leaders being threatened and killed. The government’s policies such as the 
Saiburi River Dam and the Sea Food Bank could affect the local wildlife. 
Without discussing with the locals, the government thought these policies 
would develop these poor areas. Unfortunately, these policies have 
destroyed the local environment and also created conflict among the local 
people.766 
Civil society groups in the natural resources category have been 
fighting for their rights by peaceful methods for more than 20 years. The civil 
society groups have had a significant role in negotiating as the government 
has sometimes reconsidered their policies after receiving the group’s 
requests or opinions. This could be an example of using non-violent tool for 
peaceful conflict resolution for today’s violence. This soft measure, 
however, takes time to reduce the effects of the various consequences 
caused by the conflict.767 
After the upsurge in violence in 2004, some people who worked in 
these groups adjusted their aims to resolve the insurgent problem and to 
build peace in the region. They reduced their work on natural resources to 
half or less with the rest of the time put aside to solve the violent conflict. 
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They feel it is the responsibility of everybody as it is happening in their 
homeland.768  
8.6.10 Economic 
One of the groups most affected by the turbulent situation has been 
business entrepreneurs. There are civil society groups that support 
economic coordination and negotiation among business people, the locals 
and central government. 
Provincial Chamber of Commerce offices have been established in 
every province for more than ten years now. There are only a few civil 
society groups which play a significant role in representing the business 
sector. Activities hosted by them mostly concern economic promotions such 
as the Rice Farming Model Project which educates farmers how to adapt 
sufficiency economy as well as integrated farming to increase their 
productivity. It helps the growth of the economy and it could reduce poverty 
in the area. As they are local business people, they avoid getting involved 
in the resolution of conflicts or giving any opinions which are against the 
insurgents because they are afraid that they would become the target of 
militant groups. 
The President of the Pattani Chamber of Commerce commented that 
education is the first priority that must be improved in the south as it means 
that a good career and better economy in the area would eventually lead to 
the end of the violent situation.769  
8.6.11 Public Health 
Public health civil society groups mean those groups which work for 
promoting public health accessibility, maintaining good health in households 
and providing relief work during natural disasters. Furthermore, other 
activities are to make people understand the concept of ‘National Health 
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Assembly,’ 770  public policy in health issues and to help other relevant 
organisations set their public health strategic plans.771 
They believe that government policy in health issues should come 
from the grassroots. If the policy is related to the local people’s needs, it will 
be more successful. Public health civil society groups have always been 
well supported by the community and others because public health is 
considered as a harmless issue which provides benefits to everybody.772  
 This category of civil society groups is involved in the task of 
peacebuilding because the groups help to heal victims who were affected 
physically and mentally by the conflict. Also, the public health groups can 
fulfil the basic needs of local people who want to improve their quality of life 
so as to reach the same standard as the rest of the country. 
 
8.7 The Functional Characteristics of Civil Society 
 To assess how efficient the civil society sector is in dealing with the 
southern conflict, we need to understand the main elements of their internal 
functioning which are organisational structure, human resources, evaluation 
and funding. 
 Organisational Structure 
The organisational structure of civil society groups dealing with the 
southern conflict solution seems very flexible and suitable for application in 
uncertain circumstances. Although the bureaucracy in a developing country 
such as Thailand is enormous and complicated, the government-run 
authorities, for example the CSCC773 and the Mahidol Institute of Human 
Rights and Peace Studies, 774  are able to make decisions and work 
independently. According to the academic civil society participants, 
although they belong to universities which are under the government, they 
                                            
770 The goal of the National Health Assembly is to use an evidence based participatory 
public policy process to create a public policy to improve the health of Thai people. 
Source: National Health Commission Office of Thailand, Website, http://www. 
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772 Ibid. 
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are very flexible and independent which is unique for academic-styled 
organisations.775 Simple-structured civil society groups can be easily found 
in the region. Some civil society groups do not have a hierarchic 
administrative structure because they were initiated by members who are of 
the same status, for example, the Civil Society Council of Southernmost 
Thailand776 and the Chamber of Commerce.777 As they were formed for 
networking reasons, their relationship within the groups is not vertical but 
more horizontal. The overall organisational structure of civil society groups 
is a strong advantage for working in the region which is full of unpredictable 
situations. 
 Human Resources 
People who work in the civil society sector can be grouped into two 
types, full-time staff and volunteers. Some civil society groups have offices 
which hire full-time staff to do the administrative work. Those who work for 
civil society in the southern provinces are mostly volunteers who already 
have full-time jobs. This makes some staff struggle with the time they have 
available to dedicate to the groups. The academic groups, for example, 
have full-time lecturers who cannot spare much time in the south as they 
have to teach.778 Many civil society groups have mixed volunteer and full-
time staff. The main base needs staff who do the administrative work while 
fieldwork needs local volunteers who are familiar with the people and the 
area. On the other hand, the groups in the government agencies category 
have full-time officials who are assigned directly to focus on the civil society 
sector. This could be an advantage for the community if they do not need to 
be rotated when their term ends. A rotation makes it hard for the locals to 
get familiar with and to trust the government officers.  
 Evaluation 
Evaluation is considered to be one of the most important steps of the 
working process. Although most civil society groups are open to outside 
organisations to assess their work, evaluation and getting some feedback 
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do not seem to be necessary for civil society groups. They only need to 
report back to the funding sources. Other than that, they do internal 
evaluations of themselves although there is no clear method to evaluate 
their performances. Furthermore, their incomes and expenses systems do 
not reach the accounting standards which make it hard to trace any 
irregularities.779 Those who have registered as an association must show 
their performance and financial reports to the Ministry of Culture as this is 
required in terms of the regulations of registration.780 The groups which are 
government-run agencies must report their performances to their 
headquarters as part of their annual routine. 
 Funding  
Funding is a surprisingly interesting topic for civil society groups in 
the turbulent provinces. Much money has been thrown at the deep south. 
There is no doubt this is why many groups have been formed promptly 
despite turbulent circumstances. Many groups have never encountered any 
difficulty in finding project-based funding sources although this means that 
such financial support will not last forever. Only a small number of a sample 
of civil society groups said that it is hard to get funding sometimes. Most civil 
society groups get funds from more than one source. 
The financial sources of civil society groups’ income are various such 
as the state, international organisations, the community, donations, their 
own members, and private business groups. The major financial support for 
civil society groups in the south are from overseas such as the European 
Union (EU), the World Bank and embassies (e.g. Australia) though these 
are normally available only for a short term. The EU is the biggest source of 
funding to help to solve the insurgency problem in this region. Civil society 
groups tend to choose international funding sources first because they are 
more flexible. 
The state also plays a role in distributing some money to both 
government agencies and non-government groups. The independent state 
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agencies, particularly the Thai Health Promotion Foundation 
(ThaiHealth),781 have funded many projects in the problem area.  
Some civil society associations get money from membership fees, 
donations and a little bit of support from the government. It has also been 
found that the bigger civil society groups share their funds with newly formed 
groups.  
The sustainable way of running a civil society is by being 
independent from any funding sources which are normally short term and 
uncertain. One way of doing that is to have their own small business to gain 
income for administrative work, with a little support from the state or project 
sponsors. A civil society group has to be free from the influence of funding 
sources. A respondent spoke about how they organised their fund: 
 
We have been initiating a fund for orphans since 2006. We produced 50,000 
postcards and sold it for THB 10 (NZD 0.40) each. There was good response. This 
money was used to establish 2 funds; one was for orphans in the three 
southernmost provinces and the other was local funds for 87 areas out of a total of 
140 areas. Other than this, we run some small businesses such as youth shops, 
clothes shops, and head scarf shops.782 
 
Overall, civil society groups working on the conflict problem in the 
deep south have a healthy financial status. The government-run civil society 
groups normally receive a government allocated budget annually. Those 
groups that do not receive a routine budget from any sources will apply for 
some support by submitting a project proposal. Lastly, the groups receive 
support only from their members and donations from people in the 
community who believe in the groups’ mission.  
Having funds from international organisations does not necessarily 
affect the strength of civil society groups. There are some groups which 
                                            
781 Thai Health Promotion Foundation (ThaiHealth) is an independent state agency set up 
according to the Health Promotion Act 2001 and funded by a 2% surcharge tax on tobacco 
& alcohol excise taxes. ThaiHealth has a Governing Board chaired by the Prime Minister 
with half of its members from independent social organizations. It promotes well-being in 4 
dimensions: Physical, Mental, Spiritual and Social. It funds over 1,000 projects a year; 
spends around $US 100 million on health promoting activities a year; and works with a 
wide range of multi-sectoral partners. Source: IUHPE Conferences, Website, 
http://www.iuhpeconference.net. 
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have remained active in the area for at least 30 years although they have 
not relied on any outside sources for income.783 
 
8.8 Cooperation between Civil Society and Other Sectors of Thai 
Society 
 Civil society in the south, like everywhere else in Thailand, naturally 
works as a network. Some groups work together with other civil society 
groups who have the same goal. Some of them cooperate with other groups 
which are able to help them in areas where they lack expertise and this 
could provide people with more complete services. Government authorities 
are also part of the network for some civil society groups.  
 Civil Society and the Locals 
Most civil society groups get good participation from local people 
because they normally initiate projects or activities by discussing these first 
with the community. They ask what the locals actually want and make 
people understand their activities. They usually connect with the community 
by using their local network or leaders in the area.  
 Among Civil Society Groups 
According to the fieldwork, a third of the participants said they did not 
have any problem working with other civil society groups and they 
cooperated well with one another. It is very important for civil society to 
cooperate with each other because it is the best way to spend a budget 
effectively. By working together civil society groups can combine budgets to 
be more efficient and to avoid spending on overlapping tasks. Integration 
will make civil society work more effectively as some groups have money 
while some groups have staff or knowledge.784 
One respondent mentioned that one strength of the civil society 
network in Pattani is that they will gather spontaneously when there is a 
crisis, but during normal situations they go back to work in their own way.785  
 Civil Society and the State 
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It cannot be denied that there is an adversarial relationship between 
the state and civil society.786 Three types of relationships between the civil 
society and the state can be found in the south. The first type is civil society 
groups which have no relationship with the state and their work is not related 
to the state. Civil society groups seen by the state as opposition are of the 
second type. Their activities seem to create problems for the state. The last 
one is civil society groups which cooperate well with the state. They are 
supported or sponsored by some government agencies. 
It is often suggested that civil society is a non-state sphere of 
collective life and depends entirely on citizen initiatives. It should not be 
something that the state can build or should try to. In the case of southern 
Thailand, the state can play a positive role.787 Almost half of the people in 
the research sample seem satisfied working with government authorities. 
When civil society groups cooperate with the government, it seems they 
work more slowly because of the strict rules and regulations.  
When asked why some civil society groups have been seen as an 
opposition by the state, one respondent noted, 
 
It is the nature of fighting. Today, most social problems are caused by the conflict 
of people and government. Thus, they are in conflict in terms of structure. People 
who join civil society groups see the government as not being genuine or having a 
bias from the beginning. Our group, however, does not have anything against the 
state because we are based on logic and data, not feeling.788 
 
 
 Civil Society and the Private Sector 
Cooperation between the private sector and the civil society sector is 
very rare. In the private sector, businesses aim for profit and they do not 
have important roles in resolving the conflict. The only way that the private 
sector is involved in resolving the problem is by giving donations or 
sponsoring some activities.789 Business people hardly participate in any 
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activities concerning the conflict discussion because they are concerned 
about their safety. They are sometimes seen as an opposition to the civil 
society as their purposes are very different. Business entrepreneurs work 
for their own benefit which is opposite to the civil society’s goal. Even worse, 
some civil society groups have no clue as to what the private sector is.790 
One advantage of working with the private sector is that they are more 
flexible in terms of regulations than working with government authorities.  
 Civil Society and the International Organisations 
 Many civil society groups have been working with international 
organisations in many ways. Other than being a main funding source, for 
some civil society groups in this region exchanging knowledge and 
experiences among Thai groups and international groups is also an 
important part. International organisations, particularly the embassies, 
receive information from civil society groups which work to collect data 
about the conflict. Civil society is the one which plays a role in 
communication and creating an understanding about the situation in the 
south to outsiders like embassies and international organisations.791 One 
respondent, who works in a well-known media civil society group, said that: 
  
With international organisations, we do not cooperate but we give them data. 
Embassies are the main groups which ask us for data. International organisations 
prefer using data from us because we have many kinds of data which are able to 
be balanced with the government side e.g. the rate of death and casualties. Even 
military and police ask data from us sometimes which we are glad to share because 
we are in the middle.792 
  
8.9 The Difficulties Faced by Civil Society Groups in Dealing with the 
Conflict in the South 
 The obstacles for civil society groups are caused by various factors. 
A few civil society groups, however, claimed that they did not have any 
serious working problems. Some problems are caused by internal factors 
while circumstances and external factors also affect their work.  
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 Human Resources 
The difficulties concerning human resources are significant in terms 
of the qualifications of people who work in this sector and the need for more 
specialists and skills. They lacked a new generation of staff to volunteer to 
work in the civil society sector.793 A spirit of volunteering is a basic necessity 
which is not easy to find in working people. Unfortunately, volunteering is 
not very attractive to potential members because working for an ideal cannot 
feed them. Some respondents commented about their difficulties with 
human resources. 
 
Our problem is we need staff who have not only law degrees but administrative 
knowledge as well. Both skills are needed to complete our group’s work.794 
 
Another respondent added, 
 
We need staff with more patient because people who work in the civil society sector 
must face resistance from the government sector, security agency, other civil 
society groups, villagers, community leaders, and religious leaders. Some staff 
have quitted because they could not stand it.795  
 
The need for special skills by people who work in this sector has also been 
mentioned by a respondent: 
 
I think people who work for the civil society sector should contain six specialists in 
the areas of strategy, academia, management, integration, communication and 
thought.796  
 
A respondent in the government agencies category also gave a comment 
on their human resources problem: 
 
We have a problem of continuity of officers because they are not local people but 
from headquarters. They might have to leave the area if there are any inquires 
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such as the headquarter calls them back, there is an urgent family matter or to 
further their study.797 
 
 Language 
Language is also a barrier for working in this sensitive area where 
the differences of culture and language have become the causes of the 
conflict. If people spoke the same language, they could communicate and 
understand each other better than in the past.798   
 Time 
Another obstacle for civil society is time. Time management is a 
problem for groups which have volunteer staff who normally have their own 
full-time work. It is hard when they need to hold a group meeting or to attend 
a seminar which is hosted during working hours. One respondent described 
their struggle with lack of time: 
 
It is a tough job for our group’s secretary to hold a meeting or seminar. We have 
never got all twenty members having a meeting together. We have to pick the date 
that most members are available. Funding is easier to find than time.799  
 
 Cooperation 
 Although most civil society groups claimed that they did not have any 
difficulties in cooperating with other civil society groups or the state, some 
interesting points were raised by the respondents. 
 
The disadvantage of working with other civil society groups is that of high 
competition. Every group wants to get to the funding sources. That is why they do 
not share any useful data with each other which is not good for the whole 
community. Most financial sources have to leave one day and how will civil society 
groups survive after that?800 
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Another respondent added, 
 
Discrimination among civil society groups is very high especially academic groups. 
The civil society sector is supposed to work for equality but they are themselves 
very discriminatory.801 
 
More than half of the respondents said their relations with 
government agencies were good; on the other hand, some groups were 
seen as being opposed to the government.802 The government seems not 
to trust the civil society sector803 and remains wedded to its traditional style 
which is not to cooperate with any other social sectors.804 Cooperation with 
the state is a problem for some civil society groups when their purposes 
seem to be against the state. Ultimately it depends on the policy of each 
government and leader. One respondent commented that, 
 
We have found that need to keep a distance when working with the government. It 
is okay to work for non-security issues with hospitals or the Agricultural Office but 
working with police or military, we need to keep a distance.805 
 
The main obstacle faced by those attempting to work with the state is that 
the government authorities have doubts about civil society groups and even 
see some of them as being in opposition, particularly, human rights civil 
society groups. This is because human rights civil society groups help 
people who claim that they have been tortured or treated unjustly by the 
state’s officials. 
Civil society groups in the area, and outside groups, look at the 
conflict differently and it is difficult for them to cooperate with one another.806 
Local civil society groups have different perspectives from outsiders. Civil 
society groups in the area have more understanding of the dynamics of the 
problems. 
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 Financial Issues 
Only a few difficulties were found by civil society groups which were 
competition for funding sources and a conflict of ideas. Some participants 
gave a strong comment concerning financial issues which has led to 
dishonesty and non-transparent work. Such financial issues have changed 
people who work in the civil society sector which should be working for the 
benefit of the community. The civil society group’s members today aim to 
receive compensation if they participate in seminars or activities. They even 
slander other groups which could be their competitors for funding.807  
The influence from funding sponsorship is an interesting issue for 
civil society groups in this area. This makes it difficult for them to work 
independently because funding sources may interfere with their work and 
determine their work processes which may not be compatible with the local 
needs.808 This is also because many sponsors are from overseas and have 
no profound knowledge about the conflict. For example, international human 
rights civil society organisations would focus on condemning the 
government or militant groups on incidences of human rights violations, 
while the local people want the civil society groups to resolve the conflict 
and improve their well-being, and not create a more negative atmosphere 
in the region. 
When asked what their difficulties about financial process were, one 
respondent said: 
It is because we have not registered as an official public organisation legally so we 
have a difficulty in receiving donations. We need to get support via registered 
corporation like the Subdistrict Administrative Organisation or relevant government 
agencies.809  
 
A civil society group outside the region said, “We were seen as their 
competitor for funding. They criticised that our work was not good”.810 Two 
respondents commented about the problem caused by sponsorship: 
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An influx of funding has changed the way people think about volunteers. The first 
question asked in a civil society seminar would be how much money they will get. 
People’s behaviour has changed from being keen to learn to wanting to spend time 
in a fancy hotel or going shopping in the city.811 
 
Another participant added,  
 
Discrimination among civil society groups, caused by an influx in funding, is very 
obvious. Many new groups have been formed because money motivated them 
more than the volunteering spirit. Before 2004, we enjoyed working in a friendly 
atmosphere but now it has become an atmosphere of high competition. I do not 
trust the new groups. They are not genuine so we try not to work with other groups. 
We have our pride and work in our own way.812 
 
 Other Problems 
People do not openly trust civil society groups because they have 
experienced some fake ones. They also do not trust the government sector, 
especially the military, because they see the root cause of the conflict as 
being the government.813  
 Safety issues were the concern of some civil society groups which 
needed to get into the community. They normally need to cooperate with 
some local staff who can make the community understand the purpose of 
the group before their fieldtrip.814  
 Although the King suggested the key approach in which the southern 
conflict could be resolved: ‘Understanding, Reaching out and 
Development,’815 the government has never followed up on it or tried to 
understand the differences in the identities of the local people in the south 
and the rest of the country. Some problems cannot be solved by money. An 
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increase in the budget to the south has created the problem of corruption 
among government servants.816  
 Finally, the continuity of government is another difficulty when civil 
society groups need to deal with the state agencies. They cannot rely on 
government policy and leaders as they change quite often and thus it is hard 
to deal with the government agencies for long-term activities. Moreover, the 
financial regulations and processes involved when they have to deal with 
the state agencies, take time and can be complicated.817 
 
8.10 How to Make Civil Society Work More Efficiently 
 There are some recommendations proposed by people who work in 
the civil society network. It would be very advantageous for the community 
if these recommendations were considered and brought into practice. The 
following are some comments raised by respondents as to how to make civil 
society work more effectively. 
 More Cooperation 
The biggest change that people want to see is cooperation among 
civil society groups towards the same goal which has been planned 
together. Many groups are working for the same targets and on the same 
issues, but they have never had a chance to discuss the problems together. 
It would be more effective if those who aim for the same ultimate outcome 
could share their knowledge and information. Working with people from 
different religions and cultures should create a better understanding and 
strengthen the relationship in the community.818 Thus, they should expand 
and create more variety in the civil society network, particularly an 
international one, which would be advantageous in terms of sharing 
experiences and exchanging staff. 819  Furthermore, they should support 
each group to have more dialogues and talks over peace issues. This would 
create a friendly atmosphere for both formal and informal talks where people 
are not afraid to express their ideas. They should also support working 
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together with the state for people from different religions. The Pattani Forum 
is an example which initiated peace talks between Melayu Muslims and Thai 
Buddhists.820 
 Clear Plan 
Another point that has been made is how having a clear plan and 
strategy would make civil society work more effectively. It should not work 
to respond only to funding sources, but it needs to work for local people’s 
needs.821 To make the civil society sector work more efficiently, being open 
to new knowledge and adapting from successful lessons learnt would be 
helpful. 822  The conflict cannot be resolved by feeling-based decision 
making. Knowledge and experience are necessary in the decision-making 
process.823 
 Sustainable Financial Support 
An unsustainable funding source is one of the problems the civil 
society is facing and trying to get financial support from the government is 
one way of getting long-term funding. Most civil society groups today rely 
on external or international sources which only provide funding for a limited 
time such as two years. At the end of this, civil society groups have to search 
for a new sponsor to keep their activities going. One respondent said “Civil 
society needs to link with the government which has the budget and the civil 
society, the good ideas”. 824  In fact, the most sustainable way is to be 
independent of all financial sources and to rely on the civil society itself as 
much as they can. 
 Run by the Locals 
Ideally, civil society groups should be initiated and formed by locals 
who are aware of their citizenship and being a part of society. Most people, 
however, are not sure about their roles in the peacebuilding process so we 
should try to make people understand their position and how to be involved 
in the peacebuilding process.825 One respondent commented that the type 
                                            
820 Respondent 29. 
821 Respondent 11. 
822 Respondent 6, Interview. Knowledge for Deep South (K4DS). 22 June 2012. 
823 Respondent 23. 
824 Respondent 9. 
825 Respondent 4. 
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of leadership in the civil society groups is also important. Groups’ leaders 
should be able to motivate people to volunteer to work together as most of 
them already have their full-time job.826  
 Understanding, Reaching out and Development 
The Thai King’s guideline of ‘Understanding, Reaching out and 
Development’ is a complete cycle for resolving the south’s conflict. 
However, for this to work, all sectors need to understand the real causes of 
the problem which are identity and injustice. 827  The development of 
education and the economy and more employment opportunities are 
necessary to increase local people’s standard of life. There should be a 
specific school for government servants who are assigned to work in this 
region.828 The slogan itself is very good, but it needs to be brought into 
practice.829 
 More Opportunities 
On the other hand, the government should be more open and let the 
people as well as civil society groups play their roles in an appropriate 
context because both the government and civil society have the same goal 
which is peace in this region.830 
 
8.11 Conclusion 
  The fieldwork in Thailand revealed many interesting points which 
help to clarify the situation of the civil society sector in southern Thailand. 
Some points have been clearly made including that civil society groups 
involved in building peace in the ethno-religious conflict in the deep south 
have a variety categories, activities, financial sources and initiatives. The 
significant role of the civil society in the south is being the link, or middle 
space, between local people and the state. Even though they do not have 
difficulties in finding short-term financial support, the civil society groups 
                                            
826 Respondent 10. 
827 Respondent 28. 
828 Respondent 18. 
829 Respondent 28. 
830 Respondent 20. 
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have encountered problems in the human resources area and in terms of 
coordination with other civil society groups, the state and the private sector. 
 Efforts to reduce the conflict in the southernmost region by the civil 
society sector are important. Overall, civil society groups in this region are 
satisfied with their performance. According to the fieldwork samples, they 
evaluated themselves with at least a pass of 50 per cent for their groups’ 
performance. Quite a few of them gave themselves a hundred per cent for 
their hard work. Although they seem satisfied with their performances, some 
problems still need to be resolved. 
The next chapter will present the analysis of the role of civil society 
in building peace in the ethno-religious conflict in southern Thailand. It will 
also analyse the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to the 
civil society sector as well as provide some recommendations. 
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CHAPTER IX 
ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN BUILDING 
PEACE IN SOUTHERN THAILAND 
 
9.1 Introduction  
 It is believed that the civil society sector is one of the key elements 
for a country’s successful development and for finding solutions to a 
country’s crisis caused by political, economic and social factors. Therefore, 
to handle the southern conflict, the state should also emphasise civil politics 
and citizen awareness which are necessary to strengthen the civil society 
sector in Thai communities.831  
This chapter will begin with analysis of the stages of the conflict and 
the types of actors. It will then seek to answer the four main research 
questions: what are the roles of civil society groups in the south; how 
efficient is the civil society; what are the problems of civil society groups; 
and what should be done to improve civil society’s performance. Lastly, this 
chapter will discuss the future of civil society involved in the southern conflict 
resolution. 
The analysis is based on the data from in-depth interviews, 
documentary evidence and the researcher’s experience. The interviews 
indicated the responsibilities, activities, difficulties, and recommendations of 
civil society groups involved in attempting to build peace in the deep south. 
The data from documentary research reflects how outsiders think about the 
role of civil society groups in this region. The efficacy of civil society groups 
dealing with the southern conflict was based on analysis of the internal and 
external factors which affected the work of civil society groups.  
 
                                            
831 Bongkoch Sudasna Na Ayudhaya, Civil Society-The Key for a Successful 
Development. Conference Paper of Rangsit University 2006, 3 April 2007, 95. [in Thai]. 
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9.2 The Stages of Conflict and the Types of Actors 
 Ethno-religious conflict in the southernmost provinces of Thailand 
has a long historical background. Many factors and variables influence the 
tension between the conflicting parties. According to Curle’s matrix, the 
progression of a conflict can be divided into four major stages. (see figure 
6.3 in Chapter 6, page 179). This matrix is useful for plotting where a conflict 
is located and thus it helps to indicate which conflict resolution functions and 
activities may be appropriate.832 In the case of southern Thailand, ethnic 
tension has been latent in this sensitive area for centuries. Education and 
social activities were tools which would help to prevent the conflict before it 
erupted. Unfortunately, the Thai government during that time ignored this 
unbalanced power situation and kept repeating the national policies that 
emphasised inequality in the society. When injustice and unbalanced power 
had accumulated to a certain level, along with some incidents as triggers, 
violence finally erupted and thus the conflict was no longer hidden. 
Awareness of the conflict became high and confrontation among conflicting 
parties was unavoidable.833  
The confrontation involved a series of violent and non-violent 
mechanisms or a combination of both. 834  After some factors were 
stimulated, violence erupted in the southernmost provinces in 2004. The 
strategy of resolving the conflict had been changed to suit the stage of 
conflict. In Quadrant 3, negotiation is one of the peacebuilding tools to keep 
power in balance during the unstable situation. The present situation in the 
deep south is between Quadrant 2 and 3 which are the stages of violent 
confrontation that have happened and where the state is now attempting to 
resolve the conflict. If the reconciliation between conflicting parties is 
successful, then peace in the community will be achieved. This process 
takes a long time and patience will be required together with greater efforts; 
however, the outcome is worth the time and effort. In the future, it is hoped 
                                            
832 Lederach, Building Peace, 64. 
833 Ibid., 65. 
834 Ibid. 
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that the violence in this area will end and finally sustainable peace will be 
achieved.835  
 According to the leadership pyramid developed by Lederach (see 
figure 6.2 in Chapter 6, page 174), different approaches in building peace 
and types of actors can affect the conflict differently. 836  To create a 
sustainable peace, the grassroots leadership should lead the role in 
peacebuilding. Unfortunately, in Thailand, only top level leaders in the 
leadership pyramid have definite power and the leading role in making 
decisions concerning resolving the conflict. Normally, the top leadership 
focuses on stopping physical violence and achieving an official ceasefire 
agreement. These attempts can only achieve a negative peace; not a lasting 
positive peace. 
Today, most leaders of civil society groups acting in the deep south 
are considered to be middle-range leadership. Many civil society actors play 
leading roles and they receive high respect in the communities such as 
religious leaders, ethnic leaders, notable scholars and renowned NGO 
leaders. These actors are well educated and have a vital role in growing 
public awareness and creating sustainable peace in their communities.  
 
9.3 The Roles of Civil Society in Attempting to Build Peace in the Deep 
South 
More than 300 civil society groups attempting to build peace can be 
found in this region.837 Each group normally plays more than one role and 
their activities are varied depending on the target groups and their group’s 
purposes. 
In Chapter 6, the roles of civil society groups involved in 
peacebuilding were classified into eight categories including that of being 
security protector, representative, bridge-builder, relief worker, monitoring 
observer, academic, public communicator and peace-builder. The roles of 
                                            
835 Ibid. 
836 Peacebuilding Initiative, “Introduction to Peacebuilding”. 
837 Respondent 13 and Deep South Watch, Website (accessed 4 January 2012). 
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civil society groups involved in attempting to build peace in the south can 
be classified and analysed based on the above categories. 
9.3.1 Security Protector 
The role of civil society groups as a security protector is hardly found 
in these provinces. Civil society groups dealing with the southern conflict 
are not strong enough to create a safe zone to protect themselves. State 
security agencies remain key actors in protecting civilians from harm. 
According to ‘Ryan’s Peacebuilding Model’, (see figure 2.4 in Chapter 2, 
page 49) military and police forces are in charge as peacekeepers who have 
to deal directly with conflicting parties.838 However, some volunteer groups 
were initiated by the state for security reasons. There was an attempt to 
form groups of volunteers for security protection in their village called ‘civil 
defence volunteers’. As these groups were initiated by the state, they have 
to be under the control of the Royal Thai Army. The government approved 
the Interior Ministry to recruit a number of civil defence volunteers to help 
maintain peace and security in the southernmost region. These volunteers 
have been accepted well by the locals because they are selected from local 
communities. The total number of volunteers available is still not sufficient, 
although the government has tried to boost their numbers by increasing their 
daily wage.839 Moreover, the safety of civil defence volunteers is an issue to 
be concerned about since they have been targeted by insurgent groups. 
Although the state’s officials, including civil defence volunteers, are the 
general targets of insurgent groups, 2013 was the first year that the number 
of dead state officials was very high compared with civilian deaths.840 
9.3.2 Representative 
The Malay ethnic groups in the southernmost provinces have a 
unique identity which is different from the majority of the country in terms of 
religion, culture and language. Moreover, these provinces are located in the 
                                            
838 Ryan, Ethic Conflict, 52. 
839 Thai Visa Forum, “Thailand’s Deep South Lacks Civil Defence Volunteers,” 23 March 
2012, http://www.thaivisa.com/forum/topic/542801-thailands-deep-south-lacks-civil-
defence-volunteers/ (accessed 16 September 2013). 
840 Isra News Agency, “Government Officers are the Main Target of the Militant Groups,” 
14 September 2013, http://www.isranews.org/ south-news/stat-history/item/23791-1.html 
(accessed 29 December 2013) [in Thai]. 
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deep south which is very far from the central government. This has created 
a physical and emotional distance between people in the southernmost 
region and the capital, Bangkok. Because of this distance, it made the locals 
in the south distrust government authorities and state officials. To pass on 
their matters to the central government, representatives who understand the 
local language and culture are needed.  
One obstacle that the government faces is local people refusing to 
give them any information about insurgent groups. Lack of accurate data 
and news from insiders makes it difficult for the state security authorities to 
encounter the insurgent groups and handle the conflict. The role of civil 
society as a representative of the ethnic groups is necessary as local people 
hope that civil society groups can be their representatives who will report 
the facts and forward their needs to the government.  
Civil society groups involved in the southern conflict have been 
classified into various categories which represent the specific needs of each 
group such as women, youth, academic and religious groups. Having data 
from these representatives is also very useful when the government 
authorities want to get some opinion or information from the grassroots. This 
role of civil society is also to support a bottom-up approach for information 
processing which is considered as one of the most important factors to build 
peace in the conflict in the south because it is this sort of approach which 
enables the government to get information about the grassroots’ needs. 
9.3.3 Bridge-builder 
As the gap between the government and local people in the 
southernmost provinces is very large, civil society groups can act as a 
bridge which will bring them closer to each other. Based on my fieldwork 
and other relevant articles, it was seen that the most significant role of civil 
society in attempting to create peace is that of bridge-builder.  
To solve this conflict, it is important to first understand each other 
because some of the root causes are differences in religion, culture, identity 
and ways of life. Trying to create a better understanding is the first step in 
showing sincerity to solve the problem. Compromises between the state and 
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local people may happen if they have more opportunities to talk and reveal 
what both sides want.  
As the insurgent and militant groups in these provinces operate in 
secrecy, the state has found it difficult to identify who is involved in violent 
operations or is a member of an insurgent group. People are scared to 
speak out because they are afraid of becoming a target of the state or 
militant groups. If they agree with the insurgents’ ideas, their names would 
appear on the military’s blacklist. On the other hand, if they help the state to 
spy on insurgent groups, they could be harmed by the militants. The 
significant role of civil society groups today is to create a link for people to 
communicate and negotiate among each other and with the state 
authorities. This is a safe environment where local people can openly 
express their feelings, share their opinions and voice their expectations from 
the state. The civil society sector becomes a channel for people to gather 
and work for their community. State security authorities also agree on the 
importance of the role of civil society networks, especially as a mediator that 
has created a better understanding and strengthened trust among the 
conflicting parties.841  
Another task of the bridge-builder is to create a common space for 
all relevant parties to exchange their experiences and share knowledge that 
might be useful for finding a solution. In September 2012, the ‘Patani Peace 
Process (PPP)’ was officially formed as a model that aims to foster 
cooperation among civil society groups, scholars, the media and research 
institutions as well as state agencies.842 The PPP has created the ‘Insider 
Peacebuilders Platform’ whose participants are an informal group of 
respected Thais of various backgrounds and political affiliations who share 
a desire to bring peace back to this region.843 
                                            
841 Parinya Chaidilok, “Civil Society and the Problems of the Southern Border Provinces,” 
Yuthagot Journal 118 no. 3 (April-June 2010): 26. [in Thai]. 
842 Arida Samoh, “Patani Peace Process,” Deep South Journalism School, 25  
August 2012. http://www.deepsouthwatch.org/dsj/3484 (accessed 12 October 2013) [in 
Thai]. 
843 Sol Iglesias, “The Role of Civil Society in Peacebuilding: Southeast Asia in Focus,” 
Paper for Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) Meeting at Brussels, 7 March 2013, 7. 
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9.3.4 Relief Worker  
The relief work role of the civil society sector seems very important 
in a country whose government often fails to respond to its people’s needs 
promptly. Relief work in the south can be divided into two types. The first is 
the short-term relief work which means money, food, or shelter which can 
help the conflict-affected victims immediately. The second type is long-term 
relief work which aims to improve the quality of the victims’ normal routine 
in the long-run such as providing accommodation, career opportunities and 
moral support. 
In the ongoing violence, a number of civilians have been killed and 
injured; women have been widowed and children have become orphaned. 
To provide help to the victims as soon as possible, many civil society groups 
have attempted to do this job by visiting injured people and distributing 
money to those victims and their families. Although it is important for 
providing urgent assistance to the victims, giving money away is not a 
sustainable solution. Thus, some civil society groups started projects which 
helped the locals in the long-term such as giving them careers or 
accommodation. The DSRR initiated a project for building houses for 
disabled victims of the violence through cooperation with the military 
together with local administrative organisations.844 Besides getting houses 
for victims, the project created an atmosphere of cooperation among civil 
society members, state officials and villagers. 
Also, there are some economic and multi-purpose civil society 
groups involved in the long-term relief work. Although economic focused 
civil society groups do not have a significant role in creating peace, they 
help in terms of providing knowledge, skills and funding for careers. They 
have created some projects which aim to improve the economic situation in 
the conflict region. The ‘Rice Farming Model Project’ of the Provincial of 
Commerce is one example that aims to increase the potential of agricultural 
productivity. The project ‘Industrial Estate for Halal Food Centre’ was 
initiated by the government in the Panarae district, Pattani province to 
motivate investors and to create jobs in this area. The Pattani Chamber of 
                                            
844 Respondent 7. 
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Commerce was one of the organisations assigned to operate the project. 
Although the project was disrupted by resistance and disturbance from 
insurgent groups, it has been continuing. 845  The Civil Organisation for 
Peace and Sustainable Economy of Narathiwat has a mission to publicise 
knowledge in using non-chemical fertilisers and agriculture based on the 
philosophy of a sufficiency economy.846 Multi-purpose civil society groups 
such as the Sukaew Foundation also help local farmers increase the value 
of goat farming. Since the upsurge of insurgency, the economy in this region 
has become flat. Many of these projects are based on the King’s philosophy 
of a sufficiency economy and aim to increase income for the poor local 
people and to raise the quality of life of people in the deep south. 
Relief work seems very popular among the civil society groups in this 
region because it is not a complicated task and is able to get funded easily. 
Therefore, relief work was seen as an opportunity for fake civil society 
groups to gain benefits for themselves. However, there are many civil 
society groups which genuinely want to help people affected by the violent 
conflict as the state has failed to do this duty. Thus, a civil society group with 
the role of relief worker needs more continuity and sincerity to prove their 
genuine mission. It was realised that money is not the only thing victims 
want, but also encouragement. Most groups are concerned only with 
distributing money, but mind healing as well as being supportive are also 
important for victims who have lost their loved ones.  
9.3.5 Monitoring Observer 
Many civil society groups in the media and academic categories play 
a major role as monitoring observers. Their main task is to collect data which 
are relevant to the conflict. There have been some attempts to keep 
statistics and data on deaths and casualties from the unrest. The renowned 
and trustworthy civil society groups recording such statistics are the DSW 
and DSCC. Their data have been used widely by researchers, media and 
especially international organisations. Based on the researcher’s 
                                            
845 Respondent 10. 
846 Respondent 2, Interview. Civil Organisation for Peace and Sustainable Economic of 
Narathiwat. 20 June 2012. 
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experience working with an international agency, this is because the data 
from non-government organisations is believed to be impartial and non-
biased. The data from the civil society groups based on academics’ 
knowledge is considered as especially reliable as people in academic 
networks are highly respected by Thai society. 
Moreover, these civil society groups have monitored the most 
important issues concerning the conflict. The latest news about the conflict, 
such as violent incidents, government policies or special laws used in these 
regions, are normally posted and shared on their websites. This online 
database is very useful for people who live in the conflict area and outsiders 
who are interested in this conflict. Some civil society groups have developed 
the design of data presentation such as graphs and tables classified in 
various ways to make it more interesting and easier for users. The influx of 
assistance from various organisations into these provinces has created the 
problem of overlapping or missing data. The DSCC tried to solve these 
problems by creating a checklist programme for victims’ assistance. This 
checklist helps to identify if the victims have been assisted by these 
organisations or not. This ensures that all victims have been helped.847  
The relevant data monitored by these civil society groups is very 
useful for the government as it was used as an input for the policy making 
process. This is because these civil society groups work very close to the 
grassroots with their main purpose being to help victims of the conflict. For 
example, the network of civil society supported by the Asia Foundation 
hosted 39 dialogues (from January 2010 to December 2011) covering the 
area of three southernmost provinces and more than 1,455 people 
participated to find out the real situation in these southernmost provinces. 
They came up with four important problems in this area including: 1) security 
and safety in daily life; 2) quality and local needs in education; 3) confidence 
of local people in the justice process; and 4) the spread of drugs in the 
community. They also brainstormed for solutions at the end of the 
                                            
847 Respondent 16. 
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dialogue.848 This data is useful for the government because it shows the 
actual problems in this region and how the locals want it to be resolved. 
9.3.6 Academic 
In the southern conflict, scholars and lecturers in universities in this 
region play a leading role in conveying knowledge about peace studies. It is 
very significant for researchers and lecturers in universities to play a main 
part in doing some research on conflict resolution. A number of universities 
in the south and other parts of the country opened schools or faculties for 
Peace Studies to help promote non-violent solutions. They, however, have 
been short-staffed and are looking for some lecturers who have graduated 
from and specialised in this specific field. Today, the universities are trying 
to send their lecturers for further degrees in Peace Studies overseas.  
A number of researches concerning the southern conflict have been 
produced by students and scholars from many universities and institutions 
on various topics. They offered some alternative political solutions for the 
southern crisis. In the past, an autonomous solution was banned from being 
discussed publicly because it went against the Constitution of the Kingdom 
of Thailand B.E. 2550, Section 1: “Thailand is one and indivisible 
Kingdom”.849 As a result of the growth in the civil society sector, this solution 
is now widely acceptable to be discussed publicly. Some new political 
alternatives were suggested by civil society networks to the relevant state 
authorities and were discussed widely in public. In 2008, a group of Prince 
of Songkla University researchers funded by an academic civil society 
group, the Mahidol University’s Research Center for Peacebuilding, 850 
proposed the creation of a new Ministry to oversee the administration of the 
southernmost region. The idea of autonomy and special forms of 
administration, however, has not been totally agreed to by the government 
and state security authorities. Also, the idea that special laws in the area 
should be terminated has not been agreed to by the security forces, as 
                                            
848 Civil Network for Peace in Southern Border, Voices from Villages (Bangkok: The Asia 
Foundation, 2012), 17. [orginal in Thai]. 
849 Duncan McCargo, Mapping National Anxieties: Thailand’s Southern Conflict 
(Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2012), 134. 
850 Today, the name was changed to ‘Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies’. 
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discussed in Chapter 4. These academic civil society networks have held a 
series of seminars and workshops to brainstorm with scholars who are 
experts in Peace Studies, not only in Thailand, but also from leading 
overseas institutions. The ‘Roadmap for Peace’851 was a first-step concrete 
outcome from brainstorming by local civil society networks led by an 
academic group. This roadmap aims to help the peace process move 
towards the right end which is sustainable peace without using violent 
means and within a suggested specified timeframe.852 
Moreover, this academic role includes work that targets youth. Many 
civil society groups see the younger generation as a key actor to keep 
lasting peace in the future, although this process will take a long time for the 
outcome to be seen. The idea of bringing youths from both Muslim and 
Buddhist communities to do activities together, such as camping, is very 
good because one of the root causes of the conflict is distrust and 
misunderstanding between cultures. The general schooling system has 
separated the children from the two religions, so they do not have much 
chance to make friends and to learn about different cultures. When 
friendships have bonded, conflict is hardly likely to happen because they 
will live together with an understanding of social diversity. These civil society 
groups have hosted some projects which will help the growth in the 
volunteering spirit in the next generations.  
Civil society’s role in the academic sector also covers other 
professional areas such as law and human rights. A group of lawyers who 
work in civil society groups (e.g. MAC) have been working on promoting the 
                                            
851 The ‘Roadmap for Peace’ was one of the series of Conflict Analysis Workshops, led by 
Asst. Prof. Dr. Srisompob Jitpiromsri, Director of CSCD and DSW, and Dr. Norbert 
Ropers, Director of Berghof Foundation for Peace Support gGmbH. The Conflict Analysis 
Workshop intends to bring together 25-30 local people (Muslims and Buddhists), religious 
leaders, government officials, and representatives from civil society and peace institutes 
to analyze conflicts in the three southern border provinces based on the following steps:  
1. To build knowledge on conflict analysis and peace dialogues based on global conflict 
situations; 
2. To integrate global conflict analysis methodologies into the situations of the three 
southern border provinces; and 
3. To create a common document to be used as a guideline for conflict resolution 
partners. Source: UNDP Thailand Country Office, Southern Thailand Empowerment and 
Participation (STEP), Annual Report 2012, 27. 
852 Deep South Watch, “Roadmap for Peace and Role of the Thrid Sector,” http://www. 
deepsouthwatch.org/node/4314 (accessed 14 September 2013). [in Thai]. 
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judicial process and have resisted using special laws in the southernmost 
provinces. They also help and give consultation to the locals, especially 
Muslims, who do not have legal knowledge or were threatened by the state.  
9.3.7 Public Communicator 
As it is generally believed that in conflicts who has control of the 
media will win the war, it means that the role of public communicator is 
particularly important. Today, channels for communication are various and 
convenient. Civil society groups in the media category are very efficient in 
distributing news about the southern conflict. There are many choices for 
civil society groups to communicate with the public such as websites, radio 
programmes, social networks (e.g. Facebook) and hardcopy documents 
(e.g. magazines and newsletters). Although the government has considered 
the southern conflict as an internal matter, the violence in this area has been 
monitored by other countries and international organisations.  
The civil society sector plays an important role in presenting accurate 
and non-biased news to the world. These civil society groups, such as DSW, 
have been widely trusted because they have been working in this area for 
a long time and their members are from various professional fields such as 
academia and the media. Being watched by outsiders makes the 
government careful in implementing any hardline measures or an unjust 
policy which might affect human rights and create discrimination. Many civil 
society groups try to find out a resolution for the southern conflict from 
various stakeholders, but the next step of publicising is also necessary. This 
role of civil society will help in communicating and raising agendas to the 
public by using various types of media. Civil society groups in this category 
also play a role in raising some agendas such as using political ideas to 
resolve the conflict. 
Civil society groups in the media category should work strongly to 
create a better understanding about the real situation in the deep south for 
people in other parts of the country and international networks. Media civil 
society groups might have been used by the conflicting parties to report 
biased news or show only one side of the situation which would be 
advantageous for them. To gain more support from the local people, 
 263 
 
insurgent groups could use the media to inflame tensions between the 
locals and state officials. There were some violent cases reported by media 
civil society groups which made people believe that some crimes were 
committed by state officials. In some cases, it was reported that the 
suspects who killed Muslim villagers were wearing military uniforms 
although it had not been proved whether this was true or not. As being a 
public communicator is an important role for the civil society sector, these 
groups should make an effort to publicise non-biased news of the conflict 
and not be influenced by any parties.  
Besides news of the violence, these civil society groups should be 
able to reflect other positive issues such as the beautiful natural 
environment and unique local culture which the researcher found only a few 
of them were doing. One of them is the Sukaew Foundation which has tried 
to promote local culture by organising some activities for youths. Creating a 
better understanding about the real situation in the deep south is necessary 
in order to attract outsiders to travel to, and to invest in, these provinces 
again. This would help promote tourism and the local economy in the south 
as poverty is one of the causes of the conflict.  
Furthermore, civil society groups in the women’s category also have 
roles in communicating the stories and experiences of women in the conflict 
area such as the Civic Women’s Network for Peace in the Deep South that 
has their own radio programme. These experiences shared on the 
programme will help outsiders understand the facts and how people in the 
conflict area feel. They also have their programme in Bahasa Melayu which 
is very advantageous because many local people in the southernmost area 
cannot understand central Thai fluently. 
9.3.8 Peace-builder 
The peace-builder role refers to civil society’s direct involvement in 
the peace process. In some countries, civil society groups play a main role 
in initiating peace agreements; unfortunately, in the southernmost provinces 
of Thailand, the direct role of the civil society sector in creating peace in 
 264 
 
their community is hardly found. Even the official peace dialogues 853 
between the representatives of the Thai government and BRN insurgent 
group have just been highlighted in the news almost a decade after the 
upsurge of the violence. 
In the past, the idea to expand the scope of the participants in the 
peace talks was explored by a group of Thai academics. In 2011, the peace 
dialogues between the representatives of the Thai government and the 
leaders of a militant group - PULO - in Geneva permitted local civil society 
leaders to take part in the discussion. Muslim and Buddhist leaders from the 
three southernmost provinces were invited to attend several rounds of 
meetings. This concept was to expand a partnership in the peacebuilding 
process; however, this idea did not go any further after the government 
dissolved the parliament. The new government shifted the authority that was 
in charge of negotiations with insurgent groups and changed the group of 
people who used to deal with the peace dialogues.854 In the researcher’s 
view, this made it difficult for other parties involved in the process of 
peacebuilding because working with this conflict needs a degree of trust. It 
is not a good idea when central authorities keep changing the officials in 
charge of the peace process as good relations need time to develop. After 
that, the peace dialogues faded from the Thai news until the official 
announcement of a peace dialogue between the Thai authorities and one 
of the main insurgent organisations early in 2013.  
Although the peace dialogue held in the capital of Malaysia in 
February 2013 is not the first attempt to negotiate for peace, it is considered 
as the first ever official talks. Unfortunately, the idea of including the civil 
society sector in a formal peace negotiation process has never materialised 
in the history of the Thai state’s dealing with insurgent groups.855 The civil 
society sector has always been denied access to any formal negotiations or 
peace dialogues which have normally been reserved for the state’s actors 
                                            
853 The term ‘peace dialogue’ was used more than ‘peace negotiation’ because peace 
dialogue sounds less threatening than negotiation and it was hoped that the military 
would go along with the idea of a less structured approach and concept. Source: Don 
Pathan, “Conflict Management and Resolution in Asia: The Role of Civil Societies in 
Thailand’s Deep South,” Occasional Paper no. 18 (Asia Foundation, 2012), 6. 
854 Pathan, “Conflict Management,” 7. 
855 Ibid., 6. 
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only. During a series of these formal dialogues, the civil society sector can 
only observe and criticise this matter on their networks.  
It is, however, a good sign that the peace process has been opened 
to the public as in the past the government was not keen on negotiations 
and always had these peace talks secretly. If civil society networks in 
Thailand become stronger, which needs more experiences and time, they 
could be able to negotiate some matters concerning conflict resolution with 
the government in the future. 
 
9.4 The Efficacy of Civil Society 
Nationally, Thailand has one of the largest civil society communities 
in Southeast Asia. Bangkok is a regional centre for several inter-
governmental agencies like the UN, and also hosts hundreds of regional 
NGOs. However, there seems to be limited mobilisation among local civil 
society leaders to be involved in resolving the conflict in the deep south.856 
The following sections will examine those factors affecting the civil society 
sector and attempt to answer the question of how efficient civil society 
groups are at attempting to build peace in the conflict in the southern 
provinces.  
To measure efficacy sounds complicated as it is an abstract concept, 
not a concrete fact. Nevertheless, there are some tools from organisational 
and strategic management theory that can be used to find the answer. As 
already described in Chapter 3, the main concept of SWOT Analysis is to 
study both internal and external factors that affect organisations. The SWOT 
Analysis was applied in the assessment of the efficacy of civil society groups 
dealing with building peace in the ethno-religious conflict. This SWOT 
Analysis helps to identify the present status of the civil society sector and 
the ways to enhance the civil society sector’s potential which could be part 
of the solution to the conflict. 
                                            
856 Iglesias, “The Role,” 7. 
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9.4.1 Internal Factors  
To assess the internal factors, the 7S Model of McKinsey was 
applied. The seven ‘S’s in this model refer to seven factors that start with 
the letter ‘S’: Strategy, Structure, Systems, Shared values, Style, Staff and 
Skills.857  
Strengths:  
1) Membership (Strategy)  
Most civil society groups do not have membership requirements. The 
civil society groups are usually open to all members who are interested in 
the same issues and want to volunteer for the community. There is no 
discrimination among religions or ethnicities to join their groups’ activities. 
This makes it easy to expand the networks of the civil society sector. It was 
agreed that the southern conflict is the whole country’s problem as the 
conflict is very dynamic. Thus, it is advantageous for civil society groups if 
they can be supported by a large number of people, especially the 
grassroots. 
2) Location (Strategy) 
One attribute that civil society groups need to have is a venue which 
they can use as an office, as a base for contact, and for hosting activities. 
Fortunately, locations are one of the advantages for the civil society groups 
in the south. According to the experience from the fieldtrip, many groups 
have their office location based in the town area which is easy for people to 
visit. However, most offices are rented so they could face some budgeting 
problems and uncertainty in the long-term. An example of a civil society 
group which has a large compound in a natural environment is the Sukaew 
Foundation. Their venue is very suitable for hosting activities such as youth 
camping and seminars.  
3) Organisational Structure (Structure) 
As the civil society sector was formed by a small group of people, 
their organisational structure is normally simple and functional. There is no 
hierarchy or a long chain of command. They normally have to deal only with 
their financial sources and the locals. Thus, this structure is very suitable for 
                                            
857 Toolshero, 7S Framework (McKinsey) (accessed 9 October 2013). 
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an unstable environment because it is faster and easier to make decisions 
and to manage their work. These factors make most civil society groups 
very independent and flexible. However, they are able to discuss some 
matters if they need to with experienced seniors who are their group’s 
consultants. 
4) Comprehensive Database (System)  
Good planning should be based on accurate data and reliable 
information. One of the significant works of civil society groups is collecting 
data on the conflict including the tolls of violent incidents (i.e. deaths and 
casualties). The databases were designed for people who are interested 
and want to apply the data in their work. It will be very useful if civil society 
groups can use the information from these databases to plan for their 
activities that could help in resolving the conflict. For example, the trend of 
deaths and casualties would be able to identify which groups of victims are 
the most affected by the conflict. This data would help civil society groups 
to plan for their future target groups or relevant projects. 
5) Financial Status (System)  
Most civil society groups found that it is not difficult to find the short-
term, or project-based funding for their activities. This is interesting because 
it seems like none of the civil society groups are facing any financial 
problems. Most civil society groups attempting to build peace in this conflict 
are in a healthy financial status. They have been financially well supported 
from various sources including the government, private sector, embassies, 
inter-governmental agencies and international organisations.  
Over the period 2004 to 2014, some international donor programmes 
have increasingly focused on southern Thailand. The five largest foreign 
funding sources addressing the southern area are UNICEF, USAID, UNDP, 
the World Bank, and the EU. Many of these agencies aim to promote policy 
change and institutional transformation, for example, addressing long-term 
policy in the education system in the southern provinces (e.g. improving the 
quality of teachers in local Muslim schools) or promoting debate over 
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options for establishing some political authority (e.g. special autonomous 
authority).858  
6) Common Space (Shared values) 
The civil society sector has created a common space which is safe 
and independent for people from various networks to share and exchange 
their ideas as well as experiences without political and legal interference. In 
the past, people did not want to share their opinions about the southern 
conflict because they were scared of being targeted by militant groups or 
government authorities or not sure if their thoughts could be against the laws 
which might put them in trouble. Therefore, people kept their mouths shut 
and this made it even harder for the government to resolve the conflict 
because they did not know what the locals wanted. Initially, some ideas 
were first raised in civil society networks, but today those issues are widely 
discussed at the national level such as the idea of a special autonomous 
area. 
7) Diversity (Shared values) 
There are a variety of civil society groups dealing with building peace 
in the southern conflict. This makes it very advantageous because the wide 
scope of the civil society sector can cover all types of work needed for 
resolving the conflict such as human rights, academic and media. Moreover, 
civil society groups aim to help a variety of target groups without 
discrimination such as youth and women. All victims, no matter what their 
religions, are their target groups which make people feel equal.  
8) Leadership (Style) 
Most leaders of civil society groups have unique personality traits and 
are respected in the community. Leaders of civil society group active in the 
south have broad characteristics including education up to a bachelor’s 
degree, active in this area for long time, academic expertise, and are 
renowned in the local community or even in Thai society. They have shown 
initiative and played a significant leading role in volunteering for 
communities since they were university students. This is the strength of civil 
                                            
858 Adam Burke, Pauline Tweedie, and Ora-orn Poocharoen, The Contested Corners of 
Asia: Subnational Conflict and International Development Assistance, (Asia Foundation, 
2013), 43. 
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society groups because many of their leaders are originally locals who have 
had the volunteering spirit for quite some time. 
9) Integration of Tasks (Skill) 
It is common to find civil society groups that combine more than one 
speciality to make their group work more efficiently, for example, a civil 
society group that combines academic and media skills together so that they 
can publicise their research work more conveniently. At the same time this 
will make data from that group have reliable supportive sources as they are 
based on research work.859 Another example is when a civil society group 
combine their professional skills, like maths and statistics, with their relief 
task to help their group work more efficiently. 860  The database about 
conflict-affected victims created by using statistical skills is very useful 
because it helps relevant organisations to reach all the victims faster. It also 
could help with the future planning for relief work as the data is more 
accurate and easier to access. 
Weaknesses: 
1) Various Goals (Strategy) 
A number of civil society groups come from many places with 
different purposes. People who are from outside the conflict area might have 
different perspectives on resolving this conflict from the local civil society 
groups who understand local culture and root causes better. In particular, 
the civil society groups which are mainly supported by international sources 
face more difficulties. The government is normally reluctant for them to 
receive aid from foreign organisations because they aim primarily to 
influence government policies or how the state operates in the conflict area, 
for example, supporting civil society advocacy bodies and promoting 
changes in education language policy.861  
Some civil society groups have different goals, but the target group 
is the same. These factors could make one group’s performances go 
against another group’s progress.862 
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861 Burke, Tweedie, and Poocharoen, The Contested Corners, 47. 
862 Evaluation Department of Development of Democracy, The Evaluation, 7. 
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2) Informal Structure (Structure) 
An informal organisational structure of a civil society group would be 
an advantage in terms of flexibility, but it could be an obstacle if it is not 
functional. Many civil society groups grow from time to time in this region, 
but only a few have registered with the government. Without registration, 
civil society groups hardly get supported by the government through, for 
example, tax exemption. This is why today many civil society groups have 
tried to register their groups with the government. As being registered is not 
compulsory for civil society groups, only approximately 15 per cent of them 
have been officially registered. One of the reasons that the number of 
registered groups is still low is that the groups’ organisational structure has 
not yet reached the government’s requirement as far as formal forms of 
administration such as reporting of incomes and expenses (which must be 
shown to the government authority) are concerned. 
3) Time Management (System) 
Members of civil society networks find it difficult to allocate and 
dedicate time for volunteering works in this area as some members are 
students and most staff already have full-time work such as lecturers in 
universities who have teaching responsibilities as their main duty. Moreover, 
it is also difficult to arrange for all group members to have a routine meeting 
together at the same time. Furthermore, seminars and conferences 
concerning conflict resolutions are normally held during working hours 
which makes it hard for members who have full-time jobs to participate in 
those events. 
4) Evaluation (System) 
Evaluation processes lack participation and cooperation among aid 
providers (i.e. international or government agencies), practitioners (i.e. civil 
society groups) and target groups (i.e. local people). Many civil society 
groups in the deep south do not realise the importance of evaluation or 
assessment of their performance, and ignore feedback from the local 
people. Therefore, the actual outcomes of their projects, which are very 
important, were ignored by the civil society. The civil society groups tend to 
focus more on how to write a report for funding sponsors to keep a steady 
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flow of financial support and to propose a new project for a new amount of 
money.  
5) Dishonesty (Shared values) 
It is unavoidable that the issue of corruption will be raised when 
money and benefit are involved.  There are people questioning how civil 
society groups manage their funds and if the money has been distributed to 
the victims equally or not. An influx of funding from overseas has attracted 
many people to work for relieving the conflict in these provinces which 
makes it difficult to prove those who are genuine or fake. Furthermore, 
distortion of information in order to get funded by foreign donors was found 
in some civil society groups, especially in the human rights category. They 
normally publicise the cases of human rights violations by government 
officials or present only one negative side of the situation in order to request 
financial aid from international sources. 863  Unfortunately, money has 
gradually changed the mindset of people who work in the civil society sector. 
They have changed from working based on a volunteering spirit to being 
money-centred. 
6) Buddhist Minority (Shared values) 
It was noticeable that the government has focused more on trying to 
reach out to Malays Muslims in this area through some policies such as 
offering special university entrance requirements for the local students and 
increasing local recruitment into some government agencies. Furthermore, 
most local civil society groups were formed by Muslims rather than 
Buddhists. Today, it is evident that civil society networks in the region mostly 
involve the Muslim community. To keep the balance in a diverse society, 
the government should also pay attention to the minority in these provinces 
and Buddhist civil society groups should be encouraged to play more roles 
in the peacebuilding process as well.  
7) Human Resources (Staff) 
One of the most important weaknesses is that people working in the 
civil society sector lack the required skills (i.e. leadership, communication, 
                                            
863 Narater2001, “The Purposes of Civil Society in the Deep South,” 30 September 2013, 
http://narater2010.blogspot.co.nz/2013/09/blog-post_30.html (accessed 25 January 
2014). 
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and management), higher education degrees or qualifications. Not many 
Thai scholars and university lecturers have graduated majoring in Peace 
Studies. Therefore, famous scholars from overseas were invited to work 
with Thai academics concerning the conflict in the south. Civil society 
networks need more people from the new generation to volunteer in 
resolving the problems in their community. It is not easy to find young, smart 
people who want to commit themselves to volunteering work because 
working in civil society networks has less motivation, no career paths and 
low incomes. Thus, members of the networks need to be genuine and to 
have a spirit of volunteering; not be money-centred.  
9.4.2 External Factors 
PEST Analysis describes a framework of environmental factors used 
in strategic management. The analysis includes Political, Economic, Social 
and Technological factors which are used for analysing external 
environmental factors.864  
Opportunities: 
1) Supported by Government (Political) 
The activities of the civil society sector usually aim to expand 
democracy, support decentralisation, and improve the justice system in this 
problematic region. As these aims are considered good criteria for a 
democratic country to have, many projects initiated by the civil society 
sector have been supported and financially sponsored by the government. 
Normally, the government allocates some amounts from its annual budget 
for supporting civil society activities and building peace in the conflict in the 
south. This proportion would be determined by the strategies in the National 
Plan depending on the government and the circumstances at that time. For 
example, in the fiscal year 2006, the government allocated 1.4 per cent of 
the total expenditure for the strategy of promoting democracy and the civil 
society sector. Later, in the fiscal year 2009, the government started to have 
a specific plan for conflict resolution in the deep south under the strategy of 
                                            
864 Neil Kokemuller, “Relationships between PEST and SWOT,” http://smallbusiness. 
chron.com/relationships-between-pest-swot-10083.html (accessed 9 October 2013). 
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restoring the confidence of the country with 6.6 per cent of the total 
expenditure approved for this strategy.865  
2) Relationship with International Organisations (Social and 
Economic) 
It was found that a number of civil society groups have a good 
relationship with many international organisations including embassies and 
foreign civil society groups. They have been cooperating in exchanging 
experiences and skills such as attending training courses, doing some 
fieldwork and inviting guest speakers. Exchanging knowledge and sharing 
experiences between local civil society groups and international groups are 
useful for them because this knowledge might be able to be adapted for 
conflict solution in the southernmost provinces. One example is cooperation 
between two Thai civil society groups - DSRR together with Volunteer 
Graduate Group and Indonesia - in exchanging knowledge about 
community development between Aceh and Takbai district of Narathiwat 
and Tepa district of Songkhla in a project called ‘Sister Villages’. The 
concept of this project is to create a network of towns helping each other 
when it is needed. The project includes matters of relief activities after the 
Tsunami of 2004 and insurgent violence, agriculture and community health 
development.866 The above-mentioned types of cooperation are considered 
social opportunities for civil society which can strengthen their network at 
an international level.  
In terms of financial support, the ethno-religious conflict in the deep 
south has attracted interest from many international civil society groups and 
inter-governmental organisations. Although the Thai government has tried 
to keep the conflict as a domestic issue, a huge amount of funding has been 
allocated to civil society groups dealing with this conflict.  
3) Public Participation (Social) 
It is generally believed that the grassroots are the most important 
factor for conflicting parties that want to win the war. It was apparent that 
                                            
865 Bureau of the Budget, Website, http://www.bb.go.th/bbweb/?page_id=6039 (accessed 
3 January 2014). 
866 Deep South Relief and Reconciliation Foundation, Website, http://www.dsrrfoundation. 
org/download/SummaryReportDSRR2010.pdf (accessed 3 January 2014). 
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the relationship between local people and the civil society sector is closer 
than with the government. They have more opportunities to interact and 
work together. As the locals are in a situation in which they cannot trust any 
parties, people seem to give civil society groups their hope to bring peace 
back to this region. Therefore, civil society groups have received good 
responses and feedback from local people because they have come to 
appreciate the genuine desire of civil society groups to create projects and 
activities which will be advantageous and bring peace back to the 
community.  
4) Cooperation among Civil Society Networks (Social) 
Since the upsurge of violence, hundreds of civil society groups can 
be found in this area. Although some groups see each other as competitors 
for finding financial sources, during a crisis most of them will gather and 
work together very well. There was a successful attempt to foster 
cooperation among civil society groups with the establishment of the ‘Civil 
Society Council of Southernmost Thailand’ which comprised more than 
twenty civil society groups working together. Furthermore, there is 
cooperation among civil society networks to find a conflict solution by 
hosting dialogues which invite the conflict victims and relevant parties for 
brainstorming. This dialogue aims to reflect the actual needs of local people 
and to achieve a common agreement.867 
5) Online Media (Technology) 
The internet has become one of the necessities of daily life and today 
social networks have a huge influence on Thai society. Most civil society 
groups have their websites to promote their background, mission, activities, 
group structure, sponsors, how to contribute to the groups, and contact 
details. Some civil society groups have used the social network channel 
widely to publicise their groups which is quite effective, especially to youth 
target groups. Today, a social network, like Facebook, is very popular for 
almost all ages in Thai society. Many civil society groups use Facebook to 
promote their events, share photos of their activities, and keep in touch with 
their network’s members. This channel will be advantageous to share 
                                            
867 Civil Network for Peace in Southern Border. Voices from Villages, 14. 
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knowledge and expand the networks in the future. Moreover, online media 
is a tool that costs less, works faster, and affects the larger public.  
Threats: 
1) Safety Issue (Political) 
As being a member of an insurgent group involves extreme secrecy, 
it is very difficult to identify those who are involved in the insurgency. Militant 
members might be one of the villagers in the community. This makes it 
difficult for local people to trust each other. The villagers have to live in fear 
and an insecure atmosphere. Furthermore, people who work for civil society 
networks could be the target for militant groups while at the same time they 
can be seen by the government authority as suspects involved in insurgent 
incidents. Volunteers, like village-based mediators, for good reasons, prefer 
to remain discreet rather than present themselves openly as members of 
civil society willing to mediate.868 This safety issue obstructs the locals from 
participating in civil society networks as they fear for their life and property 
from being targeted by both the government and insurgent groups.  
2) Continuity of Government Policies (Political) 
It is common that a developing country like Thailand has an unstable 
political situation. Governments hardly complete their four-year term and a 
rotation of cabinet members could happen at any time. Each government 
has a different focus in its policy and has its own measures to deal with the 
insurgent problem. The government policies have an impact on civil society 
work as many of them have been supported by state authorities. Civil 
society groups are also affected by heads of government authorities as each 
leader has their own style of working, especially the government agencies 
that were assigned directly to resolve the conflict in the southernmost area 
such as SBPAC. Changing the leaders and policies makes it difficult for civil 
society groups to continue their work smoothly.  
3) Relationship with the State (Political) 
According to the history and culture of Thailand, it cannot be denied 
that some government authorities still see the civil society sector as a tool 
or servant of the state that works for funding from government. Furthermore, 
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people in the deep south have a bad attitude to government officials: for 
example, the government always uses violence against the local Muslims; 
state officials are narrow-minded; and the state sees itself as a ruling class. 
Therefore, an adversarial relationship between the state and some civil 
society groups remains a problem.  
Some government authorities have doubts about the purposes of civil 
society groups and even see some of them as an opposition, especially civil 
society groups that work for human rights and advocacy. This is because 
the government sees some civil society groups’ work as being to help 
insurgent groups. For example, the ‘Private Islamic Religious School 
Association’ tried to negotiate for helping a religious teacher of an Islamic 
school who was tortured by the police and charged for violating national 
security. In return, the government put the association on its insurgent 
supporter blacklist.869 Furthermore, some civil society groups which have 
experience working with government authorities have found it difficult 
because of strict regulations and formal rules that cause work to progress 
slowly.  
4) Private Sector (Economic) 
Cooperation between civil society and the private sector in building 
peace in this conflict is very rare. The private sector means entrepreneurs 
and the business sector that actually has the potential to support the 
activities of civil society groups. The reasons why it offers less support are 
that they give first priority to the profit of their business and some 
businessmen are afraid for their safety as their business could become the 
insurgents’ target. Examples of the business sector becoming an insurgent 
target are car bomb attacks at a Pattani hotel and arson attacks at car 
showrooms in this area.  
5) Funding Sources (Economic) 
Civil society groups should be independent for what they aim to do, 
but in reality most groups depend on external funding sources such as 
international organisations and government authorities. Moreover, a huge 
amount of funding aid has caused people in the civil society sector to 
                                            
869 Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, Civil Society and Peace Process (Bangkok: 
Chulalongkorn University, 2009), 27. [in Thai]. 
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become divided because they were competing with each other for 
sponsorship. A number of civil society groups relied on non-sustainable 
funding sources. Although they thought it is not difficult to find sponsorship, 
the flow of funds may be a problem. Many of the civil society groups in this 
region are financially supported by international organisations. These kinds 
of funds are normally only for a short-term and not stable. 
Moreover, money from the government is still not equally distributed 
to all civil society groups which need funds for their works. Some groups are 
facing difficulties in finding a long-term financial support. One of the reasons 
for this is that some groups are not good at writing a report which is 
considered as an important criteria in applying for funding.870  
6) External Civil Society (Social) 
It could be a real threat if people from outside the conflict wanted to 
get involved in conflict resolution just because they want to take advantage 
of the crisis to gain funding. For local civil society groups, the groups from 
outside the conflicting area could be seen as their competitors for funding 
sources. Furthermore, the outsiders hardly understand the culture and the 
real need of people who are in this area. They normally have their own style 
of working which might be different from the local culture. They often 
overlook the identity of the local people as they have experience working in 
other countries and they assume that the conflict circumstances would be 
the same in Thailand. These differences could create problems. Without full 
information, Thailand was seen by outsiders as having failed to handle the 
conflict situation.871 
9.4.3 Overall Status of the Civil Society Sector 
SWOT Analysis has helped to identify the internal and external 
factors that could increase the capabilities that enable civil society groups 
to perform well and the factors that might obstruct the progress of civil 
society groups from achieving their goal.  
Noticeably, some factors, such as state involvement, can have both 
advantages and disadvantages at the same time depending on the situation 
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and perspectives of each civil society group. For instance, some civil society 
groups view the government as an opportunity for sustainable funding 
sources while some groups have never relied on the state and have seen 
the state as a threat. 
Although the civil society sector has many strong factors that are an 
advantage, there are a number of weaknesses that cause concern. 
According to the 7S Model, civil society groups in the south have created 
two strengths of ‘Shared values’ including a common space and diversity. 
They have the flexible ‘Structure’ and efficient ‘System’ including a 
comprehensive database and healthy financial status. The significant 
strength of civil society today is also the unique ‘Style’ of leadership. 
However, the most significant weak internal factors are human resources 
and lack of time and these are the most vital factors to keep the civil society 
networks going.  
According to PEST Analysis of the external factors, civil society 
groups have good opportunities that support their activities in many ways. 
All four PEST elements provide significant opportunities for the civil society 
sector to grow. In terms of the ‘Political’ element, civil society groups have 
been encouraged well by the government with supportive policies and 
regulations. The ‘Economic’ factor offers very good opportunities for civil 
society groups in this region as they are financially well sponsored by 
international organisations. The locals and communities, as part of the 
‘Social’ element, are keen to participate in their projects and to share 
experiences. The last element, ‘Technology’, also provides more 
communication channels to enhance groups’ performances. Although there 
are more external factors that can be threats to a civil society dealing with 
the conflict, half of the threats are mainly caused by one external element 
which is the ‘Political’ factor.  
In conclusion, the status of the civil society sector dealing with the 
ethno-religious conflict in the deep south has the possibility to grow as it has 
a number of strong internal factors at the same time as there are many 
opportunities. It is, however, facing some threats from outside which are 
difficult to control, especially political and safety matters. Overall, people 
who are volunteering to help to resolve the southern conflict have evaluated 
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and rated their performances positively given civil society groups have 
limited resources in terms of time and staff.  
 
9.5 Recommendations to Make Civil Society Work More Efficiently 
 1) Human Resources 
 People who work in civil society networks need to have various 
knowledge and skills because the conflict is problematic and complicated. 
Leadership and communication are very important skills to bring about 
changes in this region so it is necessary to make sure that people in the civil 
society community have these skills. Multi-tasking staff are needed for civil 
society networks because this sort of work needs people who have a 
volunteering sprit and professional knowledge (e.g. law and human rights) 
together with various skills (e.g. communication and management).  
Furthermore, it will be very advantageous if the civil society members 
can communicate in Bahasa Melayu so they can access local people easily. 
A volunteering spirit and citizen awareness should be grown in the next 
generation from a young age. Civil society groups should be able to 
motivate more members who have various skills and specialities as today’s 
civil society covers many different professional areas. At the end, civil 
society should be able to convincingly agree how important it is for 
everybody to be part of the peacebuilding process. 
 2) Cooperation 
The civil society sector is an intermediate sphere so it needs to 
cooperate with other sectors, including the state, the private sector and the 
grassroots, at all levels: international, national, regional and local. A number 
of civil society groups involved in this conflict have similar purposes or target 
groups. It would be very useful if those civil society groups can share their 
goals, experiences or even resources. This is to create unity for all groups 
who aim for peace. Moreover, the peace process should identify the 
relevant issues found in each project: for example, one project might include 
economic and education development plans and the peace process should 
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identify how each plan links to the other.872 Cooperation will help to save the 
civil society sector’s limited resources including manpower, money and 
time. However, not all civil society groups have the same ideas and 
direction. It is not a good idea to force every group to think and lead in the 
same direction because it could prevent different ideas and initiatives 
emerging which may lead to conflict resolution. Each group should be able 
to work in their own way and find which parts of their plans could be pursued 
in cooperation with other civil society groups.  
 3) Strategy 
Civil society groups should have a clear vision and working plan 
because today’s conflict situation is dynamic. There are many factors 
affecting the performances of civil society groups. While some factors are 
controllable, many are not. Civil society groups should clearly identify their 
missions, objectives and plans for achieving their goals. Otherwise, 
members could be lost in direction and not sure what they are aiming for. 
To have a strategic plan, civil society groups have to assess if their internal 
and environmental factors are an advantage or a disadvantage and then try 
to determine a plan in order to achieve their groups’ goal.  
Having a peace roadmap initiated by the civil society sector is a 
useful idea. The roadmap should include a timeline showing the time period 
of peace activities, and the structure of the peace process together with the 
roles of the conflicting parties as well as other stakeholders such as the civil 
society sector.873 
 4) Relationship with Government and Formality 
 The civil society sector should maintain good relations with 
government agencies and register their groups with the relevant state 
authorities. At the same time, the government should also provide more 
opportunities for other sectors of society to be involved in finding a conflict 
solution. Both civil society and the government should determine a clear 
policy and plan to cooperate with each other. Civil society groups should 
increase their formality in terms of financial matters and performance 
                                            
872 Mark Tamthai, Thai Heritage Treasury, Website, http://heritage.mod.go.th/nation/ 
situation/sit2.htm (accessed 5 September 2013). 
873 Deep South Watch, “Roadmap for Peace.” 
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evaluation. Thus, they can organise their groups more systematically and 
professionally. Formality will raise the official standard and reliability for local 
civil society groups to be able to work at national or international levels. 
They should, however, retain the flexibility of the groups because it is 
suitable for making decisions in these uncertain circumstances.  
 5) Needs of the Locals 
Civil society groups should work based on the needs of local people. 
An ideal development plan should rely on a bottom-up approach so the 
outcomes will be able to fulfil the locals’ needs more than a plan that comes 
from the top down. There is a gap between the locals and the government 
so that the community leaders should play an important role to pass on the 
needs of villagers. This information will be used as an input for higher level 
leaders making the development plan. However, the central authorities have 
a problem trusting community leaders because they believe that some of 
them are involved in the violence. This is a reason why they do not try to 
involve community leaders in the drawing up of a plan.874  
People might think that money is a priority need for the locals, but 
moral support is also important. Civil society groups should try to find out 
what the locals’ actual needs are to ensure civil society is heading in the 
right direction. A network of civil society groups can try to initiate hosting 
some forums dealing with the peaceful solution of the conflict by gathering 
together some conflicting stakeholders. This can be one of the efficient 
activities conducted by civil society sector to find out the needs of the 
grassroots. One concern is to ensure that the forums provide equal 
opportunities for all people to participate because many times the same 
faces could be found attending these kinds of events claiming that they are 
representing what the whole community wants.  
 6) Trust and Understanding 
Working together on a basis of non-bias and respect is important. 
Effective communication and negotiation require some degree of trust 
between the parties. Working in these provinces is different from other parts 
of the country because the area of conflict is very sensitive and trust must 
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come first, especially trust between civil society groups and the 
communities. Working with the grassroots takes time and patience. 
Prolonged and deep engagement without the pressure of deadlines for 
legislative proposals or the influence by financial sponsors might work more 
effectively.875 Mixed culture civil society groups should be encouraged by 
the locals because they help people from different backgrounds and 
cultures to understand each other. 
Some civil society groups cannot access the grassroots because 
most people working in the civil society sector are educated and not 
originally from this local area so there is a social gap between them.876 
Furthermore, some local villagers have also experienced some fake civil 
society groups which have taken advantage of the victims. Fake civil society 
groups used victims’ stories again and again to ask for money from aid 
agencies even though those victims had been relieved and had returned to 
normal daily routine. These fake groups did not tell the whole truth and they 
tried to make up some stories to make it more sympathetic for funding 
sources. Some groups gave villagers hopes and promises that they would 
have a chance to go overseas or Bangkok, but those promises have never 
come true.877 As a result of this lack of trust, civil society groups should 
make their purposes clear and show the locals their sincerity. It is, however, 
a time-consuming process to build trust and prove to people their sincerity.  
The relationship between the state and civil society sector is also 
important. Government should believe and trust the local civil society groups 
to propose a solution, allow them to make decisions and manage some 
matters. At the same time, local people should also change their negative 
perceptions about the state and learn to trust government officials. 
7) Financial Sources 
Civil society groups that received funds from external support need 
to be based on thorough analysis and clear objectives otherwise civil society 
groups might be used easily as a tool for the outsiders who want to take 
political advantage of the conflict. Today, a number of civil society groups 
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have been financially supported by international organisations. Although 
these foreign funds seem to offer a huge amount of money and are easy to 
apply for, they could leave this conflict area one day when there is a new 
conflict. Therefore, some civil society groups tend to consider the 
government funding source as a new option because it is a more 
sustainable financial source.  
To avoid being influenced by funding sources, civil society groups 
should not depend on one source and try to rely on their own financial 
sources as much as they could. Also, there are more funding options such 
as getting donations from the public, hosting fundraising events or running 
their own small business for their group’s income. Thus, the civil society 
sector could remain independent from the state and not be influenced by 
any funding sources. 
8) Civil Society Council  
Civil society groups involved in the peacebuilding process should be 
strengthened to help transform them to be able to bond people who have 
different religions and cultures together with sustainable peace. 878  The 
concept of the ‘Civil Society Council’ is not easily achieved as there are 
many differences in civil society groups’ characteristics. Thus, it has been 
suggested that it should begin with a dialogue in a small group called the 
‘Single Identity’.879 This is to bring small groups to talk and find a joint 
direction and then to ask other groups who have different opinions to join 
the next round of talks.  
To encourage civil society to play a direct role in peace negotiation 
processes, they have to cooperate among groups and to strengthen 
themselves so that their requests will be more powerful in negotiations. It is 
interesting that only the same people play key roles in most projects and 
seminars in this region. Therefore, it is also important to ensure that every 
group will have equal rights and roles when they participate in the council.  
The council should consist of civil society groups of various 
backgrounds but only a few civil society groups in the economic category 
have joined the networks so far. Civil society networks should motivate the 
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private and business sectors to get more involved in civil society activities. 
The business sector has the potential to be playing a part in building peace 
in the conflict, but mostly they give their priority to their business and profit. 
The civil society community should show them what would be beneficial for 
their business if the situation in the south goes back to being peaceful. The 
council might include international civil society organisations as consultants 
because it is a good chance to exchange experiences and to widen vision 
for members of local civil society groups.880  
Also, the networks of civil society should be strengthened vertically 
by increasing the capability of members and expanded horizontally by 
growing a number of networks at the same time, or in other words quality 
must come together with quantity.  
9) Based on Knowledge 
 It has been said that Thailand is a rumour driven society. In the 
Muslim community, a tea place is where rumours can grow fast as it is a 
meeting place where Muslim men like to gather. However, civil society 
groups should work based on data, information and knowledge, not feeling 
or rumour. There are a number of civil society groups that are working on 
keeping data and statistics. A lot of research relevant to the southern conflict 
has been produced by academic civil society groups, but they have not been 
fully used. Researchers should try to publicise and propose their works to 
relevant organisations so these studies will be useful for the wider public. 
Therefore, the civil society networks should try to use the inputs from these 
civil society groups as much as they can. Outsiders should understand the 
situation in the southern region based on facts and data from reliable 
sources, not biased sources. 
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9.6 The Future of Civil Society Involved in the Southern Conflict 
Resolution 
 As it was underlined, negotiations alone between the conflicting 
parties are not enough to end the conflict permanently; other relevant actors 
have to be included in the peace process such as civil society groups, 
scholars, the mass media, community leaders and local people. 881 The 
state, as a peacekeeper, can only stop using weapons and reduce the 
violence by formal agreement; however, the prolonged conflict remains in 
the community. The violence could escalate anytime even though an official 
ceasefire was agreed because the root causes (i.e. poverty, feeling 
discriminated and lack of trust in the rule of law) have not yet been resolved. 
In the future, trends in the civil society sector attempting to build peace will 
be varied depending on internal and external factors. The following section 
will discuss what should be kept the same or changed and improved in the 
civil society sector. 
9.6.1 Fixing and Building Tasks 
It seems that the main tasks of civil society groups remain fixing and 
building the society. Fixing tasks mean relief work which includes healing 
both the physical and emotional needs of the victims who were affected by 
the violence. Distributing the donated money and visiting the victims are still 
important roles for civil society groups. Building tasks include activities that 
create a better understanding and reconciliation between those people in a 
diverse society. It is difficult to prove that the decline of violent incidents is 
caused by the efficacy of the civil society network because there are more 
factors and actors involved in the conflict. However, having the civil society 
sector involved in the peacebuilding process is the cheapest method to 
resolve the conflict in a sustainable way.  
Funding sources remain an important variable for the success of the 
civil society sector in building peace in the ethno-religious conflict. As a huge 
amount of funds have been thrown into this region, money has gradually 
changed the way people think. People are more selfish and think of their 
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own benefit first when money is involved. Time will prove which civil society 
groups are genuine because funding sponsors from overseas could 
abandon this area anytime for another place where a new conflict has 
emerged.  
9.6.2 Positive Trends 
Some trends have been seen in the civil society sector that may 
change in a positive way. There is a high possibility that the number of 
registered civil society groups will increase because of the government’s 
encouragement and the advantages for civil society groups. It is easier for 
the state to check and monitor those civil society groups that have 
registered. It also benefits civil society groups as it is more convenient for 
them to apply for funding. It could be argued that government would have 
control over the registered civil society groups. In fact, however, the 
government can only monitor their work by examining their income and 
expenses report while civil society groups remain independent in organising 
their matters. In the researcher’s opinion, having groups registered would 
benefit both parties. The government could get rid of fake civil society 
groups and at the same time civil society groups could gain more benefits 
in funding sources and tax exemption. Moreover, aid agencies could easily 
check for the group’s transparency and trust so as to give their contribution 
to those registered civil society groups. 
Online media and social networks will play a great role in publicising 
civil society’s activities on a wider scope. These online channels will be one 
of the most efficient tools for the civil society network to get more attention 
and cooperation from the public. 
It is interesting to see the business sector gain benefits from the 
unrest in these provinces. A number of seminar series brainstorming for a 
solution to the ethnic conflict have been held widely in the south, mainly in 
the provinces of Pattani and Songkhla. Hotels in Pattani, which is not 
normally a tourist destination, are fully booked by seminar participants. 
Therefore, the hotel business has unexpectedly gained from the conflict. It 
would not be surprising if the hotel business grows faster in this region in 
the future. Although the growth in the hotel business does not directly affect 
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to the conflict solution, it could make the business sector in this area less 
stagnant. They also support peacebuilding work by offering special room 
rates for civil society’s seminars and activities hosted at their hotels. 
9.6.3 New Issues 
Besides the insurgency problem in this area, drug abuse and 
addiction in Muslim youths has become a new problem in these 
provinces.882 It was found that the southern violence is an important factor 
leading youths to drug problems because of the pressure from government 
officials and adults in the village who suspect them of being involved in 
militant groups. 883  Religious teaching has been supported as a tool to 
reduce the volume of this problem.884  
Today, the proportion of Muslim civil society groups is much greater 
than the Buddhist ones. The civil society community of the minority 
Buddhists in the southernmost area should not be overlooked because this 
ignorance might create a new problem in the future.885 People, no matter 
what religion they are, in the conflict area have been affected by the 
violence, but the Buddhists in the area complain that they are overlooked 
by the state. Buddhists in the southernmost provinces felt that the 
government’s policies only focus on providing assistance and relief 
programmes to the Muslims who receive better chances in education, 
career and living. This is a sensitive issue that could create tension among 
Buddhists who are the minority in southernmost provinces. 886  The civil 
society network could play a representative role in raising this issue with the 
government. 
9.6.4 What People in Southern Thailand Expect from Civil Society in 
the Future 
The image of the civil society sector that people would like to see in 
the future is a dynamic one. One of the most important things to prove the 
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civil society group’s sincerity to the community is continued support. The 
future of the civil society sector will be brighter if we can establish the idea 
of citizen awareness and establish a volunteer spirit in the next generation. 
It would be very useful for building peace in this region if more civil society 
groups in the academic category transform their researches into practice. 
So, these researches will not only be kept in a library, but they could be 
used to help to resolve the conflict.887  
It is an ideal to see civil society groups initiated by victims who gather 
to help and protect themselves. If the victims come out for their rights, it will 
be more powerful and provide inspiration to the others.888 Hopefully, the 
grassroots will be able to decide what they really want to happen in their 
homeland which will be the actual benefit for the grassroots, not for the elite 
groups or the leaders of community.  
At the end, the civil society sector should be able to develop their 
status to be one of the stakeholders in the conflict and then lasting peace 
could be achieved by the cooperation of stakeholders. 
 
9.7 Conclusion 
 It was generally agreed that the resolution of ethno-religious conflict 
in southern Thailand should be the responsibility of the whole country; not 
only the government. The state remains acting as the peacekeeper who 
tries to figure out how to stop the violence carried out by insurgent groups. 
However, to achieve positive sustained peace, the civil society sector must 
be involved in the peacebuilding process.  
Most civil society groups normally have more than one role and cover 
various activities. Although the civil society sector in Thailand rarely takes 
part directly in the peace process, and is usually excluded from peace talks, 
they have the power to persuade through peace advocacy and to push the 
idea of a non-violent peaceful solution.889 According to the classified eight 
roles of the civil society sector in the peacebuilding process, the role of the 
                                            
887 Respondents 1 and 17. 
888 Respondent 14. 
889 Iglesias, “The Role,” 8. 
 289 
 
bridge-builder is the most outstanding among groups which are involved in 
building peace in the southern conflict. Its main activities are to reduce the 
tense atmosphere, to improve attitudes and to strengthen relationships 
among conflicting stakeholders including the locals, the state, the outsiders, 
the insurgent groups and international organisations.  
It can be seen that the relationship between people who are involved 
in the conflict is getting better. Civil society networks, government 
authorities and local people have cooperated more on conflict resolution 
matters. More alternatives for creating peace in this region have been raised 
and forbidden issues in the past, like autonomy, today can be widely 
discussed. This is because civil society groups create a good atmosphere 
for informal negotiations. Furthermore, people from different cultures today 
have more interaction because civil society’s activities bring them closer.  
Overall, due to security concerns in an environment of mistrust, the 
civil society sector has proved that it plays a useful but limited role in 
creating a positive environment. This is because their role as bridge-builder 
helps to regain trust among people and other sectors.890 However, it seems 
like the civil society sector can play only a supporting role in the peace 
process and the state, with military measures, is still considered as the most 
important player in resolving the turbulent situation.  
The next chapter will be the final chapter and will include a summary 
of the following topics: the history, background, methodology, main findings 
and key recommendations. 
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CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
10.1 Nature of the Conflict in Southern Thailand  
10.1.1 Background to the Conflict 
The ‘Southern Fire’ is known to the Thais as the ethno-religious 
conflict in the southernmost region of the country that has claimed almost 
4,000 lives since an upsurge in violence in 2004. The near daily attacks 
including ambushes and bombings are ongoing and more than half of the 
deaths are those of innocent people. The minority Malay Muslims, 
geographically concentrated in the three southernmost provinces, are 
divided from other Thais not only by religion but also by broader cultural 
differences. Most Muslims in southern Thailand share the same 
characteristics as Muslims in Malaysia.  
In the past, the southernmost provinces were known as the Malay 
Kingdom of Patani and considered a colony of Siam. Because of Pattani’s 
prosperity from being a centre for trade and also as the centre of Islamic 
religion, it tried to separate itself from Siam. After the signing of the Anglo-
Siamese Treaty in 1909, Pattani became only a province under Thai rule. 
Tension between the Pattani region and the central government in 
Bangkok continued and was intensified after the state attempted to 
modernise the country. The extreme nationalist policies of General 
Phibulsongkhram caused a Patani People’s Movement to be formed to 
resist these policies that were perceived as the state trying to destroy their 
Muslim identity. After the disappearance of the Movement’s leader while 
under police custody in 1954, and because of the continuation of the 
assimilation policies, three major separatist groups were established: 
namely, the Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP, 1959), Barisan 
Revolusi Nasional (BRN, 1963) and the Patani United Liberation 
Organization (PULO, 1968). These groups were called separatist groups 
because their commitments initially were to establishing an independent 
Islamic state. However, it seems the objectives of the insurgent groups 
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today have changed to those of autonomy and justice rather than 
independence. 
From the early 1980s to the end of the 1990s, violence in the 
southern region declined dramatically. It was mostly because the new 
government’s approach, which emphasised public participation as well as 
social and economic development rather than a purely military strategy, was 
effective in reducing the violence. 
The violence in the deep south escalated dramatically after Thaksin 
Shinawatra became Prime Minister. His hardline security approaches and 
administration policies were widely criticised. The degree of violence in 
2004 rose and there was a sudden upsurge of violence in these provinces.  
Since the return of violence in 2004, the forms in which it has 
occurred have changed depending on the tactics of the government and the 
insurgent groups. At the beginning, from 2004 to mid-2007, a rapidly 
escalating wave of insurgent attacks were fuelled by the brutal incidents of 
the Krue Se Mosque and Tak Bai massacres. The government handled the 
conflict by using aggressive counterinsurgency measures. The national 
policies concerning the violence in the deep south depended on the 
government’s leaders and overall circumstances during that time. After the 
heavy-handed measures used by Thaksin’s government, later governments 
have seemed to handle the conflict in a more compromising manner. 
However, some governments did not put in any efforts to improve the violent 
situation in these provinces because they had other more urgent issues to 
deal with, for example, the downturn in the economy, political crises and 
natural disasters.  
The conflict has now moved to a new phase after formal peace 
dialogues were set up between the representatives of the Thai government 
and the BRN group in February 2013: the first ever official peace talks. This 
new phase of the conflict is being impacted by two new factors which are 
major tactical changes on both sides. The first is the influence of the official 
peace talks. The second is the growing government counterinsurgency 
measures, especially in intelligence operations. The violence is now 
becoming increasingly close-fought with a sharp rise in combatant 
casualties on both the state’s and militant groups’ sides. 
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10.1.2 Possible Causes of the Conflict in Southern Thailand 
In order to resolve the conflict, the root causes must be identified first. 
As described in Chapter 4, the ethno-religious conflict in southern Thailand 
has multiple causes including historical concerns, economic 
marginalisation, political issues, social and cultural differences, educational 
opportunity inequities and judicial discrimination.  
First, the distorted political history between Siam and the Kingdom of 
Patani created prejudice among Muslims in the south and was used to 
mobilise their sentiment against the state.  
The second factor is economic inequality as these three provinces 
are among the least developed in the country. Disparities between the 
centre and the rural areas have resulted in economic underdevelopment in 
the deep south. The government has failed to respond to the local people’s 
needs because most public policies are decided by the central government 
without participation from the local people. In addition, there are several 
reasons for constant poverty in the region such as the high birth rate and 
the lack of education.  
Thirdly, the failure of the government in handling the insurgent 
problem includes dissolving the key state authorities in the region. 
Moreover, having short-term governments makes it difficult to produce 
tangible outcomes.  
Fourthly, social and cultural differences can cause tensions. As 
Muslim identity in the south is different from the rest of the country, local 
people in the region feel very much connected with those in Malaysia 
because they share more similarities. Furthermore, the deep south also has 
a reputation as having a high crime rate and other forms of illegitimate 
business.  
The fifth cause is an educational one. Ponohs, which provide both 
religious and academic teachings, were seen a threat to national security 
as they could be breeding grounds for potential radical Muslims. Moreover, 
because of a syllabus imbalance, only a few graduates from ponohs are 
able to further their studies in a higher institution.  
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Finally, the problem of injustice is one factor which stimulates the 
conflict in the south. Due to the state’s lack of understanding and 
acceptance of cultural differences, local people do not trust government 
officials, have no faith in the justice system and do not rely on the national 
justice process.  
There are many conflicting views about the causes of the conflict, but 
it has never been confirmed what the real reason behind the violence is. All 
the above factors contribute to local discontent and tension in ethnic 
relations. However, the researcher believes that the root cause of the 
conflict is the disparity between the Muslims in the south and the majority of 
the country. Muslims have always thought that they are ignored by the 
central government. They consider themselves to be regarded as second-
class citizens in the country by everybody else.  
 
10.2 Theoretical Review and Methodology  
10.2.1 Purposes and Process 
As a civilian living in southern Thailand, the researcher has realised 
that it is the whole country’s responsibility to help find potential solutions to 
the conflict. As the civil society sector dealing with the southern conflict has 
grown quickly since the new round of violence, it will be useful if there is 
research into how the civil society sector can get involved in the 
peacebuilding process. This research has aimed to promote the civil society 
sector as a tool of a non-violent approach which could help building a 
sustained peace in these provinces; to study the role of the civil society 
sector in building peace in the southernmost provinces; and to strengthen 
civil society groups attempting to build peace in this region. 
In Chapter 3, it was outlined how this research used the qualitative 
method by employing in-depth interviews and documentary research. The 
thesis used both primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected 
through person-to-person interviews with the leaders or representatives of 
civil society groups in Thailand. The interview was a non-random sampling 
procedure using purposive sampling. Twenty-nine civil society groups were 
selected as research samples, mostly based in the southern provinces. 
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These groups were classified into eleven categories: natural resources 
issues, human rights, media, academic, religion and culture, economic, 
public health, women, youth, multi-purpose and government agencies.  
 The questions used in the interviews were classified into four main 
areas: the characteristics of civil society groups involved in attempting to 
build peace in ethno-religious conflict in Southern Thailand; the roles of civil 
society groups; the efficacy of civil society groups in building peace in the 
conflict; and difficulties and recommendations. 
 As noted in Chapter 3, this research adapted some techniques from 
grounded theory and mind mapping as approaches to analyse data from the 
interviews. The SWOT Analysis was used to evaluate the effectiveness of 
civil society groups. The main concept of SWOT Analysis is to study both 
the internal and external factors that affect civil society groups. The 7S 
Model was used as a framework to analyse internal factors while external 
factors were assessed by the PEST Analysis. 
10.2.2 Lessons from Ethno-religious Conflicts and the Role of Civil 
Society in South and Southeast Asia  
Many countries in South and Southeast Asia have faced an internal 
conflict since the colonial period. The problems caused by ethnicity and 
religion remain the important causes of ongoing conflicts, for example, the 
Assam conflict in India, the Mindanao conflict in the Philippines and the hill 
tribe conflicts in Myanmar as well as former conflicts such as the Eelam war 
in Sri Lanka and the Aceh conflict in Indonesia. While some countries share 
common characteristics and patterns of conflict, each case, however, has 
its own distinct history and unique causes. Although Thailand is the only 
country in this region that has never been colonised, nevertheless, 
colonialism still affected the country. The Treaty signed by Siam and the 
British created discontent among Muslims in the south who became a 
minority of the country instead of joining the Muslim-majority neighbouring 
country.  
Chapter 5 also discussed the role of the civil society sector in these 
cases of conflict. Although it is difficult for civil society actors to get involved 
in an official peace process, they have played a significant role in creating 
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a better atmosphere for peacebuilding. The main role of civil society groups 
in these countries is secretarial or supporting tasks which include, for 
example, providing popular support for peace, promoting negotiation and 
reconciliation between conflicting parties, creating links at the local level 
between different ethnic communities and monitoring a ceasefire process. 
Therefore, involvement of the civil society sector is very important to create 
and maintain peace in this problematic region.  
10.2.3 Why the Civil Society Sector is Important in Building Peace 
According to the scholars described in Chapter 2, the civil society 
sector plays a significant role in building peace and peace has various 
aspects and meanings. Relevant actors in the conflict can be various, but 
each one plays a different part in the conflict resolution. It was accepted 
widely that civil society’s involvement can create a lasting peace in the 
conflict area, for example, the Peace-building Model by Ryan and Third-
party Strategies in conflict transformation by Reimann. 
Chapter 4 discussed matters concerning government policies related 
to the southern conflict from 1938 to 2013. It was found that the government 
policies focused mainly on security issues, especially increasing troop 
strength, implementing laws and reorganising the government agencies. 
These policies could reduce the violence for some time, but the tensions 
remain and the root causes of the conflict have still not been resolved. This 
chapter has shown that the government’s policy alone could not resolve the 
problem. Thus, civil society actors are needed to be involved in building 
peace in the region. 
The concept of peace was described in Chapter 6 as having two 
different scopes and meanings. The state plays the most important role to 
achieve a negative peace which is to stop direct physical violence and to 
sign a ceasefire agreement. Nevertheless, to create a positive peace, which 
means achieving sustainable peace in society, it is the civil society sector 
that plays a vital role in creating a culture of peace and increasing social 
justice in the conflict area. Where states have failed in handling the conflict, 
the civil society sector was seen as a necessary party for reducing the 
violence and creating peace in the long-term. Moreover, the aim of 
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international diplomacy is no longer only to settle disputes, but also to 
prevent future conflict through transforming and improving attitudes in 
societies. Therefore, some peace strategies have been developed to 
enhance the participation of civil society in solving conflicts.  
Based on the researcher’s experience and an analysis of researches 
concerning civil society’s roles in building peace in Chapter 6, eight roles of 
civil society were determined including that of being security protector, 
representative, bridge-builder, relief worker, monitoring observer, 
academic, public communicator and peace-builder. These roles can be 
used to analyse the contributions of civil society in building peace in the 
three southernmost provinces.  
10.2.4 Civil Society’s Involvement in Building Peace in the Southern 
Conflict 
 According to the fieldwork, those civil society groups involved in 
attempting to build peace in the conflict have different characteristics. The 
general overview of civil society groups was examined in Chapter 8.  
 The main purposes of civil society groups in this area were changed 
after an upsurge in violence. In the past, civil society groups in the south 
had similar aims to other groups in the rest of the country which was to 
improve the general social well-being and the local economy. Until 2004, 
many existing civil society groups shifted their roles and new civil society 
groups were formed with aims concerning the conflict.  
 There are not many key persons from civil society networks who play 
significant roles in this region. Many of them are from academic networks 
and one person could be involved in one or more civil society groups. Not 
surprisingly, most civil society groups in the deep south were formed by 
Muslims as they are the majority in this region. There are both full-time staff 
and volunteers working in the civil society groups. Those who work for civil 
society groups in the deep south are mostly volunteers who already have 
full-time jobs. The size of civil society networks have expanded. One of the 
reasons is that most civil society groups are normally open to all who are 
interested in their goals and activities and do not have membership 
requirements. Moreover, many civil society groups have their offices located 
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in the town area which makes it easy to connect to and communicate with 
the community. 
 Although the state has encouraged civil society groups to register 
with the government agencies, only 15 per cent have been registered as 
foundations or associations. Many civil society groups have tried to upgrade 
from casual networks into registered organisations. Unfortunately, many of 
them have some difficulties in reaching the government’s requirements for 
registration. Civil society groups are poor in evaluation and getting feedback 
from the local population. It seems they are concerned more with process 
than the outcome. The good thing is that most civil society groups have 
simple and flexible structures which make them suitable for application in 
uncertain circumstances. Difficulties in finding financial support are not a 
concern for civil society groups and they normally receive funds from more 
than one source. Various funding sources are available for civil society 
groups, such as the state, international organisations, the community, 
donations, their own members, and private business groups. The major 
financial support for civil society groups in the south comes from 
international organisations.  
 Cooperation between civil society groups and other sectors is 
important for their group’s success. Local people respond to activities 
hosted by civil society groups quite well because most projects were based 
on the locals’ needs. Some civil society groups were good at cooperating 
with each other while some saw other groups as competitors for funding. 
The relations between civil society groups and state are various. While 
some civil society groups were supported by the government, some saw 
other groups as opposition. For the private sector, cooperation between the 
business sector and the civil society sector is very rare. The only activity 
that the business sector is involved in is giving donations or financial 
support. Relations with international organisations occur in many ways, for 
example, as funding sources, or for exchanging knowledge and sharing 
data.  
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10.3 Main Findings 
10.3.1 Role of the Civil Society Sector  
According to the fieldwork, and an analysis of it, the three most 
significant roles that civil society groups are playing in attempting to build 
peace in the conflict are those of bridge-builder, academic and relief worker. 
Civil society groups often play more than one role and the basic role 
of the bridge-builder is the one which most groups in the south are playing. 
To fill the gap of the differences in religion, culture, identity and ways of life, 
civil society groups can act as a bridge which will bring government and 
local people in the deep south closer to one another. As people are afraid 
of becoming a target of the state or militant groups, the civil society groups 
which act as bridge-builders have created better understanding and 
strengthened trust among the conflicting parties. Today, one of the 
significant successful efforts of civil society groups is creating a safe 
common space for relevant parties to communicate and share their ideas 
independently. Civil society networks have become a channel for people to 
share their ideas and work together for their community.  
Scholars in academic institutions in this region play a leading role in 
brainstorming for potential solutions from other scholars who are experts in 
Peace Studies in Thailand and also from those overseas. Moreover, this 
role aims to help promote non-violent solutions giving greater knowledge 
about Peace Studies and doing further research concerning conflict 
resolution. A number of researches have offered some alternative political 
solutions for the deep south conflict. As a result of the strong academic 
networks in the civil society sector, the autonomy solution (once banned by 
the government) is now widely acceptable to be discussed in public. The 
ideas which are supported by knowledge and academic data are stronger 
than the solution based on feelings or opinions from some parties. 
Furthermore, this academic role covers work that targets the young 
generation by helping to promote the growth of the volunteering spirit in 
children and youth who are seen as the key actors to keep a lasting peace 
in this region. 
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According to the interviews, it was found that there are a number of 
civil society groups carrying out the role of relief worker. To provide urgent 
assistance to the victims of violence, this task of civil society groups is 
necessary, especially when the state fails to fulfil its duty. Moreover, to get 
assistance from the government usually takes a longer time and has more 
procedure. The main tasks of relief workers are to visit people injured 
because of the violence and to distribute money to those victims and their 
families. The long-term projects, such as training these victims for careers 
or providing accommodation, have also been launched as giving money is 
not a sustainable solution. Furthermore, the civil society groups are aware 
of the need to heal the minds of the victims by providing moral support and 
psychological consultation. As relief work is not a complicated task and is 
able to get funded easily, this role seems very popular among the civil 
society groups that deal with the southern conflict. Relief work was, 
however, seen as an easy opportunity for some fake civil society groups to 
take the benefits and to use these for themselves.  
10.3.2 Efficacy of the Civil Society Sector 
As discussed in Chapter 9, the status of the civil society sector 
dealing with the conflict in the deep south has the potential to grow as it has 
a number of strong internal factors and many opportunities that can increase 
capabilities and help the groups to perform better. Civil society groups in the 
south have created two strengths of ‘Shared values’ including a common 
space and diversity. They have a flexible ‘Structure’ and effective ‘System’ 
including a comprehensive database and healthy financial status. The 
significant strength of civil society today is also its unique ‘Style’ of 
leadership.  
In terms of the external opportunities, which concern the ‘Political’ 
element, civil society groups have been encouraged well by the 
government. The ‘Economic’ factor provides a good opportunity for funding, 
especially financial support by international agencies. The locals, as part of 
the ‘Social’ element, are keen to participate in their projects and to share 
experiences. Finally, the ‘Technological’ element also offers various 
channels to enhance their groups’ communication. 
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Interestingly, the government factor became an important variable for 
the civil society sector because it can be considered as both advantageous 
and disadvantageous depending on the circumstances and perspectives of 
each civil society group. Some civil society groups view government as an 
opportunity for sustainable funding sources while other groups have never 
relied on the state or even see it as a threat. 
Although the civil society sector has many strong factors that are 
advantageous, there are some weaknesses that cause concern.  
10.3.3 Difficulties Faced by the Civil Society Sector  
According to the discussion in Chapter 9, there are a number of 
weaknesses and threats that the civil society sector faces. There are four 
problems, including human resources, time management, influence from 
funding sources, and political and safety issues, which this researcher has 
identified as being important and which can have a serious impact on the 
civil society sector. This is because these factors are the elements that keep 
the civil society groups going. Without staff, time, money and a safe 
environment, any kind of work cannot be done. External factors, political 
and economic elements, were considered important as they are difficult to 
control and have considerable influence on the work of civil society. 
The issues concerning human resources are the qualifications of the 
staff, the need for more specialists and the skills of the people who work in 
this sector. Also, language is a barrier in communication between the locals 
and civil society groups. As a huge amount of money has been distributed 
in this region, money has gradually turned people who work in the civil 
society sector from working based on a volunteering spirit to being money-
centred. When money is involved, people became more selfish and think of 
their own benefit first. 
Another obstacle for civil society is lack of time. Time management 
is a problem for many groups because staff normally have full-time work. It 
is a struggle for them to manage and dedicate time for volunteering work. 
Arranging time for group meetings and attending conferences which may 
be useful for their groups are also difficult.  
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Financial support is important for the success of the civil society 
sector in building peace in the ethno-religious conflict and this issue has 
resulted in various problems. Many of the civil society groups in this region 
are financially sponsored by international organisations. These kinds of 
funds are normally only for a short-term and are not sustainable. Although 
it is not difficult for civil society groups to find sponsorship, the flow of funds 
may be a problem. The civil society sector should be independent for what 
they aim to do, but in reality most groups depend on funding sources. A 
huge amount of funding money has caused conflict among people in the 
civil society networks because they were competing for sponsorship.   
The political factor has a strong impact on civil society’s activities. 
The unstable political situation in Thailand makes it difficult for civil society 
to run their projects continuously. This is because each incoming 
government has a different focus in its policy and a new leader has his/her 
own style to deal with the problem of insurgency. The issue of personal 
safety is another problem. This safety issue obstructs the locals from 
participating in civil society networks as they fear for their life and the safety 
of their property from being targeted by insurgent groups.  
10.3.4 To Improve the Performance of the Civil Society Sector 
 According to the results of internal and external analyses of the civil 
society sector, there are some recommendations to improve civil society’s 
activities, as discussed in Chapter 9. The three key recommendations that 
can help to enhance the performance of civil society groups that the 
researcher considers to be the most important are trust, understanding the 
needs of the locals, and strategy. 
Working in the area of conflict is very sensitive and requires some 
degree of trust between the relevant parties, for example, government, state 
officials, civil society groups and local communities. Thus, time, patience 
and deep engagement are needed for civil society to work with local people 
in a conflict area. Civil society should play a role in making Muslims in the 
south change their negative perception about the state and learn to trust 
government agencies. At the same time, the government should try to offer 
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opportunities for the civil society groups to share their opinions, and to allow 
them to make decisions and to manage some matters. 
Civil society groups should work based on a bottom-up approach 
depending on the needs of the local people. They should try to find out what 
the actual needs of people in the region are in order to fulfill the locals’ needs 
better than following a plan that comes from the central government. Ideally, 
civil society groups should be initiated and formed by the locals who are 
aware of their citizenship and being a part of society. Moreover, civil society 
networks should try to make people understand their roles and how to be 
involved in civil society’s activities. 
Today, the conflict is dynamic and there are many factors affecting 
the performances of civil society groups. Therefore, civil society groups 
should clearly identify their visions, objectives and plans for achieving their 
goals. While some factors are controllable, many are not. To ensure the 
group is aiming in the right direction, having a strategic plan is a useful idea. 
It is a good opportunity for the groups to assess their internal and 
circumstantial factors which can be advantageous or disadvantageous. 
Then, a suitable working plan can be determined in order to help the groups 
to survive in dynamic circumstances and to achieve their goals.  
10.3.5 Other Findings 
According to the fieldwork, there are some points that are not related 
directly to the role of civil society in building peace in the conflict, but the 
researcher found them interesting and they could be useful for further study. 
As drugs have been a problem in Thai society for a long time, there 
is no doubt that the southern provinces are facing the same problem. 
Besides the problem of insurgency in this area, many respondents 
mentioned that drug abuse and addiction among Muslim youths have 
become a new area of concern in this region. Religious teachings have been 
supported to be used as a tool to reduce the volume of this problem. 
However, the government should not overlook this problem which may be 
linked to the insurgent operations. 
Interestingly, the hotel business and civil society groups supported 
each other during the conflict. The hotel business gained from the seminars 
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and conferences on possible the conflict solutions while civil society groups 
were offered special deals for their peacebuilding activities. 
  
10.4 Recommendations for Further Study 
The ethno-religious conflict in the southernmost provinces is a 
prolonged conflict which seems difficult to resolve. Therefore, this conflict 
has been of concern to many Thais. The violence is ongoing even though 
each government has attempted to end the insurgent operation in this area. 
There is, however, not much research about the civil society sector and its 
relation to the conflict in southern Thailand. 891  Researchers may be 
interested to choose to study one particular category of a civil society group 
concerning their activities and how they are involved in creating peace in 
this area. 
Funding is a complicated variable for civil society groups in the south. 
Funding can be considered to be both an opportunity and a threat, as was 
noted in Chapter 9. One area for further study would be the influence of 
funding sources on the civil society sector in attempting to build peace in 
the conflict in these provinces. 
Most people want to see greater cooperation among civil society 
groups in building peace in the conflict in these regions. This is because it 
was believed that the wider networks can create a better change. One 
respondent questioned if it is true that the whole is more than the sum of its 
parts?892 It will need further research to answer this question.  
Another area recommended for further study is about the layers of 
the civil society sector. Since the upsurge in violence, there are many 
groups that want to be involved in conflict resolution. Civil society groups 
have divided themselves in the community by social class, education or 
region. These factors have widened the gap between the civil society sector 
and the grassroots.  
                                            
891 Chaiwat Satha-Anand, ed., Imagined Land? The State and Southern Violence in 
Thailand (Tokyo: Sanrei Printing Co. Ltd., 2009), 45. 
892 Respondent 6. 
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Further studies focusing on the possibility of bringing political 
solutions into practice, and which model is the most suitable for Thailand 
are recommended. Civil society networks have been active in mobilising 
wide-ranging debates on some forms of the special administrative 
arrangement, or regional autonomy, which have included proposals for 
various models of new governance in the south; for example, the concept 
of ‘The Monthon’893 by Prawase Wasi and the model of ‘Southern Border 
Provinces Development Administration Bureau (SBPDAB)’894 by Srisompob 
Jitpiromsri.  
 
10.5 Conclusion  
First of all, it should be clear that religious and cultural insensitivity 
has contributed to the conflict, but the conflict is not between the Buddhist 
Thais and the Muslim-Malays in the deep south. In fact, the tension and 
resentment of people in the south was caused by the disparity of 
opportunities provided by central government. However, the local people 
only want to have a peaceful and better quality of life. The actual cause of 
violence is from some groups of radical Muslim-Malay elite leaders who are 
politically, ethnically and culturally conscious.  
As far as a framework for conflict resolution is concerned, the Thai 
state has put a great effort in to increasing the number of military and police 
forces in the conflict area to stop the violence urgently which is a 
‘peacekeeping’ strategy. However, the deployment of security forces cannot 
stop the violence in these provinces and may only obtain a negative peace. 
Another strategy used was ‘peacemaking’ which includes political activities. 
An official peace dialogue between the Thai state and an insurgent group 
held early in 2013 was a good start for the peacemaking strategy.895 The 
                                            
893 Duncan McCargo, “Autonomy for Southern Thailand: Thinking the Unthinkable?,” 
Pacific Affairs 83, no. 2 (June 2010): 270. 
894 Ibid., 273. 
895 The 2014 Coup led by the Royal Thai Army, on 22 May affected the peace dialogue 
undeniably. Under the new regime, a slightly different approach to the peace talks has 
been undertaken. Key persons in the peace talks have been replaced by a new 
delegation from ISOC. This will be better in the long-term because the peace talks will not 
be affected by the political uncertainty as the main actors involved in the peace talks are 
under the Royal Thai Army, not the government. Source: Isra News Agency, “The Future 
 306 
 
civil society sector has helped contribute to peacemaking in observing and 
monitoring although its role was very limited. However, negative attitudes 
among local people remain in the community. These strategies could be 
used together with ‘peacebuilding’ which will help keep the balance of socio-
economic structures. This strategy aims to prevent violence from happening 
again and to create a sustained positive peace. In Thailand’s case, the 
violence is ongoing, although the civil society sector, a main actor in 
peacebuilding, has played its role in helping ameliorate the conditions which 
sustain the conflict since the upsurge in violence in 2004. 
This research has proved that the civil society sector plays various 
useful roles in attempting to create peace in the south. However, its role 
currently remains limited as the civil society actors cannot have an influence 
on or lead to a change in the Thai government’s tactics. Together with other 
actors, the civil society sector can be an important part of the solution to 
reduce the violence and even play a more useful role in building lasting 
positive peace in southernmost Thailand when the violence eventually 
stops.  
 
                                            
of Peace Dialogues after the Coup,” 25 May 2014, http://www.isranews.org/south-news/ 
scoop/item/29753-isoc_29753.html (accessed 9 June 2014). [in Thai]. 
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Appendix A 
Map of South and Southeast Asian Region 
 
Source: One World – Nations Online, http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map_of_southeast_asia.htm (accessed 4 April 2014). 
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Appendix B 
Map of Thailand’s Regions 
 
Source: Thailand for Visitors, http://thailandforvisitors.com/general/regions.html#north 
(accessed 4 April 2014).  
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Appendix C 
Map of Southern Border Provinces 
 
 
Source: Report of the National Reconciliation Commission, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/thailand0807/1.htm (accessed 4 April 2014). 
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Appendix D 
Interview Guide  
The in-depth interview will begin with an introduction about the 
research and the researcher’s background. Then, the interview will proceed 
covering the following topics: 
 
I. Background information  
1. When was your group established?  
2. What are your group’s main purposes?  
3. Who are the founders?  
4. Who are your target groups / does your group work for?   
5. How many members were there when your group was first established 
and how many members are there today? 
6. Who are eligible to be your group members?  
 
II. Administration and funding source  
1. What is your group structure like?  
2. From which sources does your group receive funds?  
3. Do you find it difficult to find financial support?  
4. How do you evaluate your performance and who do you report to? 
How often?  
5. Do your staff work full-time or do they have other sources of income?  
 
III. Activities  
1. What are your main activities / projects?  
2. How is your group able to solve the problem in the south?  
3. Why would you say that your group is a part of the civil society 
sector?  
4. How much participation from the community does your group get?  
5. How does your group persuade the community to be involved in the 
activities hosted by your group?  
6. Do you have any group networks?  
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7. Do you find your group work to be more efficient or more difficult 
when you have to cooperate with other civil society groups?  
8. Do you find your group work to be more efficient or more difficult 
when you have to cooperate with government agencies?  
9. Do you find your group work to be more efficient or more difficult 
when you have to cooperate with the private sector?  
10. Does your group have any difficulties to achieve your goal? If yes, 
what are they? And how do you solve those problems?  
11. How much do you score your group’s performance out of a scale of 
ten?  
12. Do you have any suggestions what should be done to improve your 
group’s performance? 
 
IV. Opinions 
1. Do you agree that it has been said that heavy-handed measures 
cannot solve the problems in the south? Why?  
2. What does a soft measure mean to you?  
3. In general, how can civil society groups resolve the conflict?  
4. Overall, what is the most important role that you think civil society 
groups are now playing?  
5. Do you have any suggestions that can improve civil society groups’ 
performance?  
6. What do you think the community is hoping to get from civil society 
groups?  
 
V. Closing comments / additional information  
 Do you have anything else to share concerning the role of civil 
society in resolving the problem in the south?  
 Do you think any changes should be made that may help the next 
interview to be more efficient? 
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